俱舍論記 15.100

15.100

「六由善根至所引無表」者，六由善根斷壞故捨。謂起加行斷善根時，於加行位便捨處中善根所引無表。《正理》難云「六由依根斷壞故捨。謂起加行斷善、惡時各捨彼根所引無表，非至斷善得靜慮時方捨處中善、惡無表，以羸劣故，起加行時便捨處中善、惡無表。如何經主於此義中說第六緣名為斷善？若作是說，斷善加行亦名斷善，為第六緣。是則應言：靜慮加行亦名靜慮，便成七緣，靜慮加行中捨惡無表故。應言：根者通善、惡根，所說斷言是斷加行，由依根斷為第六緣。此釋頌文，於理無失。」《正理》意說：處中六緣一一皆能通捨善、惡。所言根斷，根通善惡，斷是斷加行。若處中善斷，善加行捨；若處中惡斷，惡加行捨，即是靜慮加行。俱舍師救云：理實頌中所說根斷如《正理》說，而於長行偏言斷善，影顯斷惡。或可論主試後學徒為覺、不覺。應知此中若處中善，生得善所起及加行善所起者，皆於斷善加行時捨。若處中不善，斷惡加行時捨。謂於靜慮加行位中間思心捨，名斷惡加行捨。加行位中名為斷者，若加行善不成名斷，能捨無表。若生得善及與不善，伏不現行名之為斷。能捨無表，非體不成。問：處中善、惡何故唯於加行時捨？解云：以彼劣故，唯加行捨。難云：加行善發別解脫戒，彼既是強，如何亦於加行位捨？解云：彼雖是強，由於此位捨能發心，故亦隨捨。難云：生得善發處中善者，及不善心發處中不善，加行位既未捨，彼能發之心如何有捨？解云：雖未捨彼能發之心，性劣故捨。問：靜慮加行捨惡處中，受戒加行亦能捨不？解云：不能捨，論說靜慮加行捨故。又性中庸，不違受戒，於根本位尚不捨，彼況加行耶？難云：既性中庸，何妨不違靜慮？解云：靜慮正斷惡，故捨惡處中。難云：別解非正能斷惑，如何能捨不律儀？解云：與彼惡戒敵對相違，雖非斷惑，得戒名捨。又解：能捨，如得靜慮能捨惡戒。於加行位捨惡處中，得別解脫理亦應然。正得戒時既捨惡戒，加行理亦捨惡處中。豈有將受別解脫戒，不捨惡處中而受彼善戒？以將受時必先捨故。而言惡處中不違善戒，據得戒已去。若初得戒，即違不起。《正理》不說，略而不論。應知諸論說捨處中文多不具，此論、《正理》具說六種，可謂周備。問：別解與處中無表，何故捨緣差別不同？解云？若以別解五緣對處中，別解善法增勝不依二形，有二形捨；處中中庸不違二形，無二形捨。別解有晝、夜分齊，故有夜盡捨；處中無斯定限，無夜盡捨。故捨義當受心斷。命終斷捨，名義俱同。斷善同，根斷少分。總而言之，別解對處中，二別三同。若以處中六緣對別解，處中有勢力、作業、事物斷，故有此三捨；別解不爾，無此三捨。受心斷捨，義當故捨。壽命斷捨，名義俱同。根斷分同斷善捨。總而言之，處中對別解，三異三同。問：定戒與處中無表，何故捨緣差別不同？解云：若以定戒三緣對處中，定戒有易地失故，有易地捨；處中由命終捨、或加行捨，非由易地失，故無易地捨。定戒有退失，故有退捨。若善處中非由退，起惑故捨。若惡處中，惑先成故，非由退捨，故說處中無退失捨。唯命終捨同，然定戒分捨，處中全捨。總而言之，定戒對處中，二異一同。若以處中六緣對定戒，唯命終捨同，如前解。餘五緣捨，唯處中有，定戒無，可知。總而言之，處中對定戒，五異一同。問：道戒與處中無表，何故捨緣差別不同？解云：若以道戒三緣對處中，道戒有得果、練根、退失，故有此三捨；處中不爾，無此三捨，故三皆別。若以處中六緣對道戒，道戒並無，故六皆別。問：惡戒與處中無表，何故捨緣差別不同？解云：若以惡戒三緣對處中，惡戒捨難，故捨不成，有得戒捨；處中易捨，作法即成。或加行捨，故無得戒捨。惡戒惡中增勝，不依二形，有二形捨；處中中庸，不違二形，無二形捨。唯命終捨同。總而言之，惡戒對處中，二別一同。若以處中六緣對惡戒，處中捨易，作法即成，有受心斷捨；惡戒捨難，無受心斷捨。處中有勢力、作業、事物、根斷，故有此四捨；惡戒不爾，無此四捨。唯命終捨同。總而言之，處中對惡戒，五異一同。或根斷中斷惡捨義，當惡戒中得戒捨，以得善戒斷惡戒故。若作斯解，於根斷中少分同得戒。

Regarding 'Sixth, through the cutting off of wholesome roots... the non-revelatory [form] induced by them': the sixth is relinquishment through the cutting off and destruction of wholesome roots. That is, when one undertakes the preparatory application (prayoga) to cut off wholesome roots, one relinquishes in the preparatory stage the non-revelatory [form] induced by intermediary wholesome roots. The Nyāyānusāra challenges this: 'Sixth, it is relinquished through the cutting off and destruction of the basis (the roots). That is, when one undertakes the preparatory application to cut off wholesome or unwholesome [roots], one relinquishes in each case the non-revelatory [form] induced by those roots. It is not that one only relinquishes intermediary wholesome or unwholesome non-revelatory forms when reaching the cutting off of wholesome roots or obtaining dhyāna; because they are feeble, when one undertakes the preparatory application, one already relinquishes the intermediary wholesome and unwholesome non-revelatory forms. Why does the author of the treatise (Vasubandhu) in this context state that the sixth condition is called the "cutting off of wholesome [roots]"? If one states this, then the preparatory application for cutting off wholesome roots would also be called "cutting off wholesome roots" and constitute the sixth condition. Then one should also say: the preparatory application for dhyāna is also called "dhyāna", which would result in seven conditions, because during the preparatory application for dhyāna one relinquishes unwholesome non-revelatory form. One should say: "roots" refers generally to both wholesome and unwholesome roots; the word "cutting off" refers to the preparatory application for cutting off; and cutting off relying on the roots constitutes the sixth condition. Explaining the verse this way incurs no logical fault.' The meaning of the Nyāyānusāra is: each of the six conditions for the intermediary can generally relinquish both wholesome and unwholesome [forms]. When speaking of "cutting off the roots", "roots" applies generally to wholesome and unwholesome, and "cutting off" refers to the preparatory application for cutting off. If intermediary wholesome is cut off, it is relinquished through the preparatory application for wholesome [cutting off]; if intermediary unwholesome is cut off, it is relinquished through the preparatory application for unwholesome [cutting off], which is the preparatory application for dhyāna. The Kośa master defends: in truth, the cutting off of roots spoken of in the verse is as the Nyāyānusāra says, but in the prose commentary he specifies the cutting off of the wholesome to implicitly indicate the cutting off of the unwholesome. Or perhaps the author of the treatise was testing future students to see whether they would notice or not. One should know that here, if it is intermediary wholesome—whether arisen from innate wholesome or arisen from wholesome of preparatory application—all are relinquished at the time of the preparatory application for cutting off