首楞嚴義疏注經 3
English (machine translation) 3
- Language
- English
3.1
Compiled by the Śramaṇa Zixuan of Changshui
3.2
Second, refuting the six sense entrances. In Sanskrit, praveśa, which is translated here as "entrance" (ru) or also as "base" (chu)—the place where sense objects enter, and also because it is the place where consciousness arises. However, both faculties and objects are places where consciousness arises; now, dividing the six faculties to refute them individually, the faculties alone are taken as entrances. The text has two parts: first, general inquiry.
3.3
"Furthermore, Ānanda, how are the six sense entrances originally the wonderful tathatā nature of the tathāgatagarbha?"
3.4
As explained at the beginning of the five aggregates.
3.5
Second, refuting individually, which has six parts: first, the eye entrance, which has three parts: first, indicating its lack of intrinsic substance, which has two parts: first, bringing up an analogy to reveal its falsity.
3.6
"Ānanda, just as with the eye that gazes fixedly until fatigue arises, both the eye and the fatigue are together the marks of staring fixedly and producing fatigue within bodhi."
3.7
This borrows the staring eye that sees flowers from the previous section on the aggregate of form as an analogy. The eyeball analogizes the nature of awareness; staring fixedly to produce fatigue analogizes the sudden arising of delusive thoughts. "Both the eye and the fatigue," etc., refers to this eye faculty's grasping subject and grasped object arising without departing from the real, hence it says "are together bodhi." The sūtra text is brief; if discussed in detail, the clear eye analogizes the nature of awareness; producing fatigue due to fixed staring analogizes the movement of thoughts forming because of the failure to comprehend avidyā; seeing flowers in space due to producing fatigue analogizes the manifestation of delusive realms and the physical faculties and bodies due to the movement of thoughts. From "Both the eye and the fatigue" downward, the teaching is pointed out based on the analogy. The eye is the movement of avidyā; mental fatigue is the manifested faculties and objects as well as the observing mind; both this mind and objects, along with the moving thoughts, are entirely marks of fatigue born of avidyā within the nature of bodhi, having no substance to be found and arising falsely, just like the staring eye seeing flowers in space—all are fatigue.
3.8
Second, discerning non-existence based on sense dust.
3.9
"Conditioned by the two kinds of delusive dust, brightness and darkness, seeing is produced within them and absorbs these images of dust, being named the nature of seeing. This seeing, apart from the two dusts of brightness and darkness, ultimately has no substance."
3.10
Since the moving mind manifests delusive realms, faculties and dusts branch out from these delusive realms, standing in mutual opposition and comparison; originally devoid of own-nature, their substance cannot be found. As it says below: "Awareness is produced by dust; marks exist because of faculties. Marks and seeing have no own-nature, like intertwined reeds." Therefore it says: "Conditioned by brightness and darkness, seeing is produced within them." Since the dust produces the faculty, and the faculty in turn grasps the realm, only when faculty and realm are both complete does the nature of seeing become established; hence it says "absorbing these is named the nature of seeing," etc. Since it gains the name of seeing due to grasping realms, one knows that this seeing arises from reflected images. "Image" analogizes dust. The Awakening of Faith says: "Just as a bright mirror manifests forms and images, the manifesting consciousness is also like this: as the five dusts present themselves in front of it, it manifests them." If brightness and darkness, like reflected images, still have no substance to be found, how could the seeing produced by them have any substance? Therefore it says: "apart from them, it has no substance."
3.11
Second, refuting so as to establish the absence of marks, which has two parts: first, indicating non-arising.
3.12
"So it is, Ānanda: you should know that this seeing does not come from brightness or darkness, does not emerge from the faculty, and does not arise from space."
3.13
Although the previous text said "conditioned by brightness and darkness," that was to reveal that the faculty's nature is originally non-existent and exists depending on another, seeming to have a cause in terms of delusive discrimination. Now, investigating the four locations, its substance has no place of arising; hence this is indicated here.
3.14
Second, refuting the place of arising.
3.15
"Why is this? If it came from brightness, darkness would then be extinguished, and one should not see darkness. If it came from darkness, brightness would then be extinguished, and one should have no seeing of brightness. If it arose from the faculty, there would certainly be neither brightness nor darkness. Thus, the essence of seeing originally has no own-nature. If it emerged from space, looking forward it would observe the images of dust, and returning it should see the faculty. Furthermore, if space itself perceives, what does that have to do with your sense entrance?"
3.16
First, refuting arising from the realm: within the realm itself, brightness and darkness oppose each other; conditioned by brightness, one does not see darkness, because when it is dark there is no brightness, and seeing is extinguished along with brightness; conditioned by darkness, it is the reverse. Next, refuting arising from the faculty: arising from the faculty does not depend on brightness and darkness; when brightness and darkness do not arrive, the faculty has no own-nature. Arising from the faculty mentioned here means looking at itself from itself, not referring to refuting consciousness; it can also refer to the ultimate faculty viewed against the conventional faculty, hence it says "arising from the faculty." Next, refuting arising from space: if one says space can produce it, the ultimate [faculty] would be inside the floating dusts; looking forward it would observe images, and returning it should observe the faculty. Furthermore, if space itself were able to have seeing, what would it have to do with your eye entrance?
