四分律行事鈔資持記 2.474

2.474

In listing the conditions: the first is the root of constituting the karma, and the latter two are conditions that mutually complete it. The 'culminating intention' means expecting emission before ceasing. If it were merely playing, logically it should constitute a duṣkṛta. In the second condition, within the note, indicating the object explains the completion of the preparatory stage. 'Internal physical matter and external physical matter' refer to the sentient and the insentient (the five sensory objects all have internal and external aspects); 'grasped' means grasped [by consciousness], which is the sentient, regardless of oneself or another (in the Mahīśāsaka-vinaya: 'Internal physical matter is one's own body, external physical matter is another's body', which differs from this); 'ungrasped' means the insentient, which can be understood as the opposite of the above. 'Internal-and-external physical matter' means the two things, sentient and insentient, are combined together, such as holding an object with the hand and touching the body through clothing, and the like. Question: 'Below, water and wind are listed, which are also insentient; why are they mentioned again?' Answer: 'If based on the two types of physical matter, none fail to be included. However, water and wind are two things that come to touch the body; fearing that one might think there is no offense, they must be carefully distinguished. The object of empty space is also like this; because it does not rely on physical matter, one might doubt there is no offense. Fearing still that the above six do not exhaustively encompass all objects, it continues using "and so forth" to govern and include them.' Question: 'Earlier in the precept on sexual intercourse, where an intention to emit semen is formed regarding objects such as half-decayed or mostly-decayed corpses, or between bones, committing a saṃghāvaśeṣa—what kind of physical matter is this?' Answer: 'Although it lacks grasping, in principle it belongs to internal physical matter; one merely takes the category of sentient beings, so how could one distinguish between dead and alive?'