淨名玄論 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

Briefly explaining the catuṣkoṭi: First, object and cognition are both permanent. This exists only in the Mahāyāna, not in the Hīnayāna, because in the Hīnayāna the cognitions of both ordinary beings and nobles are impermanent. However, regarding the Mahāyāna's claim that both object and cognition are permanent, there are three senses: 1. Permanent cognition illuminates the object of dharmatā, as when the contemplative prajñā of the fruit-stage illuminates dharmatā-prajñā. 2. Permanent cognition illuminates the permanent object of space, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Among all permanent things, space is foremost.' Now permanent cognition illuminates this permanent object. If dharmatā is taken to be space itself—as the Dazhidulun says that space is neither existent nor non-existent, the path of words is cut off, and the activity of the mind is extinguished, which is dharmatā itself—now, proceeding provisionally on the basis of conventional facts, space is taken as permanent. These two propositions distinguish the two meanings of object and cognition. 3. Permanent cognition turns back to illuminate cognition itself; that is, the meaning of self-reflexive cognition. Next, permanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two senses: 1. It illuminates the impermanence of sentient beings; 2. It illuminates the impermanence of manifested traces. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the permanent has three propositions: 1. It illuminates the permanence of space; 2. It illuminates the permanence of the object of dharmatā; 3. It illuminates the permanent meaning of the dharmakāya and Buddha-nature. But this is only illuminating an object, not illuminating permanent cognition, because on the causal stage permanent cognition does not yet exist. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two propositions: 1. It illuminates impermanent objects; 2. Impermanent cognition itself illuminates impermanent cognition. Question: How does impermanent cognition reflecting back on cognition differ from permanent cognition knowing permanent cognition? Answer: Permanent cognition knowing the permanent has only one meaning. Impermanent cognition knowing the impermanent has two meanings: first, a subsequent moment of cognition knows a prior moment of cognition; second, a single moment of cognition naturally knows [itself]. One capable of simultaneous contemplation possesses both meanings; one not yet capable of simultaneity only has cognition of prior and subsequent knowing each other. Permanent [cognition] knowing the permanent has only a single moment of self-knowing, with no prior or subsequent knowing. Question: The treatise masters of the north say that from the first bhūmi upwards there is already the permanently abiding dharmakāya, and thus there is also permanent cognition. How is this matter? Answer: One must scrutinise the intention of this assertion: do they take the cognition that realizes tathatā as the dharmakāya, or do they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya? If they take the cognition capable of realization as the permanence of the dharmakāya, this is not so. The Dazhidulun states: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā.' If it were permanent, it would have no clarity and obscurity, and should not undergo transformation. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'This designation of permanent Dharma applies only to the Tathāgata.' The chapter 'On Longevity' screens out three types of dharmas from the meaning of permanence: first, non-Buddhists; second, Hīnayāna; third, bodhisattvas—none of them are permanently abiding. Therefore, we know the meaning of permanence lies only in the Buddha-fruit; in the causal stage there is no permanence that is presently manifest. If they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as permanent, then all sentient beings possess this; why limit it to the first bhūmi upwards? If they say that from the first bhūmi upwards one perceives Buddha-nature, and therefore takes the permanence of Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya, this is still an old doctrine of Jiangnan, not a different theory of the north. Question: A treatise master who lectures on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The first bhūmi's perception of tathatā is not different from the Buddha-stage.' How is this matter? Answer: If shown according to the treatises, how could it say: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā'? Since there is transformation, we know there is a difference of clarity and obscurity. Moreover, the treatise says: 'When prajñā is purified, it changes its name to [sarvajñā]', so we know that in the sixth bhūmi prajñā is not yet pure. Furthermore, originally it is because of seeing reality that delusion is severed; if the first bhūmi's seeing of reality were no different from the Buddha's, then all delusions would be severed. If delusions are not severed by seeing reality, then it would have to be an existent cognition that severs delusions. Therefore, this assertion is incorrect. All such things are skillful distinctions within the non-distinguished. If one does not explain this, those of shallow understanding will lose the eyebrows and eyes of learning; this is called lacking skillful means. Now, since we wish to explain the two cognitions, we will explain upāya extensively. Upāya is the cognition of differentiation within the non-differentiated. Therefore, one must first skillfully distinguish the various gates, and only then will there be unrestricted and unhindered functioning. Later, we shall explain success and failure in detail; do not be startled by similarities to the old doctrines. Now, relying on this gate, there are four propositions: 1. Words are the same, but the intention is different. 'Words are the same' is as explained above, up to permanent and impermanent. Question: Why are the words the same? Answer: The words come from the sūtras and treatises; since the sūtras and treatises share their usage, how could they not be the same? But 'the intention is different': the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says, 'Though the words are the same, the mind is different.' We now clarify that this is the skillful distinction within the non-distinguished of the two meanings of non-duality and duality; hence the two meanings of the objects and cognitions of permanence and impermanence are opened. Since it says 'duality in non-duality', one knows that although they are two, they are non-dual. As the Great Sūtra says: 'Self and non-self have no dual characteristics; permanence and impermanence are also shown thus.' The sūtra says: 'The foolish regard them as two; the wise comprehend and know they are non-dual.' Furthermore, there are foolish ones who only consider them non-dual, while the wise understand that non-duality is precisely duality. Why is this? The foolish do not recognize permanent and impermanent, nor do they know object and cognition; therefore it is ignorance, and because of ignorance they are called foolish. The wise comprehend permanence and impermanence; they are called the wise. Therefore it is said that the words are the same, but the intention is different. 2. Words are different and intention is different. Those who have grasping do not distinguish skillfully; those without grasping are able to distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'words are different'. The first is that the mind without grasping distinguishes skillfully; the second is that the mind with grasping does not distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'intention is different'. 3. 'Words are the same and intention is the same': the words are the same as those in the vaipulya sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the intention is also the same as the correct contemplation without reliance of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. Furthermore, the words are the same as those of people who grasp, and those who grasp also have a small fraction of what they attain; now the intention is also identical to theirs, hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. 4. Words are different, but the intention is the same. If the words differ from the sūtras and treatises but the intention accords with them, they may also be used. Moreover, if the words differ from the old doctrines but the intention unifies with the Buddha's purport, they may also be used. One should use these four propositions to run through all the gates comprehensively, and not take or reject things in a one-sided manner. Question: Why clarify these four propositions? Answer: There are two kinds of people. First, those who begin studying the Mahāyāna think they must exclusively differ from the old doctrines, which then becomes slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words come from the sūtras and treatises and should be used in common. It is only that grasping and non-grasping have different minds; one should not make the words different just because the intention is different. Second, those who study the Hīnayāna say the small differs from the great, and forcibly assert that the meaning is identical; this is also slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words and intention of the Hīnayāna and the words and intention of the Mahāyāna are actually not identical, yet they forcibly assert they are identical. For example, students of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra equate the markless cessation truth with the principle of the vaipulya; this too is called slandering the Dharma. For the sake of these students of the great and small, the four propositions of sameness and difference should be laid open.

