淨名玄論 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

5.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Huijizang of Huiri Monastery

5.2

Section on Object and Cognition According to the Three Treatises

Cognition does not arise in isolation; it must be brought forth by an object. Therefore the object is the root of cognition. The object does not stand independently; it receives its designation on account of cognition. Therefore cognition is the root of the object. Without the object, there would be nothing to bring forth cognition; without cognition, there would be nothing to illuminate the object. Because without the object there is nothing to bring forth cognition, the object is that which can bring forth, and cognition is that which is brought forth. Because without cognition there is nothing to illuminate the object, cognition is that which can illuminate, and the object is that which is illuminated. Since the object is that which can bring forth and is illuminated by cognition, the object's being that which can [bring forth] constitutes the object of cognition. Since cognition is that which can illuminate and is brought forth by the object, cognition's being that which can [illuminate] constitutes the object of the object. That which is illuminated by the object can bring forth cognition; therefore that which the object [illuminates] is cognition's capacity. That which is brought forth by cognition can illuminate the object; therefore that which cognition [brings forth] is the object's capacity. One cannot say that the object is prior and cognition is posterior, nor that cognition is prior and the object posterior, nor that they are simultaneous; they can only be named conditioned object and cognition.

5.4

Question: What is taken as the object that can bring forth cognition? Answer: The Tathāgata always preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths; therefore the two truths are called the teaching. Because they can generate the two cognitions, the two truths are called the object. Dharma Master Tanying of the Guanzhong region commented on the Madhyamaka-śāstra, having personally received Master [Kumāra]jīva's spoken intent. Master [Kumāra]jīva said: 'Those who will transmit my work—are they not entrusted to Daorong, Tanying, and Sengrui!' Master [Tan]ying's preface on the two truths says: 'Because of paramārtha-satya, there is no existence; because of saṃvṛti-satya, there is no nonexistence. Because it is ultimate, there is no existence, yet though nonexistent it exists; because it is conventional, there is no nonexistence, yet though existent it is nonexistent. Though nonexistent it exists, not stagnating in nonexistence; though existent it is nonexistent, not encumbered by existence. Not stagnating in nonexistence, the view of annihilation is extinguished; not encumbered by existence, attachment to permanence melts like ice. When all such extremes are stilled, it is called the middle.' Examining this meaning: because it is ultimate there is no existence, yet though nonexistent it exists—this is precisely establishing all dharmas without moving from the true limit. Because it is conventional there is no nonexistence, yet though existent it is nonexistent—this is precisely preaching dharmatā without destroying conventional designations. Because dharmatā is preached without destroying conventional designations, although called conventional designations, they are clearly dharmatā. Because all dharmas are established without moving from the true limit, although called the true limit, it is clearly all dharmas. Because the true limit is clearly all dharmas, one does not stagnate in nonexistence; because all dharmas are clearly dharmatā, one is not encumbered by existence. Not encumbered by existence, it is not permanent; not stagnating in nonexistence, it is not annihilated: this is the madhyamā pratipad. Arising from these two truths, the two cognitions are brought forth: through understanding dharmatā in all dharmas, upāya-prajñā is born; through awakening to all dharmas in dharmatā, prajñā-upāya is born. Upāya-prajñā is clearly upāya; prajñā-upāya is clearly prajñā. Because upāya is clearly prajñā, one does not cling to existence; because prajñā is clearly upāya, one does not stagnate in nonexistence. Not encumbered by existence, attachment to permanence melts like ice; not stagnating in nonexistence, the view of annihilation is extinguished. When all such extremes are stilled, it is called the contemplation of the middle. Therefore, the madhyamā pratipad of the two truths in turn gives rise to the contemplation of the middle of the two cognitions. Contemplating the contemplation of the middle of the two cognitions in turn illuminates the madhyamā pratipad of the two truths. Thus the object accords with cognition, and cognition accords with the object; the object is called the object of cognition, and therefore cognition is called the cognition of the object. Once the two objects are correct, then the meaning of the two cognitions is clear; hence one must rely on illusory objects to clarify cognition. That the two vehicles do not obtain the two cognitions is precisely because they do not see these two truths; that they do not obtain the correct contemplation is also because they do not see that the two truths are precisely the madhyamā pratipad.

5.5

Question: If prajñā illuminates the dharmatā of all dharmas and upāya illuminates all dharmas of dharmatā, then prajñā does not illuminate all dharmas and upāya does not illuminate dharmatā. Would this not circumscribe the noble mind and forfeit its unimpeded, wondrous function? Answer: Prajñā is the essence of upāya, and upāya is the function of prajñā. Essence discerns dharmatā, and function illuminates all dharmas. Therefore, by opening these two gates, cognition is entirely complete and illumination is utterly exhaustive. If both equally illuminated dharmatā and together discerned all dharmas, then the two objects would not be distinguished, and the two wisdoms would have no difference. Question: The old explanations also hold this; how does it differ from the present one? Answer: It is not that the essence of prajñā cannot illuminate all dharmas; but since function already illuminates them, there is no need to trouble prajñā to illuminate them. If, when function has already illuminated all dharmas, essence were to illuminate them again, then for one object there would be two illuminations. And if there were two illuminations for one object, then two objects should also produce a single cognition. Therefore we only explain that prajñā illuminates dharmatā and upāya illuminates all dharmas. Under the old meaning, prajñā could not illuminate all dharmas and upāya could not know dharmatā; even if they contemplated together, the functions of cognition were constantly distinct, which was to circumscribe the noble mind and rigidly adhere to two views.