3.17
Third, concluding that it is empty and false.
3.18
"Therefore, you should know that the eye entrance is empty and false, originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature."
3.19
As explained before.
3.20
Second, the ear entrance, which has three parts: first, indicating its lack of intrinsic substance, which has two parts: first, bringing up an analogy to reveal its falsity.
3.21
"Ānanda, it is like a person who tightly plugs their ears with two fingers: because the ear faculty becomes fatigued, a sound is made in the head; both the ear and the fatigue are together the marks of staring fixedly and producing fatigue within bodhi."
3.22
The ear analogizes the true nature, the fingers analogize avidyā, and the conjunction of the true and the false is called "plugging." The initial arising of moving thoughts is called "fatigue"; because thoughts move, realms manifest, like sound made in the head. From "Both the ear and the fatigue" downward: this moving thought and the delusive realm, the mind that binds and the realm that is manifested, are all marks of fatigue born of avidyā within the nature of bodhi. Here, plugging the ears is identical to staring straight ahead, hence it is also called "staring fixedly."
3.23
Second, discerning non-existence based on sense dust.
3.24
"Conditioned by the two kinds of delusive dust, movement and stillness, hearing is produced within them and absorbs these images of dust, being named the nature of hearing. This hearing, apart from the two dusts of movement and stillness, ultimately has no substance."
3.25
Since dust produces the faculty, and the faculty in turn grasps the realm, hearing is only established when faculty and realm depend on each other; therefore this ear faculty, apart from dust, has no substance.
3.26
Second, refuting so as to establish the absence of marks, which has two parts: first, indicating non-arising. "So it is, Ānanda: you should know that this hearing does not come from movement or stillness, does not emerge from the faculty, and does not arise from space."
3.27
Second, refuting the place of arising.
3.28
"Why is this? If it came from stillness, movement would then be extinguished, and one should not hear movement. If it came from movement, stillness would then be extinguished, and one should have no perception of stillness. If it arose from the faculty, there would certainly be neither movement nor stillness. Thus, the substance of hearing originally has no own-nature. If it emerged from space, having hearing as its nature it would not be space. Furthermore, if space itself hears, what does that have to do with your sense entrance?"
3.29
First, refuting arising from the realm: the realm has movement and stillness; if hearing arises from one, it would not hear the other, because in following what produces it, it has arising and extinguishing. Next, refuting arising from the faculty: not depending on movement and stillness, hearing also does not exist. Finally, refuting arising from space: if space possessed hearing, it would itself constitute a faculty; furthermore, if space itself hears, how could it involve the ear?
3.30
Third, concluding that it is empty and false.
3.31
"Therefore, you should know that the ear entrance is empty and false, originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature."
3.32
Third, the nose entrance, which has three parts: first, indicating its lack of intrinsic substance, which has two parts: first, bringing up an analogy to reveal its falsity.
3.33
"Ānanda, it is like a person who snorts forcefully through the nose: snorting for a long time produces fatigue, and then they perceive a cold sensation in the nose, and based on this sensation they distinguish unobstructedness and obstruction, emptiness and fullness, and so forth up to all fragrances and foul odors. Both the nose and the fatigue are together the marks of staring fixedly and producing fatigue within bodhi."
3.34
The nose analogizes the true nature, and the external wind analogizes avidyā. "Snorting" means drawing in breath, analogizing the conjunction of the true and the false. Fatigue analogizes the movement of mind; cold sensation, fragrance, and stench analogize delusive realms. The rest of the text is as before.
3.35
Second, discerning non-existence based on sense dust.
3.36
"Conditioned by the two kinds of delusive dust, unobstructedness and obstruction, smelling is produced within them and absorbs these images of dust, being named the nature of smelling. This smelling, apart from the two dusts of unobstructedness and obstruction, ultimately has no substance."
3.37
The explanation is as in the previous text.
3.38
Second, refuting so as to establish the absence of marks, which has two parts: first, indicating non-arising.
3.39
"You should know that this smelling does not come from unobstructedness or obstruction, does not emerge from the faculty, and does not arise from space: unobstructedness, obstruction, faculty, and space are all without a place of arising."
3.40
Second, refuting the place of arising.
3.41
"Why is this? If it came from unobstructedness, smelling would be extinguished during obstruction; how could one know obstruction? If it existed due to obstruction, there would be no smelling during unobstructedness; how could sensations like fragrance and stench be made clear? If it arose from the faculty, there would certainly be neither unobstructedness nor obstruction. Thus, the mechanism of smelling originally has no own-nature. If it emerged from space, this smelling should naturally turn back to smell your nose; if space itself possesses smelling, what does that have to do with your sense entrance?"
3.42
First, refuting arising from the realm: the mutual refutation of unobstructedness and obstruction can be understood. "Made clear" means manifested clearly. Next, refuting arising from the faculty: if it arose from the faculty, then there would be no realm; without a realm there would be no faculty, because awareness is produced by dust. "Mechanism" also means faculty. Next, refuting arising from space: looking forward it would smell the realm, and returning it would smell the faculty; if space itself smells fragrance, what use is your nose?
3.43
Third, concluding that it is empty and false.
3.44
"Therefore, you should know that the nose entrance is empty and false, originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature."