wholesome roots. If it is intermediary unwholesome, it is relinquished at the time of the preparatory application for cutting off the unwholesome: that is, relinquishment by an intermediate volition in the stage of preparatory application for dhyāna is called relinquishment through the preparatory application for cutting off unwholesome. As for being called "cutting off" in the preparatory stage: if wholesome of preparatory application is no longer possessed, it is called "cutting off", and it can relinquish non-revelatory form. As for innate wholesome and unwholesome, their being suppressed so as not to be active is called "cutting off"; this can relinquish non-revelatory form, not that their essence is unpossessed. Question: Why are intermediary wholesome and unwholesome relinquished only during the preparatory application? Explanation: Because they are feeble, they are relinquished solely by preparatory application. Objection: Wholesome of preparatory application produces prātimokṣa vows; since that is strong, why is it also relinquished in the preparatory stage? Explanation: Although it is strong, because in this stage the mind capable of generating it is relinquished, it is also relinquished accordingly. Objection: For intermediary wholesome generated by an innate wholesome mind, and intermediary unwholesome generated by an unwholesome mind, since in the preparatory stage they have not yet relinquished that mind capable of generating them, how could there be relinquishment? Explanation: Although they have not yet relinquished that mind capable of generating them, they are relinquished because their nature is feeble. Question: The preparatory application for dhyāna relinquishes intermediary unwholesome; can the preparatory application for receiving vows also relinquish it or not? Explanation: It cannot relinquish it, because the treatise speaks of relinquishment through the preparatory application for dhyāna. Furthermore, its nature is neutral, not conflicting with receiving vows; it is not even relinquished at the fundamental stage, so how much less in the preparatory application? Objection: Since its nature is neutral, why would it not also fail to conflict with dhyāna? Explanation: Dhyāna directly cuts off the unwholesome, hence it relinquishes intermediary unwholesome. Objection: Prātimokṣa cannot directly cut off defilements; how can it relinquish non-discipline? Explanation: It is directly opposed to and in conflict with that evil discipline; although it does not cut off defilements, obtaining the discipline is called relinquishing [non-discipline]. Another explanation: It can relinquish it, just as obtaining dhyāna can relinquish evil discipline; relinquishing intermediary unwholesome in the preparatory stage should logically also be so for obtaining prātimokṣa. Since when directly obtaining the vows one relinquishes evil discipline, logically in the preparatory application one also relinquishes intermediary unwholesome. How could it be that when about to receive prātimokṣa vows, one does not relinquish intermediary unwholesome and yet receives those wholesome vows? Because when about to receive them, one must first relinquish [it]. As for saying that intermediary unwholesome does not conflict with wholesome vows, this is based on after the vows have already been obtained. When first obtaining the vows, it is in conflict and does not arise. The Nyāyānusāra does not mention this, omitting it without discussion. One should know that when various treatises explain relinquishing the intermediary, their texts are mostly incomplete; this treatise and the Nyāyānusāra completely explain the six kinds, which may be said to be comprehensive. Question: Why do the conditions for relinquishing prātimokṣa and intermediary non-revelatory forms differ? Explanation: If one contrasts the five conditions of prātimokṣa with the intermediary: prātimokṣa is a superior wholesome dharma and does not rest on dual sexes, so there is relinquishment through dual sex; the intermediary is neutral and does not conflict with dual sexes, so there is no relinquishment through dual sex. Prātimokṣa has day and night delimitations, so there is relinquishment through the end of the night; the intermediary has no such definite limitation, so there is no relinquishment through the end of the night. Relinquishment by intentional renunciation corresponds to the cessation of the mind that undertook [the vows]. Relinquishment through the cessation of life is identical in both name and meaning. Cutting off of wholesome roots is identical to a small part of cutting off the roots. In summary, comparing prātimokṣa with the intermediary, two are different and three are the