5.6

Question: It was stated earlier that prajñā does not cling to existence and upāya does not realize emptiness; why is it now also said that upāya engages existence without clinging, and prajñā illuminates emptiness without stagnating? Answer: As for not clinging to emptiness, there are altogether two meanings. First, prajñā illuminates dharmatā; since dharmatā has nothing upon which to rely, prajñā likewise has nothing to cling to. This is the power of prajñā. Second, not realizing emptiness is called not clinging; this is the power of upāya. As for not clinging to existence, this also possesses two meanings. First, prajñā enters emptiness; therefore it is said not to cling to existence. Second, upāya is guided by prajñā; therefore it can engage existence without clinging, which is the power of prajñā. Therefore in the sūtras it is sometimes said that prajñā does not cling to emptiness and upāya does not cling to existence, and sometimes said that prajñā does not cling to existence and upāya does not realize emptiness. Each raises one aspect; in meaning there is no duality.

5.7

Question: If prajñā illuminates emptiness and upāya discerns existence, then both cognitions illuminate together; how can it be said that prajñā is without knowing? Answer: Although prajñā knows, it has nothing known; although it has nothing known, there is nothing it does not know. Question: Is it said to be without knowing because prajñā knows dharmatā, or is it said to be without knowing because one knows prajñā? Answer: Since the two cognitions are distinguished in terms of the two objects, prajñā only knows dharmatā, and therefore is said to be without knowing. One cannot say that it is without knowing because one knows prajñā; if one knows prajñā, that is the knowing of upāya. Question: When prajñā accords with dharmatā, inside and outside both vanish, conditions and contemplation are both stilled. How can upāya, which illuminates the conventional, know this prajñā? Answer: Prajñā knows without knowing, and is known by upāya; knowing without knowing, it is not known by upāya. Question: Prajñā knows without knowing and without knowing knows; can upāya also be like this? Answer: Pointing to the real as the provisional and pointing to the provisional as the real, the provisional and the real are nondual, so it can also be like this. Being nondual yet dual, knowing without knowing is called upāya. Being dual yet nondual, without knowing knowing is called prajñā. Question: Prajñā illuminates emptiness, possessing both knowing and non-knowing. Why does upāya, when discerning existence, not possess both knowing and non-knowing? Answer: In being dual yet nondual, both possess the two. In being nondual yet dual, the object known by prajñā is empty, while the wisdom that can know is existent; therefore it possesses both knowing and non-knowing. Moreover, upāya can know that both the object and cognition known are existent; therefore prajñā has knowing and has non-knowing, whereas upāya has only knowing. Question: How does prajñā possess both knowing and non-knowing? Answer: Prajñā knows dharmatā; therefore it is called knowing. Once it accords with dharmatā, then inside and outside both vanish, and conditions and contemplation are both stilled; therefore it is called non-knowing. Although conditions and contemplation are both stilled, object and cognition remain distinct; therefore it knows what is without knowing, and without knowing it knows.

5.8

Question: How does this differ from the meaning of Kaishan's 'ultimate cessation yet pervasive preservation'? Answer: His meaning of pervasive preservation is ultimately not ultimate cessation; his meaning of ultimate cessation is ultimately not pervasive preservation. Now, taking pervasive preservation to be ultimate cessation, and ultimate cessation to be pervasive preservation—this is why they differ. Question: The old [teachings] were also like this; how does it differ from the present? Answer: In his meaning of ultimate cessation, cognition ultimately does not become the object, and the object ultimately does not become cognition; this constitutes the two views of object and cognition—how could it be called ultimate cessation? If cognition were the object, then since the object has no cognition, being without cognition it would also have no knowing. If the object were cognition, then since cognition has nothing it does not know, the object would also have nothing it does not know. But in reality it is not so; therefore it remains two views. Now, in response to this single gate, I will briefly set forth the great ocean and storehouse of contemplation practice, the pivotal essence of the Mahāyāna. A sūtra says: 'Greedy desire is precisely the Path; anger and delusion are also like this. Within these three dharmas, immeasurable Buddha Paths are complete.' That greedy desire is precisely the Path means that when seeking greedy desire within or outside the catuṣkoṭi, it is ultimately without source; the intrinsic nature of greedy desire is originally pure, which is precisely dharmatā. Awakening like this is called prajñā. How could the object of dharmatā be different from the contemplation of prajñā? Therefore object and cognition are nondual: although greed cannot be found when sought within or outside the catuṣkoṭi, one sees that sentient beings clearly possess greedy desire, which is upāya. Pitying sentient beings who, having no greed, consider themselves to have greed, and wishing to rescue them—this upāya is further called great compassion. Wishing to cause them to awaken to greed as non-greed and giving them the bliss of non-greed—this great compassion is further called great benevolence. For this reason, a single phrase of contemplation practice is fully endowed with object and cognition, benevolence and compassion, and all the ten thousand practices. Initial faith in this dharma constitutes the ten faiths; understanding this dharma constitutes the ten understandings; up to realizing and awakening to this dharma constituting the daśabhūmi, and exhaustively penetrating it constituting the fruit of Buddhahood. Does not a single greed contain immeasurable Buddha Paths? Therefore none are not identical. The old school posited a separate real object, upon meeting which benevolence and compassion arose, establishing the ultimate cessation of object and cognition. Just as it operates with respect to a single greed, so it is across all dharmas by analogy.