3.45
Fourth, the tongue entrance, which has three parts: first, indicating its lack of intrinsic substance, which has two parts: first, bringing up an analogy to reveal its falsity.
3.46
"Ānanda, it is like a person who licks their lips with their tongue: licking continuously causes fatigue; if the person is ill, there is a bitter taste, and if the person is not ill, there is a slightly sweet sensation. From sweetness and bitterness, it is revealed that when this tongue faculty does not move, the bland nature is constantly present. Both the tongue and the fatigue are together the marks of staring fixedly and producing fatigue within bodhi."
3.47
The tongue faculty not moving analogizes the true nature, the lips analogize avidyā, and licking analogizes the conjunction of the true and the false. Fatigue is the movement of thought; because thought moves, realms arise, such as sweet, bitter, and bland. Question: Sweetness and bitterness arise due to fatigue, and thus can analogize delusive realms. Blandness is the tongue faculty not moving and ought to analogize the real; why does it analogize a realm? Answer: Originally not moving can analogize the real; now, because it is revealed as not moving by means of movement, since it is a matter of relative contrast, it constitutes delusion. As it says below: "Speaking of delusion reveals the real; delusion and reality are equally two delusions." The rest is as in the text.
3.48
Second, revealing non-existence based on sense dust.
3.49
"Conditioned by the two kinds of delusive dust, sweet-bitter and bland, knowing is produced within them and absorbs these images of dust, being named the nature of knowing taste. This nature of knowing taste, apart from the two dusts of sweet-bitter and bland, ultimately has no substance."
3.50
Second, refuting so as to establish the absence of marks, which has two parts: first, indicating non-arising.
3.51
"Thus, Ānanda, you should know that such awareness of tasting bitter and bland does not come from sweet or bitter, nor does it exist because of the bland, nor does it emerge from the faculty, nor is it produced from space.
3.52
Second, refuting its place of arising.
3.53
"Why is this? If it came from the sweet and the bitter, then with the bland the awareness would be destroyed; how could it know the bland? If it emerged from the bland, with sweetness the awareness would vanish; how again could it know the two marks of sweet and bitter? If it arose from the tongue, there would definitely be no sweet, bland, or bitter dust. This root of knowing tastes would fundamentally lack an intrinsic nature. If it emerged from space, empty space would taste itself, and it would not be your mouth that knows. Furthermore, if space knows of itself, what does that have to do with your entrance?"
3.54
Coming from the object, from the faculty, and from space are also explained as before. 'Empty space would taste itself' means that tasting is just like savoring.
3.55
Third, concluding that it is unreal.
3.56
"Therefore, you should know that the tongue entrance is unreal; fundamentally, it is neither causes and conditions nor nature of spontaneity."
3.57
Fifth, the body entrance, in three parts: first, indicating its lack of substance, in two parts: first, adducing an analogy to reveal its unreality.
3.58
"Ānanda, it is like a person who touches a hot hand with a cold hand: if the power of cold is greater, the hot one follows the cold; if the efficacy of heat prevails, the cold one becomes hot. Thus, by means of this touch of contact awareness, awareness of separation is made manifest. If the mutual influence is accomplished, it is due to the touch of fatigue; together, the body and the fatigue are both the fatigued marks produced by bodhi's staring."
3.59
The two hands symbolize the real and the false; their contact symbolizes the union of the real and the false. The real does not maintain its own nature, but in following conditions becomes faculties, objects, and so forth, just as in following cold or hot conditions, cold or hot hands are formed. Question: 'Between the two hands, which hand symbolizes the real?' Answer: 'Take the one of inferior strength to symbolize the real; reflect on this.' The rest is as in the text.
3.60
Second, discerning its non-existence with reference to dusts.
3.61
"Because of the two kinds of false dust of separation and contact, an awareness is brought forth residing within, which inhales these dust-images and is called the nature of sensory awareness. Apart from the two dusts of separation and contact, adversity and suitability, this substance of sensory awareness has no substance whatsoever."
3.62
Second, refuting it to establish the absence of marks, in two parts: first, indicating non-arising.
3.63
"Thus, Ānanda, you should know that this awareness does not come from separation or contact, does not exist from adversity or suitability, does not emerge from the faculty, and is not produced from space."
3.64
Second, refuting its place of arising.
3.65
"Why is this? If it came at the time of contact, then at separation it would already be destroyed; how could it be aware of separation? The two marks of adversity and suitability are also like this. If it emerged from the faculty, there would definitely be no four marks of separation, contact, adversity, and suitability, and thus your bodily awareness would originally lack an intrinsic nature. If it must emerge from space, space itself would have sensory awareness; what does that have to do with your entrance?"
3.66
In refuting arising from the object, the reasoning is further expanded with reference to the two marks of adversity and suitability, on the model of separation and contact before. Next, arising from the faculty and arising from space are all as in the text.
3.67
Third, concluding that it is unreal.
3.68
"Therefore, you should know that the body entrance is unreal; fundamentally, it is neither causes and conditions nor nature of spontaneity."
3.69
Sixth, the mind entrance, in three parts: first, indicating its lack of substance, in two parts: first, adducing an analogy to reveal its unreality.