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11. Gate of Success and Failure

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Provisional and real are the contemplative mind of the ultimate person; real and conventional are the marvelous objects of all the nobles. Above, we have briefly clarified the two wisdoms; now we must discuss the real and conventional. If the root of the real and conventional is established, the branch of the provisional and real will naturally be rectified. Therefore, twelve gates are opened to examine their success and failure: 1. Gate of nature and provisionality; 2. Gate of existence and non-existence; 3. Gate of having a root and lacking a root; 4. Gate of manifest and unmanifest; 5. Gate of principle and teaching; 6. Gate of spoken and unspoken; 7. Gate of shallow and deep; 8. Gate of within and outside the principle; 9. Gate of lacking fixed nature; 10. Gate of mutual dependence; 11. Gate of eliminating success and failure; 12. Gate of essence and function.

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First: Gate of Nature and Provisionality

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Question: In studying the Buddha's two truths, what are success and failure? Please explain them. Answer: Taking the two truths to have a fixed nature is failure; taking the two truths to be conditionally arisen provisional designations is success. As for the so-called two truths of fixed nature: if there is an existence that can exist, then there is a non-existence that can be non-existent. An existence that can exist does not exist due to non-existence; a non-existence that can be non-existent is not non-existent due to existence. Not existing due to non-existence, existence is not non-existence's existence; not being non-existent due to existence, non-existence is not existence's non-existence. Existence not being non-existence's existence, existence is intrinsic existence; non-existence not being existence's non-existence, non-existence is intrinsic non-existence. If existence is intrinsic existence, existence constitutes the view of existence; if non-existence is intrinsic non-existence, non-existence constitutes the view of non-existence. If the two views of existence and non-existence are established, then the sixty-two views are erected, since existence and non-existence are the root of all views. As the Lotus Sūtra says: 'Such views as existence and non-existence, / depending on the mind, / are complete as the sixty-two.' Once there are these views, craving then arises: one gives rise to craving for one's own view and anger toward others' views. Views are the drive of delusion; when there are further craving and wrath, afflictions are fully present. Once afflictions exist, karma ensues. If karma and delusion are established, one cannot escape birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, and distress; this is called failure. Next, contrasting with failure to explain success: now there is no existence that can exist, and thus no non-existence that can be non-existent. Lacking an existence that can exist, it exists due to non-existence; lacking a non-existence that can be non-existent, it is non-existent due to existence. Existing due to non-existence, existence is non-existence's existence; being non-existent due to existence, non-existence is existence's non-existence. Non-existence is not non-existent of itself; non-existent existence does not exist of itself. Because it does not exist of itself, it is not existence; because it is not non-existent of itself, it is not non-existence. Neither existence nor non-existence, they are provisionally called existence and non-existence.

