俱舍論記 13.27

13.27

「諸有為法至纔生已即滅」者，論主救不成過，釋第四句中「盡故」二字。色不相應定有剎那，後必有盡故，如燈光等。論主復顯滅不待因，謂有為法剎那定滅，滅不待因。所以者何？以理而言，待因謂果。滅是無法，無法非果，故不待因。比量云：滅不待因，以是無故，猶如兔角。或立量云：滅不待因，以非果故，猶如龜毛。或立量云：滅不待因，無非果故，猶如空花。滅既不待因，纔生已即滅。此中言滅，謂有為法起已息故，此滅無體諸部極成。次泛明有為諸法生、滅有二種因：一是主因，謂生滅相與法恒俱，因用強勝故名主因；二是客因，謂餘因緣或有或無，因用非勝故名客因。若依正量部，諸法生難由主、客二因。諸法滅時通難及易，若心、心所法，及聲、光等，但由主因不由客因，若不相應及餘色等、薪等、由主、客二因。若依說一切有部，諸法生難由主、客二因。諸法滅易，但由主因不由客因。若依經部，諸法生時由客因生，諸法滅時非客因滅，主因無體不可言因。又解：經部生滅雖無實體，然假說有。諸法生時由主、客因生、諸法滅時不由因滅。如擲物在空，去由人力，下即不由。又解：經部同說一切有部。諸法生時由主、客因生，諸法滅時由主因滅，非由客因。主因雖無別體，可假說因。復有外道計：諸法生時無因而生，諸法滅時無因而滅。此即略述諸部異計。

[On the passage] "All conditioned phenomena […] having only just arisen, they immediately perish": The author of the treatise rescues the fallacy of being unestablished, explaining the two characters "because of cessation" in the fourth line. Form and unassociated [factors] definitely have moments, because in the end there must be cessation, just like the flame of a lamp and so forth. The author of the treatise further demonstrates that perishing does not depend on a cause; that is, conditioned phenomena are definitively momentary in perishing, and their perishing does not depend on a cause. Why is this? Rationally speaking, what depends on a cause is an effect. Perishing is a non-existent entity, and a non-existent entity is not an effect; therefore it does not depend on a cause. The inference is: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existent, just like the horn of a hare. Alternatively, an inference is established: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is not an effect, just like the hair of a tortoise. Alternatively, an inference is established: Perishing does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existent and not an effect, just like a flower in the sky. Since perishing does not depend on a cause, having only just arisen, it immediately perishes. The word "perishing" here means that conditioned phenomena cease after having arisen; that this perishing is without substance is universally acknowledged by all schools. Next, he explains broadly that the arising and perishing of conditioned phenomena have two kinds of causes: first is the primary cause (mukhya-hetu), meaning the characteristics of arising and perishing that are constantly concomitant with the phenomenon, called the primary cause because its causal function is powerful; second is the incidental cause (āgantuka-hetu), meaning the other causes and conditions which may be present or absent, called the incidental cause because its causal function is not powerful. If one relies on the Saṃmatīya: the arising of phenomena is difficult, depending on both primary and incidental causes; when phenomena perish, it encompasses both the difficult and the easy: mind, mental factors, sound, light, and so forth depend only on the primary cause and not on incidental causes, whereas unassociated factors, other forms, firewood, and so forth depend on both primary and incidental causes. If one relies on the Sarvāstivāda: the arising of phenomena is difficult, depending on both primary and incidental causes; the perishing of phenomena is easy, depending only on the primary cause and not on incidental causes. If one relies on the Sautrāntika: when phenomena arise, they arise due to incidental causes; when phenomena perish, they do not perish due to incidental causes, and since the primary cause has no substance, it cannot be called a cause. Another explanation: according to the Sautrāntika, although arising and perishing have no real substance, they are nominally said to exist; when phenomena arise, they arise due to primary and incidental causes, and when phenomena perish, they do not perish due to a cause—just as when an object is thrown into the air, its going [up] is due to human effort, but its falling is not. Yet another explanation: the Sautrāntika agrees with the Sarvāstivāda: when phenomena arise, they arise due to primary and incidental causes, and when phenomena perish, they perish due to the primary cause, not due to incidental causes; although the primary cause has no distinct substance, it can nominally be called a cause. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists who posit: when phenomena arise, they arise without a cause; when phenomena perish, they perish without a cause. This briefly outlines the different doctrines of the various schools.