5.9

Question: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā clarifies that dharmatā neither arises nor ceases and can bring forth prajñā. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'The twelve links of dependent origination neither arise nor cease, up to being neither cause nor fruit, able to generate contemplative cognition.' Since both clarify object and cognition, what difference is there? Answer: Opening and combining are not the same; briefly there are four propositions: 1. Opening cause and fruit, opening object and cognition; 2. Combining cause and fruit, combining object and cognition; 3. Combining cause and fruit, opening object and cognition; 4. Opening cause and fruit, combining object and cognition. Opening cause and fruit and opening object and cognition is that which is clarified in the Prajñā[pāramitā]: in cause there are the wisdom of the path and the wisdom of the aspects of the path; in fruit there are all-knowledge and knowledge of all aspects—this is called opening cause and fruit. Dharmatā can bring forth prajñā as the object of real cognition, and saṃvṛti-satya can bring forth upāya as the object of provisional cognition—this is called opening object and cognition. Next, combining cause and fruit and combining object and cognition is like the meaning of the five natures in the Nirvāṇa: first, the causal nature; second, the cause-of-cause nature; third, the fruitional nature; fourth, the fruit-of-fruit nature; fifth, the neither-cause-nor-fruit nature. These five natures have no two substances. The meaning of the twelve links of dependent origination being able to bring forth is called the object; the meaning of that which is brought forth is called contemplative cognition. Contemplation is fully luminous, and is thus called bodhi. Bodhi is without encumbrance, which is fruit-of-fruit. Yet the twelve links of dependent origination are intrinsically pure in nature, never having been cause or fruit, nor being object or cognition; hence they are named neither cause nor fruit. Since these five natures have no two substances, they merely turn the object into cognition and transform the cause into fruit. Such cause and fruit have never been cause and fruit; therefore the five natures are of one substance, which is called combining cause and fruit and combining object and cognition. Third, combining cause and fruit and opening object and cognition is also like the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā taking prajñā as cause and sarvajñā as fruit: cause and fruit are nondual, the cause of prajñā being transformed into the name of the fruit of sarvajñā. As Master [Kumāra]jīva said, 'Sarvajñā is just old prajñā'—this is called combining cause and fruit. Opening object and cognition means that although dharmatā can generate prajñā, it does not turn the object of dharmatā into prajñā; although saṃvṛti-satya generates upāya, it does not turn the object of saṃvṛti-satya into the cognition of upāya; hence it is called opening object and cognition. Opening cause and fruit and combining object and cognition is also like the Nirvāṇa taking the turning of the object into cognition, hence called combining object and cognition; yet having cause and cause-of-cause, fruit and fruit-of-fruit, it is called opening cause and fruit.

5.10

Question: Since the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] transforms the object into cognition and is thus called combining object and cognition, it also transforms cause into effect; why then is it not [called] combining cause and effect? Answer: The text unfolds cause and cause-of-cause, effect and effect-of-effect; hence it is called unfolding cause and effect. Yet taking object and cognition, it makes them both under the name of cause-of-cause and eliminates the designations of object and cognition; hence it is called combining object and cognition. Question: Why do the Nirvāṇa and the Prajñā unfold and combine [them differently]? Answer: The Nirvāṇa explains the meaning of object and cognition in terms of the twelve links of dependent origination, wishing to clarify that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature. Sentient beings are precisely the twelve links of dependent origination: that the twelve links of dependent origination can produce is the object, and what is produced is cognition; they have no two different essences, so it clarifies the combination of object and cognition. The Pañcaviṃśati clarifies that dharmatā can produce prajñā: what is produced is the bodhisattva's contemplative cognition, which is saṃskṛta-prajñā; that which can produce [it], dharmatā, is asaṃskṛta-prajñā. Hence it does not transform asaṃskṛta-prajñā into saṃskṛta-prajñā, and thus unfolds object and cognition. Therefore the Prajñā clarifies the non-duality of duality, and the Nirvāṇa explains the duality of non-duality; thus, although both sūtras alike clarify object and cognition, object and cognition are different [in each].