3.70
"Ānanda, it is like a person who sleeps when fatigued, and wakes when sleep is full; upon inspecting dusts he remembers, and losing recollection becomes forgetting."
3.71
The person symbolizes the true nature, because it is fundamentally aware of itself. Sleeping when fatigued symbolizes ignorance deluding the real, because its nature does not comprehend. Sleeping deeply symbolizes moving thought manifesting objects; that is to say, because of sleep, dreams are formed, and dreams possess both mind and object. Mind symbolizes the karmic transformation, and object symbolizes the manifested mark. Waking symbolizes the phenomenal consciousness; the phenomenal consciousness grasps the manifested objects, discriminating between defiled and pure, failing to understand that they are manifested by one's own mind, and viewing them as coming from outside, just as in recollecting matters within a dream without being able to be clear; therefore it says 'upon inspecting dusts he remembers; losing recollection becomes forgetting.'
3.72
"These inverted arisings, abidings, alterations, and cessations, their inhalation and habituation returning within without surpassing one another, are called the mind-knowing faculty. Together, the mind and the fatigue are both the fatigued marks produced by bodhi's staring."
3.73
The above collectively indicates arising and cessation, concluding to form the mind faculty. The objects manifested in a dream exist because of sleep; stripped of substance, they are false. Once awakened from sleep, failing to comprehend their false existence, inspecting and recollecting them, one takes them to be real: this is called inverted arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation. Waking, sleeping, recollecting, and forgetting are all arising and cessation. It is also thus in the Dharma: the moving mind manifesting objects is already unreal; the phenomenal consciousness does not understand and sees the objects as truly existent, which is called inversion. Objects and discriminations replace one another before and after, shifting from moment to moment: this is called arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation. Inspecting this arising and cessation wholly returns to the mind faculty, perfuming continuously and discriminating from moment to moment; this is termed the mind faculty. The discriminating mind as subject and the discriminated objects as object are both fatigued marks of ignorance within the nature of awareness.
3.74
Second, discerning its non-existence with reference to dusts.
3.75
"Because of the two kinds of false dust of arising and cessation, it gathers awareness residing within, inhaling and seizing internal dusts."
3.76
'Gathers' means collects. 'Within' is like the interior. 'Inhaling' and 'seizing' both mean grasping. Due to the objects of arising and cessation, the internal aware and knowing nature is brought forth and gathered; this awareness and knowing constantly grasps arising and cessation, discriminating internally, unlike the previous five which illuminate external sense objects; therefore they are called 'internal dusts', because the mind faculty conditions internally and does not condition externally, which is the 'gathering of conditions wavering within' in the preceding text.
3.77
"The seeing and hearing flowing against the current, the current not reaching the place, is called the nature of awareness and knowing. This nature of awareness and knowing, apart from those two dusts of waking and sleeping, arising and cessation, has no substance whatsoever."
3.78
This distinguishes it from the previous five. 'Flowing against the current' is like conditioning in reverse. 'Place' means location. The previous five only comply with grasping external objects and cannot condition internal dusts in reverse; this internal dust is called the place that conditioning cannot reach. This unreachable place joins only with the mind faculty; precisely this place of joining is the mind-knowing faculty.
3.79
Second, refuting it to establish the absence of marks, in two parts: first, indicating non-arising.
3.80
"Thus, Ānanda, you should know that such a faculty of awareness and knowing does not come from waking or sleeping, does not exist from arising or cessation, does not emerge from the faculty, and is also not produced from space."
3.81
Second, refuting its place of arising.
3.82
"Why is this? If it came from waking, sleeping would then be destroyed; what would be taken as sleeping? If it definitely exists when there is arising, then with cessation it would likewise be non-existent; who would be made to undergo cessation? If it exists from cessation, arising would then be destroyed and non-existent; who would know what arises? If it emerged from the faculty, the two marks of waking and sleeping follow the body's opening and closing; apart from these two substances, this aware and knowing one is identical to flowers in space, lacking an intrinsic nature altogether. If it were produced from space, it would naturally be space's knowing; what does that have to do with your entrance?"
3.83
First it refers to waking and sleeping, and next to arising and cessation; although the Dharma and the analogy are two, both refute arising from the object, in each case where one exists and the other vanishes. Next, in refuting arising from the faculty: the mind faculty has no mark, yet with reference to waking and sleeping it is revealed that waking can deliberate and sleeping forms dreams, whereby one knows it is the mind faculty. Now, refuting it: waking and sleeping are of themselves the body's opening and closing, not the mind faculty. The Liezi says: 'When waking, the form opens; when sleeping, the form intersects.' Intersecting is closing. The Zhuangzi also says: 'When sleeping, the spirits intersect; when waking, the form opens.' The meaning is that waking and sleeping have no substance of their own, but naturally follow the body and are not the mind faculty; one should know that the mind faculty is completely unobtainable. If it were produced from space, that is naturally impossible.
3.84
Third, concluding that it is unreal.
3.85
"Therefore, you should know that the mind entrance place is unreal; fundamentally, it is neither causes and conditions nor nature of spontaneity."
3.86
Third, refuting the twelve bases; this directly refutes the objects. The text has two parts: first, a general interrogation.