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Question: Why do you say 'neither existence nor non-existence, provisionally designated as existence and non-existence'? Answer: This is merely intended to clarify the meaning of existence and non-existence. Since they are conditionally arisen existence and non-existence, conditionally arisen existence and non-existence are vividly apparent as existence and non-existence yet are not existence and non-existence; and neither existence nor non-existence is vividly apparent yet is existence and non-existence. Therefore it is said: existence does not exist of itself, hence it is not existence; non-existence is not non-existent of itself, hence it is not non-existence; neither existence nor non-existence, provisionally existent and provisionally non-existent. One should reflect deeply on these words. For example, an illusory person is not a person; because an illusory person is not a person, he is a person. An image in a mirror is not an image; because it is not an image, an image appears. In this way existence and non-existence lack fixed nature; thus views and craving do not arise, and painful retribution is not incurred. Hence this is called success. Question: Where do these words come from? Answer: This is an old doctrine from Guanzhong. For instance, Master Sengzhao's Treatise on the Emptiness of the Non-Absolute clarifies that existence is not true existence, so although it exists, it is empty; emptiness is not true emptiness, so although it is empty, it exists. It is just like an illusory person: it is not that there is no illusory person, but an illusory person is not a real person. When the treatise was completed, he showed it to Kumārajīva, who praised it, saying: 'Among the people of Qin, the foremost in understanding emptiness is this man Sengzhao.' Dharma Master Guangqin composed the Souxuanlun, in which, among the fourteen traditions on the two truths, he took Master Zhao as the foundation. Therefore this is an old doctrine, not called a new theory; it should certainly be trusted.

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Next, investigating the meaning of nature. Question: Whose doctrine clarifies that there is an existence that can exist and a non-existence that can be non-existent, thus constituting intrinsic nature? Answer: Now, to explain generally all doctrines possessing grasping—internal and external, great and small—they necessarily have an existence that can exist as attaining existence, and a non-existence that can be non-existent as attaining non-existence. This is termed possessing grasping, and therefore falls into intrinsic nature.

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Question: Suppose we now cite the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's explanation of the three provisionalities (saṃjñā) to show it does not fall into error. Why? That text explains that the three provisionalities as existent are saṃvṛti-satya, while the three provisionalities as empty are paramārtha-satya. Being identical with the three provisionalities, it is always the four negations (catur-vācā); being identical with the four negations, it is always the three provisionalities. Being identical with the three provisionalities yet always the four negations, existence does not exist of itself; being identical with the four negations yet always the three provisionalities, emptiness is not empty of itself. Therefore, it does not mean svabhāva. Answer: If the three provisionalities are saṃvṛti-satya and the four negations are paramārtha-satya, does the existence of saṃvṛti-satya depend on true emptiness, or does it not depend on it? This single interrogation leads to two unacceptable conclusions. If you say that saṃvṛti-satya depends on paramārtha-satya, then saṃvṛti-satya is that which depends and paramārtha-satya is that which is depended upon; the two truths would then merely be provisionality of mutual dependence. How then could one fix the three provisionalities as saṃvṛti-satya and the four negations as paramārtha-satya? If you say that the existence of saṃvṛti-satya does not depend on true emptiness, then since it is not mutually dependent, it becomes svabhāva. Therefore, it cannot be answered [in this way]. Question: The existence of saṃvṛti-satya cannot depend on the essence of paramārtha-satya, because the true essence is transcendent and therefore cannot enter mutual dependence. Answer: Now, if the existence of saṃvṛti-satya depends on the name of saṃvṛti-satya and the name of paramārtha-satya, existence depends on non-existence, and there is no such fault.

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Question: Is the name of paramārtha-satya subsumed under saṃvṛti-satya, or is it subsumed under paramārtha-satya? If it is subsumed under saṃvṛti-satya, then saṃvṛti-satya would be like long depending again on long, or short being caused again by short. If the name of paramārtha-satya is subsumed under paramārtha-satya, which is nameless, then how can that which is nameless subsume a name? If paramārtha indeed subsumes the name, then paramārtha is not transcendent of names. If you say that the principle of truth has no name, but a name established for truth subsequently belongs to truth, then once it belongs to truth, truth possesses a name. If truth cannot be named, it also cannot be possessed. Therefore, if the emptiness and existence of the two truths have no sense of mutual dependence, that is svabhāva. Furthermore, if paramārtha is transcendent and cannot be depended upon, while saṃvṛti is dependent and cannot be transcendent, how is this not svabhāva? Next, we separately interrogate saṃvṛti-satya: Concerning long and short depending on each other in saṃvṛti-satya, do they depend after long and short are already established, or are long and short first established only after they depend on each other? Both are untenable. If they depend after being established, there are two faults: First, the fault of losing dependence. Since they are already established, why must they depend again? Whenever one discusses dependence, it is originally to make them established. Now that they are already established, they should not depend further. Second, if they are already established and depend again, then before they depended, they were already originally established as two, and after depending, they are established again, which means only one long object would have two establishments. How could there be two establishments? If there are two establishments, there must be two long objects.

