俱舍論記 13.37

13.37

「彼亦非理至復由誰滅」者，論主破彼亦非理。若二竝生，可言此滅於彼。前後二覺，前、後二聲，不俱起故。前若至現，後念未生無體，不應能滅前法。後若至現，前念已謝，如何後法能滅於前，如疑、智二法，苦、樂二法，貪、瞋二法等，自相相違，理無俱義，如何可說後滅於前？設許後念能滅於前，如何後位不明了覺、聲，能滅前位明了覺、聲？設許後劣能滅前勝，若相續起可後滅前，最後覺、聲復由誰滅？

[On the text,] "That is also unreasonable … by what would it then be destroyed?": The author of the treatise refutes that [view] as also unreasonable. If two [moments] arose together, one could say that this destroys that. But a preceding and a succeeding awareness, or a preceding and a succeeding sound, do not arise simultaneously. If the preceding reaches the present, the succeeding moment has not yet arisen and has no real substance; it cannot be capable of destroying the preceding phenomenon. If the succeeding reaches the present, the preceding moment has already perished; how could a succeeding phenomenon destroy the preceding? Like doubt and knowledge, pain and pleasure, or greed and hatred, their self-characteristics are mutually contradictory, and logically they cannot exist simultaneously; how could one say that the succeeding destroys the preceding? Even granted that a succeeding moment could destroy the preceding, how could an indistinct awareness or sound in a succeeding stage destroy a distinct awareness or sound in a preceding stage? Even granted that an inferior succeeding [moment] could destroy a superior preceding [moment], and that in a continuous series a succeeding [moment] could destroy the preceding, by what would the final awareness or sound then be destroyed?