5.11

Section 4: Identity and Difference

5.12

Question: In general there are the two cognitions of the five periods: First, illuminating phenomena among concrete events is provisional, and discerning the principle of the four truths is real; this is the two cognitions of the Tripiṭaka teaching. Second, illuminating true emptiness is real, and discerning conventional existence is provisional; this is the two cognitions of the Pañcaviṃśati teaching. Third, knowing the illness and recognizing the medicine is real, and administering the medicine according to the illness is provisional; this is the two cognitions of the Vimalakīrti teaching. Fourth, illuminating the single non-vehicle is real, and discerning the three vehicles is provisional; this is the two cognitions of the Lotus teaching. Fifth, illuminating eternal permanence is real, and discerning the impermanence of saṃsāra is provisional; this is the two cognitions of the Nirvāṇa teaching. What was explained above was merely an exposition of the purport of the Pañcaviṃśati teaching; how can it be used to explain the central doctrine of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra? Answer: As for the theory of the five periods and the treatise on the four doctrines, the masters' own minds departed from the scriptures and compromised their meaning; this has already been detailed in the past and will now be stated briefly. Upon examination, within a single sūtra all five texts are completely present; one does not need to wait from beginning to end for all the cognitions to be fully provided. For instance, as the Pañcaviṃśati clarifies by broadly expounding the teachings of the three vehicles, bodhisattvas universally train in all paths: this is recognizing that discerning the principle of the four truths is real and illuminating phenomena among concrete events is provisional; therefore, within the Pañcaviṃśati teaching there are the two cognitions of the Tripiṭaka. Prajñā discerning emptiness and upāya engaging with existence: the ninety chapters of the sūtra abundantly discuss this teaching, which is the two cognitions of emptiness and existence. The exposition in the "Definite Chapter" citing the purport of the Lotus [Sūtra] is the two cognitions of the three and the one. The "Dharmodgata Chapter" explains that the form body of all buddhas has coming and going, while the dharmakāya has no coming and going; this is the two cognitions of permanence and impermanence. Knowing the illness and recognizing the medicine is present in all sūtras without need of mention. Therefore, the single sūtra of the Pañcaviṃśati contains all five [pairs of] two cognitions; how could one say that it is restricted only to the provisional and real of emptiness and existence? How are all the cognitions present in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra? The chapter "Inquiring about Illness" states: "Regulating oneself through the three emptinesses is wisdom; purifying lands and transforming people is upāya"—these are the two cognitions of emptiness and existence. The "Disciples Chapter" clarifies that the Buddha's body is asaṃskṛta and does not fall into any categories, which refers to the root's eternal permanence; yet, merely to appear in the five defilements, he expediently manifests illness, which is the impermanence of the traces. Illuminating this root and traces is the two cognitions of permanence and impermanence. The Dharma gate of nonduality clarifies that the śrāvaka's mind and the bodhisattva's mind are nondual, which is the one vehicle; clarifying the great and the small as dual is called the three vehicles—these are the two cognitions of the three and the one.

5.13

Question: How is the Dharma gate of nonduality the one vehicle? Answer: The principle of nonduality is the root of the one vehicle. Because one realizes the principle of nonduality, nondual contemplation arises; relying on nondual contemplation, one can guide the myriad practices to emerge from saṃsāra and arrive at that sarvajñatā. Hence the Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra states: "The profoundly vast meaning is what is called definite emptiness." Because one penetrates this meaning, one penetrates the Great Vehicle, is equipped with the six pāramitās, and is without obstruction. Question: The principle of nonduality is universally the root of the three vehicles; how could it be the root only of the one vehicle? Answer: Since the principle is nondual, how could the vehicle be three? Merely uttering these words, one knows they return to the one. Furthermore, it even clarifies eternal permanence; how could it not reveal the one vehicle? Hence we know that the Vimalakīrti Sūtra also contains the five [pairs of] two cognitions. As for the Lotus [Sūtra] containing all five: the "Expedient Means Chapter" states, "Though I preach nirvāṇa, / it is not true extinction. / All phenomena from their origin / are ever of the mark of quiescent extinction." The former nirvāṇa was not true extinction, while the present nirvāṇa is true extinction; thus, what formerly had no nirvāṇa was not truly permanent, while the present nirvāṇa is truly permanent. Vasubandhu's treatise, commenting on the "Fathoming the Lifespan Chapter", fully clarifies the three bodies: the nirmāṇakāya has a beginning and an end; the saṃbhogakāya has a beginning but no end; the dharmakāya has no beginning and no end. Hence we know that it fully possesses the meaning of permanence and impermanence. Moreover, if the fruit of the one vehicle were still impermanent, the fruit would be identical to annihilation into ashes; how could the cause differ from the śrāvaka? Therefore it has the two cognitions of permanence and impermanence. The "Practices of Ease and Bliss Chapter" clarifies that knowing all phenomena to be empty as dharmatā is real wisdom, while knowing them to arise from causes and conditions is called expedient wisdom; it also contains the two wisdoms of emptiness and existence. Praising the virtues of the śrāvakas still relies on the Small Vehicle; hence we know that it also has the two cognitions of the Tripiṭaka. That the Nirvāṇa contains all five needs no further comment.