3.87
"Furthermore, Ānanda, how are the twelve bases fundamentally the wondrous nature of tathatā of the tathāgatagarbha?"
3.88
Previously this was generally indicated; now it is specifically interrogated and raised in order to reveal the nature of the garbha.
3.89
Second, specific refutations, in six parts: first, the eye and form bases, in three parts: first, adducing facts to interrogate.
3.90
"Ānanda, you just observe this Jeta Grove and the various springs and ponds. What do you think in your mind? Do these mean that form produces the eye's seeing, or that the eye produces the marks of form?"
3.91
'Base' takes 'door of arising' as its meaning; the six faculties and six objects are the places where consciousness arises. The faculties have already been refuted previously; now the objects are directly refuted, yet they are also refuted in mutual opposition to the faculties; therefore it asks both whether form produces or the eye produces, and so forth.
3.92
Second, taking up their conceptions to refute them.
3.93
"Ānanda, if the eye faculty were to produce the marks of form, then seeing space which is not form, the nature of form should dissolve; if it dissolves, then when manifested, all would be entirely non-existent. Since the marks of form are already non-existent, who could clarify the substance of space? Space is also like this."
3.94
This refutes the faculty producing the object. The first two sentences take up [the view]; from 'seeing space which is not form' downward refutes the object having form and space. Now they are refuted by opposing form and space; this refutes form. If when seeing space there is no form, then since the faculty produces form, which is called the nature of form, it should dissolve and vanish. If that which produces has vanished, how could that which is produced exist? Therefore it says: 'when manifested, all would be entirely non-existent'; this is space appearing and form dissolving. From 'the marks of form' downward there are two meanings: first, space does not reveal itself, but is revealed by form; now since there is no form, through what could space be revealed? Furthermore, the faculty that produces is likewise a form dharma; since the marks of form have perished, the faculty also ceases along with it; since the faculty has already ceased, what again would one use to comprehend the substance of space? This is space lacking form to reveal it. 'Space is also like this' refutes producing space by analogy; its operational marks are like form.
3.95
"Furthermore, if the dust of form produces the eye's seeing, then when observing space which is not form, the seeing would dissolve and perish; if it perishes, then all is non-existent, so who could clarify space and form?"
3.96
This refutes the object producing the faculty. The first two sentences take up [the view]; from 'when observing space' downward refutes it. This is also refuted by opposing form and space; this refutes form. Since form produces the faculty, at the time of observing space form has already dissolved and ceased; from what could the faculty be produced to comprehend space? Furthermore, form can reveal space; at the time of seeing space form has already dissolved and ceased; from what could space be revealed? The single word 'form' below implicitly contains the meaning that space can produce seeing, which should be known by analogy with form. Refuting singly while concluding doubly exhaustively realizes the translator's intent.
3.97
Third, concluding and showing it to be unreal.
3.98
"Therefore, you should know that seeing, along with form and space, are all without location; that is, the two bases of form and seeing are unreal; fundamentally, they are neither causes and conditions nor nature of spontaneity."
3.99
'Without location' means without a place of arising. The rest of the text can be seen.
3.100
Second, the ear and sound bases, in three parts: first, adducing facts to interrogate.
3.101
"Ānanda, you listen further in this Jeta Grove: the drum is beaten when the meal is ready, and the bell is struck when the assembly gathers, the sounds of bell and drum succeeding one another before and after. What do you think in your mind? Do these mean that sound comes to the ear's side, or does the ear go to the sound's place?"
3.102
This refers to the ear hearing the two sounds of bell and drum in order to refute the mark of coming and going between faculty and object. If one knows that both are unreal, what goes and what comes?
3.103
Second, taking up their conceptions to refute them.
3.104
"Ānanda, if this sound came to the ear's side, it would be like me begging for food in the city of Śrāvastī: being in the Jeta Grove, I would not be there; this sound would necessarily come to Ānanda's ear, and Maudgalyāyana and Kāśyapa should not hear it together, let alone the one thousand two hundred and fifty śramaṇas within it, who upon hearing the bell sound all together come to the dining place."
3.105
This refutes sound coming to the ear's place. The first two sentences take up [the view]; from 'it would be like me' downward refutes it. First, adducing an analogy: the Buddha is the sound; the city is the ear faculty; the grove is the bell and drum. From 'this sound' downward refutes by analogy. Since the sound has come to the side of your ear, this sound has already left the bell and drum, and it would only be fitting for you alone to hear it, and not fitting for others to listen to it as well; now it is not so, and everyone hears it; one should know that sound has no coming or going.
3.106
"If your ear went to that sound's side, it would be like me returning to dwell in the Jeta Grove: being in the city of Śrāvastī, I would not be there; when you hear the drum sound, your ear having already gone to the place where the drum is beaten, when the bell sound is produced at the same time, you should not hear both together, let alone the various sounds of elephants, horses, oxen, and sheep therein."
3.107
This refutes the ear going to the sound's place. The first two sentences take up [the view]; from 'it would be like me' downward refutes it. First, adducing an analogy: the Buddha symbolizes the ear faculty; the Jeta Grove symbolizes the drum; the city symbolizes Ānanda. From 'when you hear' downward refutes by analogy. Since the ear faculty has already gone to the drum's place, Ānanda should lack an ear faculty; when the bell sound sounds at the same time as the drum, it would not be fitting to hear the bell's resonance again, let alone other sounds.