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Question: First, the entities are established, and later, through dependence, the names 'long' and 'short' are established. Because the entities are established first while the names are not yet established, mutual dependence is necessary, thereby avoiding the fault of non-dependence. Since only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not established anew, there is no error of redundant establishment. Answer: If only the names are established through mutual dependence while the entities are not, then the single provisionality of mutual dependence would only be a dependence of names. Could it be clear that the entities are not provisionalities of mutual dependence? However, names and entities depend on each other, which means everything depends and everything is established. Question: There is this fault if long and short are established first and depend later. What fault is there if they depend first and are established later? Answer: Originally, one takes the established 'long' to depend on 'short'. Before depending on 'short', there is as yet no 'long'; what would one take to depend on 'short'? If one takes 'long' to depend on 'short', one falls back into establishing first and depending later; nor is it established sequentially. If now there is long and short, there is dependence; if there is dependence, there is long and short—because they are simultaneous, there are not the two faults above. Question: If so, when a long object does not depend on a short one, does this object exist or not? If this object exists, it exists without dependence, sharing the fault of being established first. If this object does not exist when not depending, it shares the fault of depending first. If you say that although this object exists, it cannot be called 'long' or 'short' before depending on a short one, then this is still the same as an entity existing before dependence, with the entity depending to obtain a name. Although you desire simultaneity, you do not escape the three faults. Question: You previously said that there is no existence to be existed, but it exists due to non-existence; there is no non-existence to be non-existed, but it is non-existent due to existence. Others hold that there is an existence to be existed and a non-existence to be non-existed, which is establishing first and depending later. Now, since there is no existence to be existed and it exists due to non-existence, is this not depending first and establishing later? Answer: We now explain that there is no existence to be existed merely to counter the position of having an existence to be existed. It is not that it is unestablished before depending and only established after depending, nor is it that it is established first and depends later. Therefore, it is dependent origination and mutual dependence; one cannot interrogate its svabhāva through the two approaches of existence and non-existence. Question: Although you say this, the universal characteristic is not yet complete. Please explain it. Answer: Take long and short for instance. Short is not short of itself; it is short because of long, so it is not established first and dependent later. Since short is not short of itself, nor is short short through other, it does not depend first and become established later. If there were an entity of short that again depended on long, that would be short through both self and other, and this short would have two faults: if there were an entity of short, it would fall into the fault of establishing first and depending later; if it were short through other, it would fall into the fault of depending first and establishing later. Therefore, it is not short through self, other, or both. Short is not short of itself, nor does it arise from other, so it is not that there is short without cause. Now we explain that the name 'short' is long and short—how could it be without cause? Question: Since the catuṣkoṭi cannot be obtained, mutual dependence cannot be obtained either. Answer: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, having refuted the catuṣkoṭi of self, other, both, and causeless, answered Kāśyapa: 'It can only be named as being established through causes.' The same is true here: it can only be named mutual dependence through causes and conditions, like an illusory creation. How could one determine its source with certainty?

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Second, explaining correctness and error through the gate of existence and non-existence.

