維摩經義疏 4.10.2

4.10.2

若眾生得離病者，則菩薩無復病」。 夫法身無生，況復有形。 既無有形，病何由起？ 然為彼受生，不得無形。 既其有形，不得無病。 若彼離病，菩薩無復病也。 「譬如長者唯有一子，其子得病，父母亦病； 若子病愈，父母亦愈。 菩薩如是於諸眾生愛之若子，眾生病則菩薩病，眾生病愈菩薩亦愈」。 此舉譬及合答，釋上病滅之問也。 又言是病何所因起，此答第一問也。 問本在前，今答居後，故稱又焉。 不前答者，但說病生滅久近既明，則大悲自顯，是以前答生滅、後答大悲也。 「菩薩病者，以大悲起」。 菩薩前悲無窮，與癡愛但生； 後悲無盡，共群生俱滅。 但眾生病原起乎癡愛，菩薩疾本生於大悲。 問：菩薩病因眾生起，云何因於大悲？ 答：因眾生有大悲，因菩薩心悲故有菩薩身病。 「文殊師利言：居士！ 此室何以空無侍者」。 此第二以論空室。 淨名前明空室，然後示病； 此明由空故起慈，即說實慧生方便也。 文殊前問大悲之疾，復問空室者，示大悲即空，亦由方便，故明實慧也。 初有二問：一問空室。 夫人所住應有資生之物，而今廓然都空，何故爾耶？ 又凡病者，理必須侍，何故無耶？ 所以并問二事者，以俱無二事，故合問之也。 問空室，明無法； 問無侍者，顯無人。 「維摩詰言：諸佛國土亦復皆空」。 答二問，即為二別。 答初問凡有二番：平等之道，其理無二，十方國土無不空者，曷為問一室空耶？ 而舉佛土者，惑者謂眾生虛妄，依果可空； 佛土真實則不可空。 又眾生無力持故可空，佛有力持則應不空。 故今明佛得自在，尚不能使己國為有，況眾生土耶。 「又問：以何為空」。 汝室以無物故空，十方佛土宛然現故有，何得空耶？ 「答曰：以空空」。 上空，是空慧空也； 下空，是前境空也。 要當以空慧觀之，然後一切空，非是無物然後空也。 「又問：空何用空」。 法本自空，何用空慧空諸法耶？ 「答曰：以無分別空法故空」。 法雖自空，必須空慧； 若無空慧，則於我為有。 用此無分別空慧，故得其空。 得其空，即於我非有也。 所以名無分別空慧者，無智之生也起於分別，而諸法無相，故智無分別。 故以無分別智觀諸法空也。 《攝大乘論》正以空智為無分別智。 「又問：空可分別耶」。 自上已來明前境空，此下已去欲辨智空。 體空之慧乃不分別，故知諸法空。 即此能觀之慧而體是有，可得分別耶？ 「答曰：分別亦空」。 此明空慧亦空也。 若慧異於空則是分別，以慧亦空故無分別，所以云分別亦空。 「又問：空當於何求」。 上因正觀以明空，惑者謂空義在正、不在於邪，故問空義之所在，以明邪正不二也。 「答曰：當於六十二見中求」。 六十二見即畢竟空，故就諸見以明空所在也。 「又問：六十二見當於何求」。 上泯邪正，今齊縛解，故問諸見當於何求。 「答曰：當於諸佛解脫中求」。 諸佛解脫即畢竟空，故與諸見不二，所以求諸見於解脫。 「又問：諸佛解脫當於何求」。 此欲明眾生與佛不二，故發斯問也。 「答曰：當於一切眾生心行中求」。 惑者謂諸佛解脫在乎正觀，眾生心行居愛見煩惱，故明眾生與佛本無二相，愛見煩惱即大涅槃，故就眾生心行中求佛解脫。 「又仁所問：何無侍者？ 一切眾魔及諸外道皆吾侍也」。 此答第二問也。 前明空室以顯於空，今答無侍以顯於有。 所以然者，以空室故，則上攝佛土一切皆空； 以無侍故，下攝群生以為侍者。 又上明空室，則辨法空； 今論無侍，明乎人有。 法空謂實慧也，人有即方便慧也，故此經始末皆有二慧。 「所以者何？ 眾魔者樂生死，菩薩於生死而不捨； 外道者樂諸見，菩薩於諸見而不動」。 魔樂著五欲、不求出世，故云樂生死。 外道雖求出世而執著己法，故云樂諸見。 大悲觀生死同涅槃，故能不捨；

“If sentient beings were free from sickness, then the bodhisattva would have sickness no more.” Now, the dharmakāya is unarisen, much less having a physical form. Since it has no physical form, how could sickness arise? Yet, taking birth on their behalf, it cannot be without form. Since it has form, it cannot be without sickness. If they are freed from sickness, the bodhisattva will have sickness no more. “Just as an elder who has an only son: when that son falls ill, the father and mother also fall ill; when the son recovers from the illness, the father and mother also recover. The bodhisattva likewise loves all sentient beings as an only son: when sentient beings are sick, the bodhisattva is sick; when sentient beings recover from sickness, the bodhisattva also recovers.” This adduces the simile and the matching explanation, resolving the previous question regarding the cessation of the illness. Furthermore, it says, “What is the cause from which this illness arises?” This answers the first question. The question was originally first, but here the answer is placed after; hence it says “furthermore.” The reason it was not answered first is simply that, once the duration and the arising and cessation of the illness are made clear, great compassion becomes self-evident; therefore, he first answered concerning arising and ceasing, and later answered concerning great compassion. “A bodhisattva's illness arises from great compassion.” The bodhisattva's earlier compassion is infinite, arising together with [sentient beings'] ignorance and craving; the later compassion is inexhaustible, ceasing together with all sentient beings. While the root of sentient beings' illness arises from ignorance and craving, the bodhisattva's illness fundamentally originates in great compassion. Question: If the bodhisattva's illness arises on account of sentient beings, why is it said to arise on account of great compassion? Answer: Because of sentient beings there is great compassion; because of the