淨名玄論 6.9

6.9

Question: Suppose we now cite the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's explanation of the three provisionalities (saṃjñā) to show it does not fall into error. Why? That text explains that the three provisionalities as existent are saṃvṛti-satya, while the three provisionalities as empty are paramārtha-satya. Being identical with the three provisionalities, it is always the four negations (catur-vācā); being identical with the four negations, it is always the three provisionalities. Being identical with the three provisionalities yet always the four negations, existence does not exist of itself; being identical with the four negations yet always the three provisionalities, emptiness is not empty of itself. Therefore, it does not mean svabhāva. Answer: If the three provisionalities are saṃvṛti-satya and the four negations are paramārtha-satya, does the existence of saṃvṛti-satya depend on true emptiness, or does it not depend on it? This single interrogation leads to two unacceptable conclusions. If you say that saṃvṛti-satya depends on paramārtha-satya, then saṃvṛti-satya is that which depends and paramārtha-satya is that which is depended upon; the two truths would then merely be provisionality of mutual dependence. How then could one fix the three provisionalities as saṃvṛti-satya and the four negations as paramārtha-satya? If you say that the existence of saṃvṛti-satya does not depend on true emptiness, then since it is not mutually dependent, it becomes svabhāva. Therefore, it cannot be answered [in this way]. Question: The existence of saṃvṛti-satya cannot depend on the essence of paramārtha-satya, because the true essence is transcendent and therefore cannot enter mutual dependence. Answer: Now, if the existence of saṃvṛti-satya depends on the name of saṃvṛti-satya and the name of paramārtha-satya, existence depends on non-existence, and there is no such fault.