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Regarding what is called existence and non-existence: because the preceding notion of svabhāva is rejected, svabhāva-existence cannot be found, and svabhāva-non-existence cannot be found either. If there were existence and non-existence, there could be both existence and non-existence, and neither non-existence nor non-non-existence. When the first two do not exist at all, how could the latter three exist? Therefore, all five propositions cannot be obtained, and the five eyes do not see them. In former days when I listened to lectures, I heard the Preceptor of Xinghuang quote the words of Great Master of Sheling: 'The five eyes do not see sentient beings or any phenomena outside of principle.' At that time, I did not yet believe and understand it; only after a long time did I realize it. Such persons and dharmas conceived with apprehension are originally non-existent; what would the five eyes see? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra repeatedly uses the self and person as analogies; furthermore, the sixteen views are utterly non-existent, so the five eyes do not see them. Now, persons and dharmas conceived as svabhāva-existence with apprehension are likewise not seen by the five eyes. Question: When examining these five propositions as unattainable, is this the non-existence of paramārtha-satya or not? Answer: This non-existence is outside the two truths and the two vehicles, because it is not subsumed by the two truths. One master holds two kinds of non-existence: first, it is called non-existence because something is negated; second, it is called non-existence because there is nothing at all. Being called non-existence because something is negated refers to apprehension: the five propositions are all utterly empty, which is what all Buddhas and bodhisattvas renounce; hence it is called non-existence. Explaining non-existence as having nothing at all refers to the non-existence of real truth within the two truths. Why? The two truths are distinctly existent yet non-existent, so they are called having nothing at all, and thus designated non-existence. Second, existence is explained in contrast to non-existence. Since there is no such notion of apprehension, there are the two truths of non-apprehension through nominal designation and causes and conditions of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas: existing because of non-existence, and non-existing because of not-non-existence. Such existence and non-existence are the domain where the cognition of existence and non-existence of Buddhas and bodhisattvas operates; thus it is called the object. Question: Why explain this existence and non-existence? Answer: Because the previous existence and non-existence could not be established, and the present existence and non-existence are established as such; it explains the sense of establishment in contrast to their failure, which is why this existence and non-existence are explained. Furthermore, it comes to guide those with the view of annihilation. Some people originally clung to svabhāva-existence and non-existence, and suddenly hearing that all five propositions are unobtainable, they gave rise to the view of annihilation, claiming that there are no such dharmas as the two truths, cause and effect, and so on. For the sake of such people, it is said that what is negated is merely the existence and non-existence of your views, not the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. As the Madhyamakaśāstra states in the Chapter on the Agent: 'This action arises from various conditions, and in birth has no definitiveness.' Like the existence and non-existence you describe, it is existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. Furthermore, in response to treatises such as the Abhidharma, they claim that their doctrine possesses cause, effect, and the two truths. Hearing the Three Treatises refute all dharmas, they give rise to the view of annihilation, thinking there are no dharmas such as cause, effect, and the two truths. Now we clarify that the old doctrines merely lack cause, effect, and the two truths, while now cause, effect, and the two truths are first able to exist. Why? When one posits conditions with apprehension, there is neither cause nor effect, and the two truths are not established; hence it results in the meaning of no cause and effect. Now, when cause and effect are established, they first become tenable; therefore, the meaning of cause and effect exists. Furthermore, having previously refuted svabhāva-existence and non-existence, the view of existence was refuted; now, by clarifying the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions, the view of non-existence is refuted. Wishing to reveal the middle way, the gate of existence and non-existence is explained.

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Third, explaining correctness and error through the gate of possessing a root and lacking a root.

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Because of lacking a root, there is error; because of possessing a root, there is correctness. Regarding the statement that there is error because of lacking a root: the existence and non-existence of apprehension have no fundamental root. What is the root? The nondual correct path is the root of existence and non-existence. The Avataṃsaka-sūtra states: 'The true dharmatā is far removed from all paths of speech.' All destinies and non-destinies are entirely of the characteristic of quiescence; therefore, they are neither existent nor non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent, nor neither existent nor non-existent; hence it is said to be 'far removed from all destinies'. This is the root of all dharmas. All Buddhas and bodhisattvas attain the root of the true Dharma, so they are called sages. Because they lose the root of the true Dharma, [ordinary beings] wander in the six destinies. Since the true Dharma is neither existent nor non-existent, yet Buddhas and bodhisattvas wish to lead sentient beings out, they make provisional designations within what is devoid of names and characteristics, and therefore speak of existence and non-existence. Such existence and non-existence possess a root. Because they possess a root, before attainment they can be established, and thus the meaning of existence and non-existence stands. The existence and non-existence of apprehension are fixed in existence and non-existence, claiming that the two truths have two separate principles; since they are not neither existent nor non-existent, nor neither-not-existent-nor-not-non-existent, they lack a root. When the root is lacking, the branches cannot stand either, so existence and non-existence cannot be established. This is why it is an error.

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Examining the Essential Tenet. Question: Why is this meaning explained? Answer: It is to establish the above meaning of success and failure. The reason why the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have success in possessing being and non-being is that being and non-being have a root. The reason why essential being and non-being are not established is that they lack a root. Question: In the second gate of being and non-being, it states, "All phenomena of apprehension are sought through the five propositions and cannot be found, and only then is the present being and non-being of causes and conditions distinguished." How does this differ from the present explanation that being and non-being arise due to non-being and non-non-being? Answer: This is an old doctrine of our mountain lineage (Sheshan). Later scholars did not recognize it and liked to confuse them with each other. The former explanation that the five propositions cannot be found is merely the meaning of 'there being that which is negated'. What is explained here, that the five propositions cannot be found, is the meaning of 'being devoid of anything existent'; hence they are not the same. Question: Since both explain that the five propositions cannot be found, how is one 'there being that which is negated' and the other 'being devoid of anything existent'? Answer: One may observe it with a careful mind. The former explanation that the five propositions cannot be found means there are no phenomena outside of principle. What is explained here, that the five propositions cannot be found, refers to the correct path; therefore, the former primarily negates what is existent, whereas the present is the being and non-being of that which is devoid of anything existent. Therefore they differ. Question: Is there a sequence between these two? Answer: One must first refute and wash away all phenomena outside of principle, demonstrating that the five propositions cannot be found, and only then can one distinguish the two truths of causes and conditions; through the two truths one is first able to express the correct path of nonduality. In terms of those who awaken and enter, there is such a sequence. If one considers it from the perspective of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: explaining that the correct path is fundamentally neither being nor non-being, they speak of being and non-being for the sake of sentient beings, and only then are there the two truths. And these two truths cut off the five propositions of essential being and non-being, so next is explained being and non-being devoid of inherent nature. This is based on the sequence of manifesting function. Therefore, one must recognize our mountain lineage's essentials in distinguishing success and failure, which are also the heart and marrow of the sūtras and treatises.

