淨名玄論 6.11

6.11

Question: First, the entities are established, and later, through dependence, the names 'long' and 'short' are established. Because the entities are established first while the names are not yet established, mutual dependence is necessary, thereby avoiding the fault of non-dependence. Since only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not established anew, there is no error of redundant establishment. Answer: If only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not, then the single provisionality of mutual dependence would only be a dependence of names. Could it be clear that the entities are not provisionalities of mutual dependence? However, names and entities depend on each other, which means everything depends and everything is established. Question: There is this fault if long and short are established first and depend later. What fault is there if they depend first and are established later? Answer: Originally, one takes the established 'long' to depend on 'short'. Before depending on 'short', there is as yet no 'long'; what would one take to depend on 'short'? If one takes 'long' to depend on 'short', one falls back into establishing first and depending later; nor is it established sequentially. If now there is long and short, there is dependence; if there is dependence, there is long and short—because they are simultaneous, there are not the two faults above. Question: If so, when a long object does not depend on a short one, does this object exist or not? If this object exists, it exists without dependence, sharing the fault of being established first. If this object does not exist when not depending, it shares the fault of depending first. If you say that although this object exists, it cannot be called 'long' or 'short' before depending on a short one, then this is still the same as an entity existing before dependence, with the entity depending to obtain a name. Although you desire simultaneity, you do not escape the three faults. Question: You previously said that there is no existence to be existed, but it exists due to non-existence; there is no non-existence to be non-existed, but it is non-existent due to existence. Others hold that there is an existence to be existed and a non-existence to be non-existed, which is establishing first and depending later. Now, since there is no existence to be existed and it exists due to non-existence, is this not depending first and establishing later? Answer: We now explain that there is no existence to be existed merely to counter the position of having an existence to be existed. It is not that it is unestablished before depending and only established after depending, nor is it that it is established first and depends later. Therefore, it is dependent origination and mutual dependence; one cannot interrogate its svabhāva through the two approaches of existence and non-existence. Question: Although you say this, the universal characteristic is not yet complete. Please explain it. Answer: Take long and short for instance. Short is not short of itself; it is short because of long, so it is not established first and dependent later. Since short is not short of itself, nor is short short through other, it does not depend first and become established later. If there were an entity of short that again depended on long, that would be short through both self and other, and this short would have two faults: if there were an entity of short, it would fall into the fault of establishing first and depending later; if it were short through other, it would fall into the fault of depending first and establishing later. Therefore, it is not short through self, other, or both. Short is not short of itself, nor does it arise from other, so it is not that there is short without cause. Now we explain that the name 'short' is long and short—how could it be without cause? Question: Since the catuṣkoṭi cannot be obtained, mutual dependence cannot be obtained either. Answer: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, having refuted the catuṣkoṭi of self, other, both, and causeless, answered Kāśyapa: 'It can only be named as being established through causes.' The same is true here: it can only be named mutual dependence through causes and conditions, like an illusory creation. How could one determine its source with certainty?