3.108
"If there is neither coming nor going, there is also no hearing."
3.109
Concluding doubly that the meaning of hearing is not established.
3.110
Third, concluding and showing it to be unreal.
3.111
"Therefore, you should know that listening and sound are both devoid of location; that is, the two loci of listening and sound are empty and false, inherently neither from causes and conditions nor of self-so nature."
3.112
Third, the āyatana of the nose and odors, in three [parts]: first, adducing an occurrence to question.
3.113
"Ānanda! You also smell the candana in this censer. If only a single grain of this incense were burned, within forty li of the city of Śrāvastī all would simultaneously smell its aroma. What do you think: is this fragrance born from the candana wood? Is it born from your nose? Or is it born from space?"
3.114
Here [the sūtra] merely asks about the place where the sense-object is born, unlike the previous passage, which refuted faculty and object against each other.
3.115
Second, citing the assertion and refuting it.
3.116
"Ānanda! If this incense were born from your nose, then what is said to be born from the nose should emerge from the nose. The nose is not candana; how could there be the aroma of candana inside the nose? As for your smelling the fragrance, it should enter into the nose; for the nose to emit fragrance, to call it 'smelling' is not logical."
3.117
Refuting its being born from the faculty. The first part cites [the assertion]; from "what is said to be born from the nose" onward is the direct refutation; from "as for your" onward is the conditional refutation. Even granting that your nose could generate fragrance, although the sense of generation would be established, the sense of smelling would not stand, because it would merely emit fragrance and not enter from outside to unite with the nose.
3.118
"If it is born from space, the nature of space is constant and eternal, so the fragrance should be ever-present; why rely on burning this dry wood in the censer?"
3.119
Refuting its being born from space. The nature of space is permanently abiding, so there should constantly be fragrance. If there were constantly fragrance, why would one need to burn wood before smelling the aroma?
3.120
"If it is born from the wood, then this fragrant substance turns into smoke due to burning. If the nose comes to smell it, it ought to receive the smoky vapor. When that smoke rises into space, it has not yet reached far; how is it that within forty li it is already smelled?"
3.121
Refuting its being born from the wood. This refutes based on the visible, coarse manifestation of smoke, without discussing its aroma. If indicated by smoke, it indeed has not penetrated, hence it says: 'When that smoke rises into space, it has not yet reached far.' The smoke is still near, while the smelling has already penetrated far; therefore one knows that its fragrance does not emanate from the wood.
3.122
Third, concluding by showing its emptiness and falsity.
3.123
"Therefore, you should know that the fragrance, the nose, and the smelling are all devoid of location; that is, the two loci of smelling and fragrance are empty and false, inherently neither from causes and conditions nor of self-so nature."
3.124
Fourth, the āyatana of the tongue and tastes, in three [parts]: first, adducing an occurrence to question.
3.125
"Ānanda! You regularly hold your bowl among the assembly at the two meal-times, and on occasion you encounter butter, curds, or clarified butter, which are called supreme flavors. What do you think: is this flavor born from space? Is it born from the tongue? Or is it born from the food?"
3.126
Second, citing the assertion and refuting it.
3.127
"Ānanda! If this flavor were born from your tongue, in your mouth there is only one tongue; if that tongue had at that time already become the flavor of butter, when encountering dark cane-sugar it should not shift. If it does not shift, it cannot be called knowing flavor; if it shifts, the tongue is not multiple in substance, so how could multiple flavors be known by a single tongue?"
3.128
Refuting its being born from the faculty. The first part introduces [the assertion]; 'in your [mouth]' directly refutes that one tongue could not know multiple flavors. If flavor conforms to the tongue, flavors should not be distinct. From 'if it does not' onward is a conditional refutation: supposing you grant that flavors are not distinct, then since flavors are undifferentiated, how does that constitute knowing flavor? From 'if it shifts' onward refutes the shifting of flavor, [showing that] the tongue should be multiple in substance; the first two lines refute through the contrary, and the latter two lines conclude the refutation. This means that if the tongue conformed to flavors, the tongue would become multiple; but in your case it is not so, hence it says: 'how could multiple flavors be known by a single tongue?'
3.129
"If it is born from the food, food does not possess consciousness; how could it know itself? Furthermore, if the food knows itself, that is identical to another eating it; how does it pertain to your being said to know the flavor?"
3.130
Refuting its being born from the sense-object. The first three lines are the direct refutation: if flavor were born from food, it should not depend on the faculty; without the faculty distinguishing the food, how could flavor be formed? If flavor were formed, the food would have to possess consciousness; if it lacks consciousness, how could it know itself? From 'furthermore, if the food' onward is the conditional refutation: even granting that the food could know itself, that would be identical to another person tasting the flavor; what does that have to do with the knowing of your tongue?
3.131
"If it is born from space, when you consume empty space, what flavor should it have? If empty space inevitably had a salty flavor, then as it salted your tongue, it would also salt your face, and the people of this world would be identical to ocean fish. Constantly experiencing saltiness, they would have no inkling of blandness; if they did not recognize blandness, they would not perceive saltiness either. If they inevitably know nothing, how could it be called flavor?"