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Fourth, revealing success and failure through the gate of revealing the path and not revealing the path.

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The being and non-being of apprehension fixate on being and non-being; therefore, being does not express non-being, and non-being fixates on non-being, so non-being cannot express non-non-being. Since such being and non-being do not reveal the correct path of nonduality that is neither being nor non-being, it is called failure. As for the being and non-being of conventional designations through causes and conditions, being does not abide in being, and being expresses non-being; non-being does not abide in non-being, and therefore non-being expresses non-non-being. Since such being and non-being can express the correct path of nonduality, it is called success.

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Examining the Essential Tenet. Question: Why explain expressing the path? Answer: Since the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have realized that the path is fundamentally neither being nor non-being, wishing to bring sentient beings to awakening, they know it is neither being nor non-being and provisionally speak of being and non-being; provisionally speaking of being and non-being in turn expresses non-being and non-non-being. The former is giving rise to function from the path; the present is opening the path by means of function. The former is the upāya capable of transforming; the present is causing beings to awaken and enter. With the being and non-being of apprehension, there is no giving rise to function from the path nor opening the path by means of function, nor is there any upāya capable of transforming or [...] leading beings back to the source. Therefore, this is the great essential tenet of failure and success.

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Fifth, distinguishing success and failure through the gate of principle and teaching.

6.21

The being and non-being of apprehension is principle; the being and non-being of non-apprehension is teaching. The old theories say that the two truths are two principles: the fourfold transcendence is the principle of paramārtha-satya, and the threefold designation is the principle of saṃvṛti-satya. With two principles, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, their nature and characteristics are ever so; being deluded about them constitutes the six destinies, and awakening to them yields the three vehicles. Now we explain: since they are two principles, they cannot be changed or reversed, so the roots of being and non-being run deep, solid as stones. Because of this definitive being and non-being, the two views arise. Why is this so? Since in their principle there is truly being and non-being, how could the two views of being and non-being fail to arise? Furthermore, suppose two principles are established: identity and difference cannot be maintained. If the two principles were one, then conventional designation would also make the ultimate designated, and the ultimate transcendence would also make the conventional transcended. If one is designated and one is not designated, or one is transcended and one is not transcended, then the two principles cannot be one. If the two principles are not one, then form is not emptiness and emptiness is not form, and the statement of mutual identity is ruined. Since one establishes the name of two principles, one must face the inquiry into identity and difference. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya claims: 'The Great Existence is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and the impermanent are of one substance.' The Vaiśeṣika claims: 'The Great Existence is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; therefore the permanent and the impermanent are of two substances.' The treatise master (Nāgārjuna) directly refutes the permanent and impermanent being of one substance or of different substances, and existence and the myriad phenomena are ruined of themselves. We request a detailed examination of this meaning: regarding the two truths as permanent and impermanent, how could their being of one substance or two substances avoid sharing the same failure? For instance, Kaishan (Zhizang) says: 'Paramārtha-satya is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and impermanent are of one substance.' Longguang (Sengmin) says: 'Paramārtha-satya is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and impermanent are of two substances.' Making them identical with the doctrines of the two non-Buddhists, we clarify success by contrasting it with failure: the two truths are teaching. What is meant by 'teaching' is that, because the principle is fundamentally nondual, yet for the sake of beings duality is spoken, it is named teaching.