5.14

Question: If a single teaching completely contains all cognitions, then it is merely a single sūtra; why are there various collections? Answer: All Mahāyāna sūtras universally serve to reveal the Way. Since the Way is nondual, how could the teachings differ? Hence they may also be called a single collection. For this reason, all Mahāyāna sūtras are universally called Vaipulya; yet because there are many gates revealing the Way, there are differences among the various sūtras. Moreover, although within a single sūtra all five kinds are fully clarified, a single meaning has primary and secondary aspects, so the various collections are not the same. The Tripiṭaka teaching merely clarifies the provisional and real of phenomena and principle, and has not yet distinguished the other gates. Therefore, the Pañcaviṃśati takes emptiness and existence as primary, and the remaining meanings as secondary. The Lotus takes the three and the one as its starting point, and cursorily treats the rest. The Nirvāṇa takes permanence and impermanence as its purport, and clarifies all the rest alongside it. Question: Why do the various sūtras have this distinction between primary and secondary? Answer: There are two kinds of bodhisattvas: first, bodhisattvas who proceed straight ahead; second, those who turn from the small and enter the great. For the bodhisattvas who proceed straight ahead, the Prajñā teaches upāya and real wisdom so that they do not cling to the three realms; and real wisdom and upāya so that they do not fall into the two vehicles. Like having two strong men each supporting one arm, they proceed directly to the Buddha path, without needing to clarify that the three vehicles are provisional and the one vehicle is real. Hence the Lotus states: "There are Buddha's disciples whose minds are pure, / pliant and of sharp faculties. / I confer prophecy on such persons: / in a future age they will become buddhas. / Hearing that they will attain buddhahood, / great joy fills their entire bodies." This refers to the matters of the Prajñā period. But as for persons who turn from the small and enter the great, during the time of the Pañcaviṃśati their faculties were not yet mature; hence it does not directly clarify the meaning of the three and the one. That the "Definite Chapter" cites the Lotus Sūtra to clarify retrogression and non-retrogression is merely a secondary touch in the latter section of the Prajñā. Third, as for the attachment to impermanence, by the time of the Pañcaviṃśati its roots had not yet been overthrown; therefore it does not broadly preach eternal permanence. But since prajñā and upāya are causal practices, one must also recognize the fruitional Dharma; for this reason, the latter section of the Pañcaviṃśati briefly clarifies that the dharmakāya is eternally permanent and the traces have coming and going. Furthermore, Sadāprarudita originally sought prajñā, so it takes the two wisdoms as primary; halfway through he doubted the Buddha's coming and going, so it secondarily clarifies root and traces.

5.15

Question: The Pañcaviṃśati clarifies saṃskṛta-prajñā and asaṃskṛta-prajñā; does this not directly distinguish permanence and impermanence? Answer: As for asaṃskṛta-prajñā, in general there are two kinds: First, taking the object of dharmatā as asaṃskṛta-prajñā, and the contemplative cognition produced by it as saṃskṛta-prajñā. Second, taking the dharmakāya of the Buddha fruit as asaṃskṛta-prajñā, and the bodhisattva's causal wisdom as saṃskṛta-prajñā. In the Pañcaviṃśati, it directly clarifies object and cognition as the meaning of asaṃskṛta, and secondarily clarifies cause and effect as the meaning of asaṃskṛta. Therefore the treatise states: "If one wishes to attain saṃskṛta-prajñā, one should learn the asaṃskṛta"—this clarifies that if one wishes to attain contemplative cognition, one should contemplate the object of dharmatā. If one were to say that wishing to attain the cause one should learn the effect, that would not be suitable in meaning. Furthermore, that dharmatā can produce prajñā is precisely producing cognition by means of the object. If one were to say that the effect produces the cause, the meaning would not be suitable. If one takes dharmatā to be precisely the dharmakāya and takes suchness to be the Buddha, then this object and cognition are indeed cause and effect. In the five propositions above, this meaning has already been explained in detail. The Lotus Sūtra is directly intended for those who turn from the small and enter the great; therefore it clarifies that the three vehicles are provisional to make them abandon the Small Vehicle, and that the one vehicle is real to encourage them to adopt the Great; hence it directly clarifies the two wisdoms of the three and the one. Having abandoned the small and sought the great, they generate the bodhicitta and cultivate the bodhisattva practices. They further learn the provisional and real of emptiness and existence, not clinging to the three realms and not falling into the two vehicles, proceeding directly to the Buddha path. However, since the Pañcaviṃśati had already broadly clarified this, the Lotus merely states it briefly. When the śrāvakas of the three faculties were in the assembly of the Lotus, they did not cling to impermanence, yet had not understood permanence and bliss; but having preached the cause of the one vehicle, one must distinguish the fruit of the dharmakāya; for this reason, the latter section briefly distinguishes permanence and impermanence. Furthermore, preaching eternal permanence establishes its one vehicle; if it were impermanent, it would be identical to annihilation into ashes; since it differs from the former three, one knows it is eternally permanent. These are all secondary clarifications, not the primary doctrine.

5.16

Question: When the Pañcaviṃśati clarifies object and cognition as saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta, how are they primary and secondary? Answer: Although the object of dharmatā is the root of prajñā, from beginning to end the Pañcaviṃśati directly clarifies the two wisdoms. The two wisdoms are what is produced, which is saṃskṛta-prajñā; hence taking the saṃskṛta as primary, one cannot take the object as the central doctrine.

