楞伽阿跋多羅寶經註解 4.98

4.98

非因不相似事生等者，謂無常若非有因，則無差別事生。若其生矣，一切法則與之偕生悉皆無常，豈非差別事以驗無常之有因必矣。如彼所計，則此法彼法、能作所作應無差別，而現見差別之異，云何妄計無因生差別法耶？若性無常等者，凡言性必究竟無作，無作則常。既云無常，則墮於有作諸法，非究竟義。以是為因，則墮作因性相，失本性義。言自無常應無常者，謂能作之性若是無常，應同所作之法皆是無常。自性既是無常，則所作無常之法反應是常。一切性即一切法也。

Regarding "Dissimilar things do not arise without a cause" and so on, it means that if impermanence did not have a cause, differentiated things would not arise. If they did arise, all dharmas would arise along with it and all would be impermanent; is it not by differentiated things that the necessity of impermanence having a cause is verified? According to what they reckon, this dharma and that dharma, the maker and what is made, ought to be without difference, yet we visibly perceive the distinctions of difference; why falsely reckon that things with differences arise without cause? Regarding "If nature were impermanent" and so on: whenever one speaks of nature, it must be ultimately unmade; being unmade, it is permanent. Since they say it is impermanent, it falls into conditioned dharmas, which is not the ultimate meaning. Taking this as a cause, it falls into the nature and characteristic of an active cause, losing the meaning of original nature. Stating "impermanence itself ought to be impermanent" means that if the nature capable of making were impermanent, it ought, like the dharmas that are made, to be entirely impermanent. Since intrinsic nature would be impermanent, the impermanent dharmas that are made would conversely have to be permanent. "All natures" means all dharmas.