6.22

Examining the Essential Tenet. Question: Why are the two truths taken as teaching? Answer: Taking being and non-being as teaching has briefly five meanings: First, contrasting with principle, it clarifies that the two truths are teaching. Because the ultimate principle is without duality, it is neither being nor non-being; now being and non-being are spoken, and therefore being and non-being are teaching. Second is the conditions of the sages. The sage realizes the path has never been being or non-being; now speaking of being and non-being is to teach beings, and therefore being and non-being are teaching. Third is to remove views. In the old doctrines, grasping being and non-being as principle has existed for a long time, so the roots of the two views are deep and difficult to uproot. The Great Master of Mount She (Sengquan / Falang), rebuking the disease in response to the conditions, wished to uproot the roots of the two views and cause them to relinquish both attachments to being and non-being; thus he said that being and non-being can lead to the nondual principle and are not ultimate, so one should not abide in being and non-being; hence being and non-being are teaching. Fourth, being and non-being are the root of all views. All sūtras and treatises vigorously reprimand the two views and rebuke being and non-being, as in 'Ordinary people are attached to being, and those of the two vehicles are attached to non-being'; also, 'Those with much craving are attached to being, and those with many views are attached to non-being'; also, 'Those with many of the four views hold to being, and those with many wrong views grasp non-being'; also, 'Five hundred treatise masters in the Buddhadharma grasped being, and upon hearing of ultimate emptiness it was like a knife wounding their hearts; the Fangguang (vaipulya nihilists) grasped non-being, disbelieving in cause and effect'; also, 'What the ninety-six kinds of non-Buddhists grasp does not go beyond being and non-being.' If the Buddhas appearing in the world again said that being and non-being are two principles, that would only increase the mind of various views; by what means could they be uprooted? Therefore, now we clarify that being and non-being are the function of the teaching gate, capable of leading to the nondual principle, and one should not abide in being and non-being, in order to quiet all views. Thus the sūtras and treatises explain that being and non-being are the teaching gate. Fifth, when followers who receive the teaching hear that being and non-being are the function of the teaching, capable of leading to the correct path, they empty their minds without being defiled by the teaching of being and non-being; when obsolete, the moment they generate the intention they transcend the ordinary and the sage. Therefore, taking being and non-being as teaching, the intention and benefit are attained.

6.23

Question: What texts prove that the two truths are teaching? Answer: The textual passages are extremely numerous; let us briefly cite one sūtra and one treatise each. The treatise (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*) says: 'The Buddhas teach the Dharma relying on the two truths'; therefore the two truths are teaching. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* says: 'Bodhisattvas abide in the two truths to teach the Dharma for sentient beings. For those attached to being they teach emptiness; for those attached to emptiness they teach being.' Thus we know the two truths are teaching. The treatise cites what the Buddha said, and the sūtra clarifies what the bodhisattva said; therefore, in both sūtras and treatises, Buddhas and bodhisattvas all clarify that the two truths are teaching. Question: If you prove that the two truths are teaching with five meanings and two texts, now we also use five objections and two texts to show that the two truths are not teaching. First, if one hears that the two truths are teaching, then when the Buddha speaks the teaching gate there are two truths, and when he does not speak there should be no two truths. If so, originally the two truths gave rise to the two cognitions; when the Buddha does not speak the two truths, there are no two truths, and since there are no two truths, what does the Buddha illuminate? Second, if the two truths are teaching, the six pāramitās and other practices are all saṃvṛti-satya. When the Buddha does not speak saṃvṛti-satya, there is no saṃvṛti-satya, and then there would be no six pāramitās and other practices. If so, there would only be the Dharma jewel of the expressive teaching, and no Dharma jewel of wholesome karma. Third, the two truths serve as the object that generates the two cognitions; the two truths are named the Dharma jewel of the objective realm. If the two truths are teaching, there is only the Dharma jewel of the expressive teaching, and no Dharma jewel of the objective realm. If you say that because the teaching generates cognition it is alternatively called an object, then when the Buddha does not speak the teaching, there is no teaching that can be converted, and there would be no object. Fourth, if the two truths are teaching, form and the myriad phenomena are all saṃvṛti-satya. Since saṃvṛti-satya is teaching, form and the myriad phenomena should also be teaching. If so, when the Buddha does not speak saṃvṛti-satya, there would be no form or myriad phenomena. Fifth, if saṃvṛti-satya is teaching, saṃvṛti-satya would only have the teaching-fire, and should lack the function of real fire. If fire were only teaching, speaking 'fire' with the mouth should burn the mouth. Next, we cite two texts to prove that the two truths are not teaching. If one says that paramārtha-satya is teaching, the sūtra says: 'Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the nature and characteristics permanently abide'; but teaching exists only when there is a Buddha and does not exist when there is no Buddha—how could it permanently abide? The sūtra says: 'Regarding the twelve links of dependent origination, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, they permanently exist of themselves'; hence we know saṃvṛti-satya is not teaching. Answer: There are two kinds of truths: first, truths in relation to [perspective] (yuditi); second, truths as teaching (jiaoditi). Truths in relation to [perspective] means: form has never been being or non-being, yet in relation to the ordinary it is being, termed saṃvṛti-satya; in relation to the sage it is emptiness, termed paramārtha-satya. Because being in relation to the ordinary is named saṃvṛti-satya, the myriad phenomena are not lost; because emptiness in relation to the sage is named paramārtha-satya, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, the nature and characteristics permanently abide. Truths as teaching means: the Buddhas and bodhisattvas thoroughly comprehend that form has never been being or non-being, and to transform sentient beings, they speak of being and non-being as the two truths, wishing to make them awaken through this being and non-being to neither being nor non-being—this is teaching. Now the old doctrines explaining that the two truths are principle: this is merely the two truths in relation to [perspective]. When truths in relation to [perspective] are compared with truths as teaching, they not only lose the nondual principle, but also lose the teaching capable of expressing it.