3.132
Refuting its being born from space. The first three lines cite the assertion and examine the flavor; from 'if empty space inevitably' onward is the direct refutation. The first four lines show that both body and face would be salty, and the next two lines show that the saltiness would make one identical to marine life: if both are salty, there is no difference from ocean fish. From 'constantly experiencing' onward is the conditional refutation. The first four lines mutually negate and both vanish: even granting that you constantly experience saltiness, you would ultimately be unable to know blandness; if there were no bland flavor, how could saltiness be manifested? Neither blandness nor saltiness could be established. The last two lines from 'if they inevitably' conclude that this is not knowing flavor: since saltiness and blandness cannot be distinguished, it cannot be called knowing flavor.
3.133
Third, concluding by showing its emptiness and falsity.
3.134
"Therefore, you should know that the flavor, the tongue, and the tasting are all devoid of location; that is, tasting and flavor are both empty and false, inherently neither from causes and conditions nor of self-so nature."
3.135
Fifth, the āyatana of the body and tactile objects, in three [parts]: first, adducing an occurrence to question.
3.136
"Ānanda, you regularly rub your head with your hand in the early morning. What do you think? In what is known through this rubbing, which is the agent of touch? Is the agent in the hand, or is it in the head?"
3.137
The regular practice of massage is always like this, which is why he rubs his head. This interrogates whether the agent of touch is in the head or in the hand; both have flaws, as refuted below.
3.138
Second, citing the assertion and refuting it.
3.139
"If it is in the hand, the head would have no sensation; how could touch be accomplished? If it is in the head, the hand would have no function; how could it be called touch?"
3.140
Refuting through mutual presence and mutual absence: touch can only be accomplished when faculty and object manifest each other; if one exists and the other does not, it cannot be called touch.
3.141
"If each possessed it separately, then you, Ānanda, should have two bodies."
3.142
Refuting through the separate existence of two substances. If head and hand each possessed it, there would be two knowings, and two knowings would become two bodies of Ānanda; which body would be you?
3.143
"If head and hand were born of a single touch, then the hand and head would have to be of one substance; if they were of one substance, touch would not be accomplished."
3.144
Refuting through their jointly forming a single substance. The first four lines are the direct refutation: if head and hand together produced a single touch, this would cause the two to merge into a single substance. Even granting a single substance, touch itself would not be accomplished; this concludes the refutation.
3.145
"If they were of two substances, in which would the touch reside? If it resides in the agent, it is not in the object; if it resides in the object, it is not in the agent. Nor can empty space form touch with you."
3.146
Refuting the shifted defense. The first two lines cite the defense and question it generally. If you defend by saying: 'Although that which is produced is one, those that produce it are naturally two; why force my head and hand not to be different?'—then where does this single touch reside? Hence it says: 'In which would the touch reside?' The two lines from 'if it resides in the agent' deduce the same refutation as before; previously it said, 'If it is in the hand, the head would have no function,' and so forth. From 'nor can' onward refutes its being born from space: even dharmas with form cannot produce it, how much less could empty nonexistence accomplish touch?
3.147
Third, concluding by showing its emptiness and falsity.
3.148
"Therefore, you should know that tactile sensation and the body are both devoid of location; that is, the body and touch are both empty and false, inherently neither from causes and conditions nor of self-so nature."
3.149
Sixth, the āyatana of the mind and dharmas, in three [parts]: first, adducing an occurrence to question.
3.150
"Ānanda! In your mind there are always standard norms that are naturally formed from the objects grasped across the three natures of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Are these dharmas born precisely from the mind, or do they exist in a separate location apart from the mind?"
3.151
The dharmas of the three natures grasped within the mind encompass all things completely. They are spontaneously as they are, hence it says 'naturally formed.' For these grasped dharmas to be identical to the mind or apart from the mind both entail flaws, which the text below proceeds to refute.
3.152
Second, citing the assertion and refuting it.
3.153
"Ānanda! If they were identical to the mind, then dharmas would not be sense-dust, not an object grasped by the mind; how could they constitute an āyatana?"
3.154
Refuting their being identical to the mind. The first line cites [the assertion], the next line determines [it], and from 'not an object' onward refutes it. Since they are identical to the mind, they are definitely not sense-dust; if they are not sense-dust, they are not an objective realm grasped by the mind; how can they be called the āyatana of dharmas? Below refutes their being apart from the mind.
3.155
"If they had a separate location apart from the mind, would the self-nature of these dharmas be conscious or non-conscious?"
3.156
Citing the assertion and questioning both alternatives. The first two lines cite [the assertion], and from 'would the [self-nature]' onward questions it. Since these dharmas are apart from the mind, it further interrogates and refutes them on the grounds of being conscious or non-conscious.
3.157
"If conscious, they would be called mind; being different from you, they would not be sense-dust, but identical to the mental capacity of another. If they were identical to you, they would be identical to your mind; how could your mind be duplicated apart from you?"