5.17

Question: If the Pañcaviṃśati directly clarifies saṃskṛta-prajñā, then regarding not abiding in phenomena, abiding in prajñā, and being complete with the six pāramitās and myriad practices: is this saṃskṛta or asaṃskṛta? Answer: Not abiding in phenomena means not abiding in any phenomena that involve appropriation; because one does not abide in any phenomena, one abides in prajñā—this is dharmatā-prajñā. Below this, it is complete with the six pāramitās. Among the six pāramitās, the sixth, prajñā, is saṃskṛta-prajñā: by virtue of not abiding in any phenomena, one abides in dharmatā-prajñā, and therefore contemplative cognition arises, becoming fully equipped with saṃskṛta-prajñā. By virtue of saṃskṛta-prajñā, it guides and completes the myriad practices. Therefore three dharmas are clarified: first, dharmatā-prajñā; second, contemplative cognition prajñā; third, guiding and completing the causal and fruitional practices. Question: How is it known that this is dharmatā-prajñā? Answer: It is discussed in terms of two points. First, among the explanations of the previous six masters, the fifth was named asaṃskṛta, and the sixth, being neither saṃskṛta nor asaṃskṛta, is dharmatā. Furthermore, if one says that not abiding in phenomena and abiding in prajñā is not dharmatā-prajñā, then among the six pāramitās below, what kind of prajñā is the sixth again? Since the sixth is the saṃskṛta-prajñā of contemplative cognition, we know that the first is the asaṃskṛta-prajñā of dharmatā.

5.18

Question: Why does the Pañcaviṃśati take object and cognition as saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta as primary, while the Nirvāṇa takes cause and effect as saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta as primary? Answer: The Pañcaviṃśati speaks of the bodhisattva's practice: dharmatā produces prajñā, and due to prajñā there is upāya; therefore it takes object and cognition as primary. The Nirvāṇa directly clarifies fruitional attainment; therefore, from saṃsāra up through the causal stages, all is impermanent, and only the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is eternally permanent. The Nirvāṇa directly distinguishes fruitional phenomena; hence taking cause and effect as saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta is its primary doctrine. The teaching of the Nirvāṇa arose directly for the sake of the attachment to impermanence; hence it discloses eternal permanence. As for the three and the one, and emptiness and existence, the previous teachings had already clarified them, so it only states them briefly.

5.19

Question: Sūtras such as the Prajñā[pāramitā] are for bodhisattvas who proceed straight ahead; the teaching of the Lotus [Sūtra] is for those who turn from the small and enter the great. Thus the inclusion of conditions [for liberation] is already complete; what, then, is gained by the arising of the teaching of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]?

Answer: Teachings are set forth for many reasons and cannot be reduced to a single pathway. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra has nineteen causes and conditions, and the purposes of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra are more than one. Explaining this convergence according to the meaning of the Lotus Sūtra, the children are of two kinds: first, those who have lost their minds, who are dull-rooted people; second, those who have not lost their minds, meaning sharp-rooted people. Although there are those who proceed straight ahead and those who turn from the small, those who hear the Prajñā and the Lotus [Sūtras] and both comprehend them are the children who have not lost their minds, the sharp-rooted people. The remaining dull-rooted people who have lost their minds have not yet taken the medicine; therefore, entering the Twin Groves and proclaiming cessation, [the Buddha] taught the Nirvāṇa Sūtra for their sake, and only then did they place their trust. If that is so, from the Lotus Treasury at the beginning to the Bhadrā River at the end, there are only the two kinds of conditions: sharp and dull. Furthermore, in the assemblies of the Prajñā and the Lotus, all had already attained the path, but now upon hearing the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] they advance further in awakening; hence it says: "For the sake of Bodhisattva Kāśyapa, the king of elephants among men, this sūtra is taught." Furthermore, there are two conditions: first, the condition of having attained awakening through going through the [previous] teachings; second, the condition of directly hearing the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] and immediately receiving the path. Therefore, although the Prajñā and the Lotus are for the two types of persons, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] is taught again for the two cognitions, discussing the two sūtras separately.

5.20

Question: What is the difference between the two cognitions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the two cognitions of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra?

Answer: In all, there are three explanations. Distinguishing the meaning of the five periods is as explained above. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra perceives emptiness and existence as the two wisdoms; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra knows the disease and recognises the medicine, applying medicine in response to the disease. Those who take the asaṃskṛta provisional and real according to the meaning of the four periods say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra are together the second teaching; however, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra comprehensively illuminates from the eighth bhūmi and above, yet both alike distinguish illuminating emptiness as the real and observing existence as the provisional. These two are the explanations of masters from the southern lands.

Some say: "Vimalakīrti is the perfect teaching, neither defiled nor pure, yet disporting in both defilement and purity." This is the explanation of the treatise masters of the northern lands.

I say now that this is not so. "The perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, and upāya is their father; all guides of beings are born from these without exception." How could this be restricted to the Prajñā[pāramitā] and not apply to the Vimalakīrti Sūtra? Furthermore, perceiving emptiness and illuminating existence are named prajñā and upāya; this mostly clarifies the bodhisattva's own practice. Knowing the disease and recognising the medicine, and applying medicine in response to the disease, clarifies the Great Being's method of transforming others. As bodhisattvas, all are endowed with these two; how could one present the Vimalakīrti Sūtra solely through transforming others and confine the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā to one's own practice? Therefore, the previous explanations are incorrect.

