俱舍論記 12.108

12.108

「一縷合中至應亦得衣」者，論主以理徵破。此中且破離縷有衣，離藤有支准衣應破，故不別顯。勝論宗計有一全衣與眾縷合。論主破云：一縷與彼全衣合中，曾不得衣，唯得縷故。若言縷上別有全衣，見縷之時有誰為障令不得衣？若言有障，見縷之時何不見障？既不見障但見其縷，故知離縷無別有衣。若有別衣，如何不見？勝論計衣雖多縷合，此中且以一縷為難，餘縷准知。或一縷言顯多縷中一一縷也。若汝救言：於一縷中無全衣轉。則應一縷上但有衣家少分，無有全衣。既爾，應許此全衣體集眾縷上諸衣分成衣，是假非實，非更別有有分全衣說名實衣。言有分者，謂此全衣有眾縷分，或此全衣有眾衣分名為有分。若許全衣攬眾縷上衣分以成，復轉徵言：又如何知縷上衣分異縷而有？若言縷上別有衣分，見縷之時何不見彼衣分？既不別見衣分，明知離縷無別衣分。汝若復謂此全衣體非一縷合能顯，此衣要待多縷為所依合體方顯者。難云：於唯多經縷和合，未著緯縷時，應亦得衣。又解：若謂全衣要待多所依縷和合衣體方顯，非一縷者。於唯多經和合，未著緯縷時，應亦得衣。上來約縷以破。

"In the conjunction with a single thread […] one should also perceive the cloth": The author of the treatise refutes through reasoning. Here, he provisionally refutes the existence of cloth distinct from threads; that the ring-stand distinct from vines is refuted follows the same logic as the cloth, so it is not separately set forth. The Vaiśeṣika school holds that there is an entire whole cloth conjoined with many threads. The author refutes them, saying: In the conjunction of a single thread with that entire cloth, one has never perceived the cloth, but only perceived the thread. If you say that on the thread there is a separate whole cloth, when seeing the thread, who acts as an obstruction to prevent perceiving the cloth? If you say there is an obstruction, when seeing the thread, why is the obstruction not seen? Since no obstruction is seen and only the thread is seen, one knows that apart from the thread there is no separate cloth. If there were a separate cloth, how could it not be seen? Although the Vaiśeṣika holds that the cloth is a combination of many threads, here the objection is provisionally raised with respect to a single thread; the other threads can be understood by analogy. Or, the phrase 'a single thread' indicates each individual thread among many threads. If you rescue your position by saying: In a single thread the entire cloth does not exist; then on a single thread there would only be a small part of the cloth, and no entire cloth. If that is so, you must concede that this entity of the entire cloth is an aggregation of all the parts of the cloth upon the multiple threads to form a cloth, which is nominal (prajñapti) and not real (dravya); it is not that there is additionally a distinct whole entity with parts that is spoken of as a real cloth. What is called a composite whole (avayavin) means that this whole cloth has the parts of many threads, or that this whole cloth has many cloth-parts, hence it is called a composite whole. If you concede that the whole cloth is formed by grasping the cloth-parts on the multiple threads, the objection turns again: Furthermore, how do you know that the cloth-parts on the threads exist separately from the threads? If you say that on the threads there are separate cloth-parts, when seeing the threads, why do you not see those cloth-parts? Since you do not separately see the cloth-parts, it is clear that apart from the threads there are no separate cloth-parts. If you further claim that the entity of this whole cloth is not manifest through conjunction with a single thread, but this cloth must depend on many threads as its locus of conjunction for the entity to become manifest; the objection is: In the case where only many warp threads are combined, before the weft threads are attached, one should also perceive the cloth. Another interpretation: If you claim that the whole cloth must depend on many supporting threads conjoined before the entity of the cloth becomes manifest, and not from a single thread; then when only many warp threads are combined, before the weft threads are attached, one should also perceive the cloth. The above refutation has been formulated in terms of threads.