3.158
Refuting their being conscious. The first line strips them of their status to make them mental capacity: if dharmas apart from the mind were conscious, they should be called mind. From 'being different from you' onward, it further distinguishes identity and difference to refute them; the first two lines refute difference. If conscious dharmas were different from your mind, they would be identical to another person, because they are different from your mind and yet conscious. The three lines from 'if they were identical to you' refute identity with the mind; the first line half-cites and half-determines, and the latter two lines refute it. Since conscious dharmas would be identical to your mind, that would mean that outside your mind there is yet another mind of yours, hence it says: 'duplicated apart from you.'
3.159
"If they are non-conscious, since this sense-dust is not the characteristics of form, sound, odor, taste, parting, joining, cold, heat, or empty space, where would it reside? Now, among form and space there is no indication of it whatsoever, nor should there be anything outside of space in the human world. Since it is not an object grasped by the mind, from what can the āyatana be established?"
3.160
Refuting their being non-conscious. The first five lines determine that they are neither form nor space; the next line examines where they reside. The two items of form and space encompass all dharmas; since they are neither form nor space, where do they reside now? The two lines from 'now, among form' deduce that there is no indication: if this dust of dharmas were also included in form and space, by what indication would one know it is the dust of dharmas? The two lines from 'nor should there be' refute that nothing can be established outside space: since there is no indication within form and space, it is untenable that this dust resides outside of space, for space has no outside. The two lines from 'since it is not' conclude the sense of having no āyatana: as examined above, the dust of dharmas does not exist, so the mind has no objective realm to grasp; from what could the āyatana be established?
3.161
Third, concluding by showing its emptiness and falsity.
3.162
"Therefore, you should know that standard norms and the mind are both devoid of location; that is, the mind and dharmas are both empty and false, inherently neither from causes and conditions nor of self-so nature."
3.163
Fourth, refuting the eighteen dhātus, in two [parts]: first, general questioning.
3.164
"Furthermore, Ānanda! How is it that the eighteen dhātus are fundamentally the wondrous tathatā nature of the tathāgatagarbha?"
3.165
In Sanskrit it is called dhātu, translated here as realm (jie). 'Realm' has the meaning of 'cause', because the three—faculty, object, and consciousness—serve mutually as causes. It also has the meaning of 'category' (species/lineage), because faculty, object, and consciousness each constitute one category. Furthermore, the six beginning with the eye are distinct in their categories.
3.166
Second, specific refutations, in six [parts]: first, the realm of eye-consciousness, in three [parts]: first, citing the assertion and questioning both alternatives.
3.167
"Ānanda! As you understand, eye and form serve as conditions to produce eye-consciousness. Is this consciousness born due to the eye and bounded by the eye as its realm? Or is it born due to form and bounded by form as its realm?"
3.168
The Buddha, in the provisional teachings of the Hīnayāna, spoke of dharmas of causes and conditions; now, to clarify the truth of the primary meaning, both causes and conditions and self-so are frivolous conceptual proliferation, so here he cites and questions them.
3.169
Second, citing the assertion and refuting it.
3.170
"Ānanda! If it is born due to the eye, in the absence of form and space there is nothing to distinguish; even if you have consciousness, what will you use it for? Moreover, your seeing is not blue, yellow, red, or white; it has no manifestation whatsoever, so from what would its realm be established?"
3.171
This refutes arising from the sense faculty. The first sentence cites [the thesis]. The four sentences from 'since neither forms nor empty space exist' onward are a refutation on the ground that consciousness without an objective realm is of no use. Since it arises from the sense faculty, it would not require an objective realm; but if that realm does not exist, what is there to distinguish? The object of apprehension being absent, what use is that which apprehends? The four sentences from 'Your seeing, moreover' onward are a refutation showing that the sense faculty that could produce consciousness is devoid of substantial nature. If it is claimed that it arises from the sense faculty, the faculty is not blue or any other [colour] and thus cannot be seen, and furthermore has nothing to indicate it. Since the faculty is not even established, from where could consciousness come into being? Below is the refutation of arising from the objective realm.
3.172
"If it arises due to forms, when empty space is devoid of forms your consciousness should be extinguished; how then could it cognize that this is the nature of empty space? When forms undergo change, you also cognize that the characteristics of forms are shifting and changing; if your consciousness does not change, from what is the realm established?
3.173
This is a refutation based on forms and empty space negating each other so that consciousness is absent. The first sentence cites [the thesis], and the four sentences from 'when empty space is devoid' onward establish reasoning to directly refute it. Since it arises from forms, when empty space appears and forms vanish, consciousness should be extinguished along with them; who then could cognize empty space? The five sentences from 'When forms undergo change' onward pose a direct refutation based on reasoning. If forms shift and change, while that which enables you to cognize change—consciousness—originally does not shift, then since the characteristics of forms are absent, from what is the realm established?
3.174
"If it changes along with [the forms], then it changes, and the characteristic of a realm is naturally absent. If it does not change, then it is permanent; since it arose from forms, it ought not to cognize where empty space is."
3.175
This is a refutation based on [the dilemma that] whether changing or unchanging, it is not a realm. The first two sentences refute it on the ground that if it changes along with them, there is no consciousness: if consciousness also changes when forms change, what can be called consciousness? The four sentences from 'If it does not change' onward refute it on the ground that if it does not change, it has no cognition: if it does not change along with them, consciousness would be permanently present; yet having originally arisen from forms, it should not cognize empty space.
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- 首楞嚴義疏注經 — Classical Chinese