The Dazhidulun lists ten kinds of great sūtras, such as the Lotus Sūtra, yet the Prajñā[pāramitā] is the greatest; how could one say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone illuminates the wondrous path? If it is said that the teaching of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra is profound because [its interlocutors] are people of the eighth bhūmi and above, the Tathāgata is the ultimate fruit-stage and should be the central marvel of the Prajñā[pāramitā]; moreover, if Śāriputra and Subhūti, being lesser men, spoke it, then it would not be a great teaching. If it is said that the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the inconceivable, where the immense and the minute accommodate each other, and is therefore profound, does not the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarify the power of a finger obstructing the wind, or a single hair lifting up the great chiliocosm—does it not make this clear? Furthermore, prajñā and upāya are the root of the inconceivable; borrowing the seats and requesting the meal are the traces of the inconceivable. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā abundantly clarifies the two wisdoms, thus distinguishing the root of the inconceivable; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra manifests supernormal powers, thereby showing the traces of the inconceivable. How could the root be common to both shallow and profound while the traces are considered wondrous? If the three vehicles study prajñā in common, and so prajñā is common to the shallow and the profound, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains that the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, which is prajñā itself; how could it not be common [to both]?

Furthermore, to say that it is the perfect and sudden teaching is also not so. The Prajñā[pāramitā] and other texts also broadly praise the provisional path and upāya of bodhisattvas; why should the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone be taken as the perfect and sudden teaching?

I now clarify that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra have both similarities and differences in clarifying the two wisdoms. As for the similarity: since the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas and upāya is their father, we know that both sūtras illuminate emptiness as the real and engage existence as the provisional. As for the difference: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards clarifies upāya. Its ninety chapters are opened into two paths: sixty-six chapters clarify the path of prajñā, and the remaining twenty-four chapters distinguish the path of upāya. The reason it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya is that dharmatā is the root and all phenomena are the branches. Prajñā illuminates dharmatā, so prajñā is the root; upāya illuminates all phenomena, so upāya is the branches. This shows two roots and two branches, proceeding from root to branches and giving rise to function from essence; hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya.

Furthermore, all views are of two kinds: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā refutes the view of existence, and upāya refutes the view of non-existence, thereby revealing the madhyamā pratipad and leaving behind the two extremes. Therefore, first clarifying real wisdom and afterwards clarifying upāya constitutes the sequence of refuting views.

Furthermore, the regress of a bodhisattva involves two matters: first, craving the three realms; second, taking up the Hinayana. Through upāya and real wisdom, one does not cling to the three realms; through real wisdom and upāya, one does not fall into the two vehicles. Therefore one enters the bodhisattva stage and is able to attain the Buddha path. One must necessarily leave the three realms first and leave the two vehicles afterwards; therefore it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya. This is like the five-hundred-yojana perilous and evil path in the Lotus Sūtra: the three realms are three hundred [yojanas] and the two vehicles are two hundred [yojanas]; one leaves the three hundred first and leaves the two hundred afterwards. Hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes provisional wisdom. Thus in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the two vehicles are combined as one hundred, clarifying only four hundred; opening and combining differ, but it is broadly identical with the Lotus Sūtra, as is explained at length there.

Furthermore, Master Sengrui's preface to the Dazhidulun states: "The Fully Awakened One, knowing that mistaken thoughts arise from oneself, therefore produced the Āgamas; perceiving that attachment to existence is caused by delusion, therefore made the Prajñā[pāramitā] to provide internal illumination." If that is so, then the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarifies the refutation of the existence posited by the Hinayana; hence it first clarifies real wisdom. Although it refutes clinging to existence, it also fears the realization of emptiness; hence upāya refutes emptiness. This is the sequence determined according to the order of the teachings.

Next, clarifying in terms of stages: what is first clarified as the path of prajñā refers to the Dharma gates of the sixth bhūmi and below; what is next clarified as upāya is the non-arising tolerance of the seventh bhūmi and above. These are all broad distinctions. Nāgārjuna says, "Within prajñā there is no absence of upāya; within upāya there is no absence of prajñā," but the former mostly clarifies prajñā, while the latter mostly clarifies upāya.

Next, when the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the two wisdoms, it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Why is this? The arising of this teaching directly originates from the illness; hence it says: "Through upāya he manifested illness in his body." Because there was illness, there were the two gatherings in the ten-foot room and the two assemblies in the Āmrapālī Grove; therefore it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Furthermore, maturing sentient beings and purifying Buddha lands are the applications of the bodhisattva's upāya. Thus the chapter on "Buddha Land" clarifies purifying Buddha lands, and from "Upāya" onward it distinguishes maturing sentient beings; for this reason, this sūtra mostly clarifies upāya.

Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of one's own practice, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly distinguishes the provisional and real of transforming others. How is this known? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies that prajñā does not cling to existence and upāya does not realize emptiness; this mostly pertains to the two wisdoms of the bodhisattva's own practice. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra internally and serenely observes the faculties and medicines, and externally manifests supernormal powers extensively; therefore it mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of transforming others. Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies real wisdom and expedient wisdom, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of the provisional and the real.

5.21

Question: What is the difference between "provisional" (quan) and "upāya" (fangbian)?