bodhisattva's compassionate mind, there is the illness of the bodhisattva's body. “Mañjuśrī said: ‘Householder, why is this room empty, without attendants?’” This secondly discusses the empty room. Jingming previously manifested an empty room and afterward displayed illness; this clarifies that love arises from emptiness, which is to say that real wisdom gives rise to upāya. Mañjuśrī, having previously asked about the illness of great compassion, asks again about the empty room to reveal that great compassion is itself empty, and also that from upāya, real wisdom is thereby illuminated. At first, there are two questions: the first asks about the empty room. What a person dwells in should have provisions for life, but now it is thoroughly open and completely empty—why is this so? Furthermore, anyone who is ill, by principle, definitely requires attendants—why are there none? The reason both matters are asked together is that because both are absent, they are questioned together. Asking about the empty room clarifies the absence of dharmas; asking about the absence of attendants reveals the absence of persons. “Vimalakīrti said: ‘The buddha-lands of all buddhas are likewise all empty.’” Answering the two questions, there are two distinct parts. Answering the first question, there are two turns: The Path of equality is non-dual in principle, and of the lands of the ten directions there are none that are not empty; why ask about the emptiness of a single room? As for citing buddha-lands: the confused think that sentient beings are illusory, so their dependent fruition can be empty, whereas a buddha-land is real and therefore cannot be empty. Moreover, [they think that] because sentient beings lack sustaining power, [their realm] can be empty, whereas a buddha has sustaining power and therefore it should not be empty. Therefore, he now clarifies that even though a buddha has attained sovereign mastery, he still cannot make his own land existent, so how much less the lands of sentient beings! “He further asked: ‘With what is it empty?’” Your room is empty because it is devoid of objects, while the buddha-lands of the ten directions exist because they clearly appear—how can they be empty? “He replied: ‘It is empty with emptiness.’” The former “empty” is the emptiness of empty wisdom; the latter “empty” is the emptiness of the objective realm before it. One must necessarily contemplate it with empty wisdom, and only then is everything empty; it is not that things are empty only after being devoid of objects. “He further asked: ‘Why use emptiness to empty?’” Dharmas are fundamentally empty of themselves; why use empty wisdom to empty dharmas? “He replied: ‘It is empty because one empties dharmas through non-discrimination.’” Although dharmas are of themselves empty, empty wisdom is essential; if there were no empty wisdom, they would exist for me. By using this non-discriminating empty wisdom, one attains its emptiness. Attaining its emptiness, it does not exist for me. Why is it called non-discriminating empty wisdom? The arising of non-wisdom originates in discrimination, whereas all dharmas are markless; hence wisdom is without discrimination. Thus, with non-discriminative wisdom one contemplates all dharmas as empty. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha precisely takes empty wisdom to be non-discriminating wisdom. “He further asked: ‘Can emptiness be discriminated?’” From above, the emptiness of the objective realm has been clarified; from here down, he wishes to examine the emptiness of wisdom. The wisdom that embodies emptiness does not discriminate, and thus it knows that all dharmas are empty. Does this very contemplative wisdom, being existent in its substance, admit of discrimination? “He replied: ‘Discrimination is also empty.’” This clarifies that empty wisdom is also empty. If wisdom were different from emptiness, it would be discrimination; because wisdom is also empty, it is without discrimination; hence he says, “Discrimination is also empty.” “He further asked: ‘Where should emptiness be sought?’” Above, emptiness was clarified based on correct contemplation; the confused think that the meaning of emptiness lies in the correct and not in the perverse, so he asks where the meaning of emptiness resides, to show that the perverse and the correct are non-dual. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the sixty-two views.’” The sixty-two views are themselves ultimate emptiness; therefore, he clarifies where emptiness resides with reference to these views. “He further asked: ‘Where should the sixty-two views be sought?’” Above, perverse and correct were eliminated; now bondage and liberation are equalized, so he asks where the views should be sought. “He replied: ‘They should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas.’” The liberation of all buddhas is itself ultimate emptiness; therefore, it is non-dual with the views; hence he seeks the views in liberation. “He further asked: ‘Where should the liberation of all buddhas be sought?’” Wishing to clarify that sentient beings and buddhas are non-dual, he raises this question. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the mental activities of all sentient beings.’” The confused think that the liberation of all buddhas lies in correct contemplation, whereas the mental activities of sentient beings abide in the defilements of craving and views; hence he clarifies that sentient beings and buddhas fundamentally have no dual characteristics, and the defilements of craving and views are themselves Great Nirvāṇa; therefore, he seeks the liberation of buddhas in the mental activities of sentient beings. “He also said: ‘As for your question, Benevolent One, “Why are there no attendants?”—all the māras and all the non-Buddhists are my attendants.’” This answers the second question. Previously he clarified the empty room to reveal emptiness; now he answers regarding the lack of attendants to reveal existence. Why is this so? Because with an empty room, above, he encompasses the buddha-lands as all empty; because of having no attendants, below, he encompasses all sentient beings as attendants. Moreover, above, in clarifying the empty room, he examined the emptiness of dharmas; now, in discussing having no attendants, he clarifies the existence of persons. The emptiness of dharmas refers to real wisdom; the existence of persons is upāya wisdom; therefore, this sūtra has both wisdoms from beginning to end. “‘Why is that? The māras delight in saṃsāra, and the bodhisattva does not abandon saṃsāra; the non-Buddhists delight in views, and the bodhisattva remains unmoved among views.’” Māras delight in and cling to the five desires and do not seek transcendence of the world; hence they are said to delight in saṃsāra. Non-Buddhists, although seeking transcendence of the world, cling to their own dharmas; hence they are said to delight in views. Through great compassion, one contemplates saṃsāra as identical to nirvāṇa, and thus is able not to abandon it;