same. If one contrasts the six conditions of the intermediary with prātimokṣa: the intermediary has cessation of momentum, action, and object, so it has these three relinquishments; prātimokṣa is not like this and lacks these three relinquishments. Relinquishment through cessation of the mind of undertaking corresponds to intentional renunciation. Relinquishment through cessation of life is identical in both name and meaning. Cutting off the roots partially corresponds to relinquishment through cutting off wholesome roots. In summary, comparing the intermediary with prātimokṣa, three are different and three are the same. Question: Why do the conditions for relinquishing dhyāna vows and intermediary non-revelatory forms differ? Explanation: If one contrasts the three conditions of dhyāna vows with the intermediary: dhyāna vows have loss through change of realm, hence there is relinquishment through change of realm; the intermediary is relinquished through the end of life or through preparatory application, not through loss by change of realm, hence it lacks relinquishment through change of realm. Dhyāna vows have loss through falling away, hence there is relinquishment through falling away. As for intermediary wholesome, it is not relinquished through falling away by giving rise to defilements. As for intermediary unwholesome, because defilements were already accomplished before, it is not relinquished through falling away; hence it is said that the intermediary lacks relinquishment through falling away. Only relinquishment through the end of life is the same; however, dhyāna vows are partially relinquished, while the intermediary is entirely relinquished. In summary, comparing dhyāna vows with the intermediary, two are different and one is the same. If one contrasts the six conditions of the intermediary with dhyāna vows: only relinquishment through the end of life is the same, as explained before. The remaining five conditions for relinquishment exist only in the intermediary and are absent in dhyāna vows, as can be understood. In summary, comparing the intermediary with dhyāna vows, five are different and one is the same. Question: Why do the conditions for relinquishing the vows of the Path and intermediary non-revelatory forms differ? Explanation: If one contrasts the three conditions of the vows of the Path with the intermediary: the vows of the Path have obtaining a fruit, training the faculties, and falling away, hence they have these three relinquishments; the intermediary is not like this and lacks these three relinquishments, so all three are different. If one contrasts the six conditions of the intermediary with the vows of the Path: the vows of the Path have none of them, so all six are different. Question: Why do the conditions for relinquishing evil discipline and intermediary non-revelatory forms differ? Explanation: If one contrasts the three conditions of evil discipline with the intermediary: evil discipline is difficult to relinquish, so renunciation does not take effect, and there is relinquishment through obtaining vows; the intermediary is easy to relinquish, taking effect simply through ritual action, or it is relinquished through preparatory application, hence there is no relinquishment through obtaining vows. Evil discipline is superior among unwholesome things and does not rest on dual sexes, so there is relinquishment through dual sex; the intermediary is neutral and does not conflict with dual sexes, so there is no relinquishment through dual sex. Only relinquishment through the end of life is the same. In summary, comparing evil discipline with the intermediary, two are different and one is the same. If one contrasts the six conditions of the intermediary with evil discipline: the intermediary is easy to relinquish, taking effect simply through ritual action, so there is relinquishment through cessation of the mind of undertaking; evil discipline is difficult to relinquish, lacking relinquishment through cessation of the mind of undertaking. The intermediary has cessation of momentum, action, object, and roots, so it has these four relinquishments; evil discipline is not like this and lacks these four relinquishments. Only relinquishment through the end of life is the same. In summary, comparing the intermediary with evil discipline, five are different and one is the same. Alternatively, within cutting off the roots, the relinquishment through cutting off the unwholesome corresponds to relinquishment through obtaining vows in evil discipline, because obtaining wholesome vows cuts off evil discipline. If one interprets it this way, within cutting off the roots, it partially corresponds to obtaining vows.