6.24

Question: Since being existent with respect to ordinary beings is an error, is being non-existent with respect to noble ones also an error?
Answer: Provisionally speaking, with respect to ordinary beings, the noble [perspective] is clarified as correct; but when looked at from [the standpoint of] the teaching-satya, both are errors. Since form has never been existent or non-existent, yet one forms an understanding of existence or non-existence, how could that not be an error?
Question: The sūtra states: "All saṃvṛti-satya, if with respect to the Tathāgata, is indeed the supreme paramārtha-satya." Is this also an error?
Answer: Provisionally, in contrast to the existence of ordinary beings, it is an error, and the emptiness of the noble ones is praised as correct. But if considered from [the standpoint of] the teaching-satya, the satya with respect to [subjects] not only fails to express the principle of nonduality, it also fails to attain the teaching capable of expressing it; it is merely what is seen by conceptual attachment. However, the Tathāgata understands that form in reality has never been empty or existent. If one recognizes the two kinds of two truths, then the five objections naturally dissolve.
Question: Although the objection has this resolution, it is still not yet evident. Now, when you state that the existence and non-existence of form is the teaching-satya, when it is not spoken, is the existence and non-existence of form the teaching-satya?
Answer: Since speaking is taken as the teaching, when the Buddha does not speak, there is no teaching-satya.
Question: If that is so, then there are only ever the two satyas with respect to [subjects], and there would be no existence and non-existence of causes and conditions.
Answer: All phenomena are constantly the existence and non-existence with respect to the two [classes of subjects], and are also constantly the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. If with respect to the two conditions, that is precisely the existence and non-existence of the two satyas with respect to [subjects]. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas understand that this form is precisely the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. However, between "with respect to" and "teaching", there have never been two: with respect to the two conditions, then the teaching is established; in understanding and awakening, then "with respect to" becomes the teaching.
Question: If with respect to the two conditions it is precisely the existence and non-existence with respect to the two [classes of subjects], then from the perspective of Buddhas and bodhisattvas it is precisely the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. If this existence and non-existence of causes and conditions is precisely the object of causes and conditions, how can it be said to be the teaching?
Answer: The existence and non-existence of causes and conditions has never been existent or non-existent; therefore, although it is existent and non-existent, it is neither existent nor non-existent. Such existence and non-existence is capable of revealing nonduality, which is precisely the meaning of the teaching.
Question: If the Buddha does not speak, there is constantly the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. How could the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions be the teaching?
Answer: We do not only take the sense of speaking as the teaching; the sūtras explain that the six sense-objects are all teachings.
Question: If that is so, what is the difference between object and teaching?
Answer: This existence and non-existence of causes and conditions can be discussed from two perspectives. Giving rise to cognition is the object; being capable of revealing the principle of nonduality—neither existent nor non-existent—is the teaching. This is based on the Buddha's non-speaking, where object and teaching naturally exist. If explaining object and teaching based on the sense of speaking: the Buddha illuminates existence and non-existence, and existence and non-existence are called the object; the Buddha speaks of existence and non-existence, and existence and non-existence are the teaching.
Question: Others also say that illuminating existence and non-existence means existence and non-existence are the object, and speaking of existence and non-existence means existence and non-existence are the teaching. How does this differ from the present [view]?
Answer: Others only attain the existence and non-existence of fixed nature with respect to the two [classes of subjects]; this existence and non-existence cannot reveal neither-existence-nor-non-existence, hence it is not the teaching. Moreover, the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions is the object, whereas the existence and non-existence of fixed nature is not the object. Why? Existence does not exist from itself; it exists due to non-existence. Non-existence does not not-exist from itself; it is non-existent due to existence. Being non-existent due to existence, non-existence is the non-existence of existence; being existent due to non-existence, existence is the existence of non-existence. Understanding this existence and non-existence of causes and conditions can generate the two wisdoms: recognizing that existence is the existence of non-existence gives rise to real expedient wisdom; understanding that non-existence is the non-existence of existence gives rise to expedient real wisdom. If it were existence and non-existence of fixed nature, it would give rise to the two views of annihilation and permanence, and therefore cannot be called an object.

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淨名玄論 — Classical Chinese