俱舍論記 12.109

12.109

「或應畢竟至如旋火輪」者，此即約根以破。或應畢竟無得全衣理。猶如一衣，眼見身觸此一邊時，中及餘邊不對根故。以中及外非俱對根，是則非得一段全衣。豈有一衣有對、不對？故知畢竟無得衣理。或對根者可名為衣，不對根者應非衣攝。汝若謂此中及餘邊漸次皆可對治眼、身根，非頓對者。則應眼身唯得諸衣分，不應說彼眼、身二根得有分、無全衣。勝論計衣，眼、身能取。既破外訖，示正義言：是故即於諸縷分上，眼、身二識漸次了別，次後意識總起有分段衣覺。故如旋火輪，實見火色非見火輪，從眼識後意識謂輪。輪實無體，此衣亦爾。

Regarding [the text from] “Or there should ultimately…” up to “…like a whirled firebrand”: this refutes [their claim] on the basis of the sense faculties. Or there should ultimately be no principle by which a whole cloth is apprehended. It is like a single piece of cloth: when the eye sees or the body touches this one side, the middle and the other side do not confront the faculties. Since the middle and the outside do not confront the faculties simultaneously, one does not apprehend a single piece of whole cloth. How could a single cloth both confront and not confront [the faculties]? Therefore we know that there is ultimately no principle by which the cloth is apprehended. Or, that which confronts the faculties might be called “cloth,” while that which does not confront them should not be included under “cloth.” If you claim that the middle and the other edges can all confront the eye and body faculties sequentially, not all at once, then the eye and body would apprehend only the parts of the cloth; one should not say that those two faculties, eye and body, apprehend the whole and not the whole cloth. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that cloth is graspable by the eye and the body. Having refuted the heterodox view, [the author] reveals the correct doctrine, saying: “Therefore, upon the parts of the threads, the eye-consciousness and body-consciousness sequentially discern [their objects], and subsequently the mental consciousness collectively gives rise to the conception of a whole piece of cloth. Thus, it is like a whirled firebrand: one actually sees the color of the fire, not a fire-wheel; after the eye-consciousness, the mental consciousness conceives of a wheel. The wheel actually has no substantial entity; this cloth is also like that.”