Answer: Generally speaking, there is no difference: both have the meaning of skillfulness. Speaking of them distinctly, "upāya" is broad, while the meaning of "provisional" is narrow. I now broadly clarify three meanings:

First, dharmatā is explained as the real, and observing the myriad phenomena is explained as the provisional.

Second, serenely observing the myriad phenomena is the real, and manifesting external transformations is the provisional.

Third, with respect to dynamic application, the body without illness is the real, and feigning illness in the ten-foot room is the provisional.

Initially illuminating dharmatā is called real wisdom; the remaining three gates all belong to upāya, so upāya is broad. The meaning of provisional is narrow because it only takes serenely observing faculties and medicines as the real, while manifesting external transformations onward all belongs to the provisional; hence provisional cognition is a distinct function within upāya, which is why it is called narrow.

Question: Since provisional and upāya have narrowness and breadth, is the same true of the two reals?

Answer: As for the real of upāya, this real is broad. Since upāya leaves nothing undone, real wisdom also leaves nothing undone; illuminating that there is nothing undone, while in reality doing nothing, it is therefore broad. Provisional cognition is merely the function of external transformation within the cognition of existence, and real cognition is merely the efficacy of serene observation within the cognition of existence; hence the provisional and the real are both narrow.

Question: Manifesting external transformations is provisional and thus trace; dynamic action with nothing moved is the real. Does merely establishing these two establish the meaning of provisional and real?

Answer: Manifesting external transformations is the provisional; this is applying medicine in response to the disease. One must necessarily observe the faculties and medicines serenely within as the real, and only then are the two wisdoms constituted. Wisdom of emptiness does not know faculties and medicines; because it knows them, the two wisdoms are constituted.

5.22

5. Section on Narrowness and Breadth

5.23

Encompassing the various sūtras as a whole, there are [altogether] four propositions: (1) real cognition is long and provisional cognition is short; (2) provisional cognition is long and real cognition is short; (3) both are long; and (4) both are short.

As for 'real cognition is long and provisional cognition is short', this divides the two cognitions in terms of movement and stillness. Quietly observing both emptiness and existence is the real; since the real comprehensively illuminates emptiness and existence, it is long. The function of external transformation and movement is the provisional; since the provisional is only the function of existence, it is short.

Question: If real cognition, which inwardly and quietly observes emptiness and existence, is long, the external function of transformation and movement also explains both emptiness and existence, just as it explains the two truths. Moreover, it simultaneously manifests both emptiness and existence, as when Mañjuśrī manifested a body like empty space for King Ajātaśatru, which was manifesting emptiness, and displayed a body of sixteen or a thousand cubits, which was displaying existence. If so, then active function also extends to emptiness and existence, so both cognitions should be long.

Answer: Although externally it explains emptiness and existence and manifests emptiness and existence, this arises only from the cognition that observes existence. Because it inwardly observes and knows the illness and recognizes the medicine, it externally displays emptiness and existence; therefore it is short.

As for 'the provisional is long and the real is short', this divides the two cognitions by taking the observation of emptiness as the real and the illumination of existence as the provisional. Illumination of emptiness is the real; real cognition is exclusively quiet observation and not transformation and movement, and so it is called short. Illumination of existence is the provisional; the provisional possesses both stillness and movement—first observing the faculties and the medicines is stillness, and externally responding to illness to administer medicine is movement. Because the provisional extends to both stillness and movement, it is long. Both of these [first two] propositions determine length and shortness in terms of stillness and movement.

Third, as for 'both cognitions are long', this is decided purely in terms of emptiness and existence. Real cognition illuminates emptiness, and provisional cognition observes existence. Within the observation of existence, both moving and still existence are explained; real cognition's illumination of emptiness explains that both movement and stillness are empty. This being so, between the two cognitions there is neither shortness nor length.

The fourth proposition, 'both cognitions are short', divides the two cognitions purely within the cognition of existence, and therefore both cognitions are short. For instance, taking the knowledge of illness and recognition of medicine as the real, and responding to illness to dispense medicine as the provisional—both of these cognitions are subsumed under the gate of existence, and for this reason both are short. In essence, Vimalakīrti's unailing body is the real, and the meaning of demonstrating illness is the provisional.

Question: If one only unfolds the provisional and the real in reference to the cognition of existence to explain that both are short, can one also establish the provisional and the real with respect to the cognition of emptiness to have shortness and length?

Answer: Real cognition clarifies the meaning of 'two and not two' and constitutes their essence, so one does not unfold the provisional and the real [within it]. Provisional cognition is the meaning of 'not two and yet two' and constitutes their function, so it is what is unfolded. If one wishes to unfold it, the principle may be classified similarly: illuminating the shallowness of the emptiness of persons is the provisional, and illuminating the depth of the emptiness of phenomena is the real. Furthermore, illuminating the emptiness of the two vehicles is called the provisional. Why is this? In reality, there is no emptiness such as that seen by the two vehicles; because it illuminates this provisional emptiness, it is called provisional. Illuminating the emptiness of bodhisattvas is called the real, because the emptiness known by bodhisattvas is real emptiness. Because it illuminates real emptiness, it is called the real.

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淨名玄論 — Classical Chinese