俱舍論記 13.28

13.28

「若初不滅至理必不然」者，牒彼計徵破。若色等法初位不滅，後位之時亦應不滅，以後與初有體性等。立量云：後位之時應當不滅，有性等故，猶如初位。既後有盡，知前有滅。立量云：初位之時應亦有滅，有性等故，猶如後位。汝若救云：色等後位有體異前，方可滅者。夫言異者，兩法相望後位之時，不應即此前位法體而名有異，即此前法體相有異理必不然。

[On the passage] "If it did not perish at the beginning […] this is logically impossible": He cites their position, questions, and refutes it. If phenomena such as form did not perish at their initial phase, then at their subsequent phase they should also not perish, because the subsequent and the initial possess identity of substantial nature. An inference is established: At the subsequent phase it should not perish, because it has identity of nature [with the initial], just like the initial phase. Since there is cessation in the end, we know there is perishing before. An inference is established: At the initial phase there should also be perishing, because it has identity of nature [with the subsequent], just like the subsequent phase. If you attempt to rescue it by saying: The subsequent phase of form and so forth has a substance different from before, and only then can it perish—now, as for the word "different", when comparing two phenomena at the subsequent phase, it should not be the very substantial entity of this prior phase that is called different; that the substantial characteristics of this very prior phenomenon should become different is logically impossible.