淨名玄論 6.11

6.11

問：先有體成，後待竟復得長短名成。以先有體成、未有名成，故須相待，免不待之過。以相待但有名始成，而體不更成，無重成之咎。答：若相待但有名成而體不成者，則相待一假，唯名待耳。體明非相待假耶？然名與體還復相待，即一切皆待一切皆成也。問：先長短成而後待，有此過。先待而後成，有何咎耶？答：本將長成待短耳，先未待短。既生無長，將何待短耶？若將長待短者，還墮先成後待，亦非先後成。今有長短即有待，有待即有長短，一時故，無上二過。問：若爾者，長物不待短時，為有此物以不？若有此物，則是不待而有，同先成之失。若不待時，無有此物，同先待之過。若言雖有此物，未待短時不可名其長短。若爾，則還同未待時有物體，體待得名。雖欲一時，不免三失責山門。問：汝先云無有可有，由無故有；無無可無，由有故無。他有有可有、有無可無，此是先成而後待。今無有可有，由無故有，豈非先待而後成耶？答：今對上有有可有，故明無有可耳。非是未待之時未成，待竟方成。亦非先有成竟，然後待也。故是因緣相待，不可以有無二門責其定性。問：雖有此言，未具共相。請為述之。答：且據長短。短不自短，持長故短，非是先成後待故。短既不自短，短亦非他短，故非先待而後成。若有短體復因長，即是自他共短，此短便有兩過。若有短體，則墮先成後待過。若由他短，則墮先待後成過。是故非自他共短。短不自短，復不由他，則非無因有短。今明短名長短，豈可無因。問：既不得四句，亦不得相待。答：《大經》破自他共無因四句竟，答迦葉云：唯得名為從因得成。今亦爾，唯得名因緣待如幻化物。寧可定責其所由耶？

Question: First, the entities are established, and later, through dependence, the names 'long' and 'short' are established. Because the entities are established first while the names are not yet established, mutual dependence is necessary, thereby avoiding the fault of non-dependence. Since only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not established anew, there is no error of redundant establishment. Answer: If only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not, then the single provisionality of mutual dependence would only be a dependence of names. Could it be clear that the entities are not provisionalities of mutual dependence? However, names and entities depend on each other, which means everything depends and everything is established. Question: There is this fault if long and short are established first and depend later. What fault is there if they depend first and are established later? Answer: Originally, one takes the established 'long' to depend on 'short'. Before depending on 'short', there is as yet no 'long'; what would one take to depend on 'short'? If one takes 'long' to depend on 'short', one falls back into establishing first and depending later; nor is it established sequentially. If now there is long and short, there is dependence; if there is dependence, there is long and short—because they are simultaneous, there are not the two faults above. Question: If so, when a long object does not depend on a short one, does this object exist or not? If this object exists, it exists without dependence, sharing the fault of being established first. If this object does not exist when not depending, it shares the fault of depending first. If you say that although this object exists, it cannot be called 'long' or 'short' before depending on a short one, then this is still the same as an entity existing before dependence, with the entity depending to obtain a name. Although you desire simultaneity, you do not escape the three faults. Question: You previously said that there is no existence to be existed, but it exists due to non-existence; there is no non-existence to be non-existed, but it is non-existent due to existence. Others hold that there is an existence to be existed and a non-existence to be non-existed, which is establishing first and depending later. Now, since there is no existence to be existed and it exists due to non-existence, is this not depending first and establishing later? Answer: We now explain that there is no existence to be existed merely to counter the position of having an existence to be existed. It is not that it is unestablished before depending and only established after depending, nor is it that it is established first and depends later. Therefore, it is dependent origination and mutual dependence; one cannot interrogate its svabhāva through the two approaches of existence and non-existence. Question: Although you say this, the universal characteristic is not yet complete. Please explain it. Answer: Take long and short for instance. Short is not short of itself; it is short because of long, so it is not established first and dependent later. Since short is not short of itself, nor is short short through other, it does not depend first and become established later. If there were an entity of short that again depended on long, that would be short through both self and other, and this short would have two faults: if there were an entity of short, it would fall into the fault of establishing first and depending later; if it were short through other, it would fall into the fault of depending first and establishing later. Therefore, it is not short through self, other, or both. Short is not short of itself, nor does it arise from other, so it is not that there is short without cause. Now we explain that the name 'short' is long and short—how could it be without cause? Question: Since the catuṣkoṭi cannot be obtained, mutual dependence cannot be obtained either. Answer: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, having refuted the catuṣkoṭi of self, other, both, and causeless, answered Kāśyapa: 'It can only be named as being established through causes.' The same is true here: it can only be named mutual dependence through causes and conditions, like an illusory creation. How could one determine its source with certainty?