俱舍論記 11.19

11.19

「誰言法外至名為有法」者，數論救。誰言大等法外有別彼自性有法？以大等法即有法故。彼宗立即義，此文應言：誰言有法外別有彼法。而言誰言法外別有有法者，義相似故。唯即此大等法於轉變時，大等異相所依自性名為有法，據體以論不得法外別有有法，據相似說可言自性名為有法。彼宗二十五諦中我及自性是常，大等二十三諦體常，即自性故。相無常，前生後滅，相不定故。

"Who says that outside of the dharmas […] is called the substantive entity?": this is the Sāṃkhya defense. Who says that outside of the dharmas such as the Great Principle there is a separate substantive entity of that nature? Because dharmas such as the Great Principle are themselves the substantive entity. According to their school's thesis, this text should say: 'Who says that outside of the substantive entity there are separately those dharmas?' But it says 'Who says that outside of the dharmas there is separately a substantive entity?' because the meanings are similar. Only these dharmas such as the Great Principle themselves, at the time of transformation, have their fundamental nature—which is the support of the diverse characteristics of the Great Principle and so forth—called the substantive entity. If discussed based on substance, one cannot have a separate substantive entity outside of dharmas; if explained based on similarity, one can say that the fundamental nature is called the substantive entity. In that school's twenty-five principles, the self (puruṣa) and fundamental nature (prakṛti) are permanent; the substances of the twenty-three principles such as the Great Principle are permanent, because they are identical with the fundamental nature. Their characteristics are impermanent, arising earlier and perishing later, because their characteristics are not fixed.