俱舍論記 15.13

15.13

「非於正得至防護過現」者，論主彈前第一、第三句云「非於正得善律儀時，可有現在惡業道，及加行、後起並諸遮罪，何故乃言第一句中，從現在加行、後起及諸遮罪？第三句從現世根本業道？」彈訖正云「是故第一句應言：從現在加行、後起及諸遮罪處。第三句應言：從現在根本業道處。」此中且正第一、第三句，理實四句皆加「處」字。「第二句應言：謂去來根本業道處。第四句應言：謂從去、來加行、後起遮罪處。」正訖又云「若據發戒，有通三世。若論防護，理應但說防護未來，定不應言防護過、現。過去已滅、現在已生，不須防故。」《正理》救云「於業道等處，置業道等聲，故前四句義亦無失。由如是理，亦通防護過、現業道等，非唯防未來，以業道等聲說彼依處故。若異此者，則應但說防護未來，律儀但能防未來罪令不起故，非防過、現。已滅、已生，律儀於彼無防用故。」解云：於能發不善業道等所依境處，說能依不善業道等聲。從不善業道等所依境處發戒，故說從不善業道等發戒。故前四句，義亦無失。由如是不善業道所依境處通三世理，亦通防護過、現不善業道等。以能於過、現不善業道所依境處發律儀時，即防護過、現不善業道所依境處，不令發不善業等。亦說防護過、現不善業道等，以業道等聲說彼不善業道等所依境界處故。若異此防護不善業道所依境處，唯說防護能依不善業道體者，即應但說唯未來法發，唯防護未來。律儀但能防未來罪令不起故，非防過、現不善業道等體。過去已滅、現在已生，律儀於彼無有防用令不起故。俱舍師破云：唯加處字，於義無疑，何故不加？廣勞異釋。豈從彼世法發得律儀，即防彼世惡業道等？發戒雖復通於三世，防過無防唯在未來。反難令防未來，此乃誠如所說。

"Not that at the time of directly obtaining […] guarding against the past and present": the author of the treatise criticises the previous first and third alternatives, saying: "It is not possible that at the time of directly obtaining the wholesome discipline, there could be present unwholesome courses of action, preparatory applications, subsequent actions, and offences by prohibition. Why then say in the first alternative: 'from present preparatory applications, subsequent actions, and offences by prohibition,' and in the third alternative: 'from present fundamental courses of action'?" Having criticised them, he corrects them, saying: "Therefore, the first alternative should say: 'from the locus of present preparatory applications, subsequent actions, and offences by prohibition.' The third alternative should say: 'from the locus of present fundamental courses of action.'" Here, although he corrects only the first and third alternatives, in reality, all four alternatives should add the word "locus". "The second alternative should say: 'that is, from the locus of past and future fundamental courses of action.' The fourth alternative should say: 'that is, from the locus of past and future preparatory applications, subsequent actions, and offences by prohibition.'" Having corrected them, he further states: "If based on the generation of the discipline, it extends across the three times. If discussed in terms of guarding against, it should in principle only be said that it guards against the future; it certainly should not be said to guard against the past and present. The past has already perished and the present has already arisen, so there is no need to guard against them." The Nyāyānusāra rescues [the earlier text], saying: "Applying the term 'courses of action' and so forth to the locus of courses of action and so forth, the meaning of the previous four alternatives is not flawed. By this reasoning, it also extends to guarding against past and present courses of action and so forth, not only guarding against the future, because the term 'courses of action' and so forth designates their supporting locus. If it were otherwise, one should only speak of guarding against the future, because discipline can only guard against future offences so that they do not arise, not guard against the past and present. Because they have already perished or already arisen, discipline has no guarding function with respect to them." Explanation: With respect to the objective locus upon which unwholesome courses of action and so forth rely that can give rise to them, the term designating the dependent unwholesome courses of action and so forth is used. Because discipline is generated from the objective locus upon which unwholesome courses of action and so forth rely, it is said that discipline is generated from unwholesome courses of action and so forth. Therefore, the meaning of the previous four alternatives is not flawed. Due to the principle that such objective loci on which unwholesome courses of action rely extend across the three times, it also extends to guarding against past and present unwholesome courses of action and so forth. Because when discipline is generated with respect to the objective locus upon which past and present unwholesome courses of action rely, it guards against the objective locus upon which past and present unwholesome courses of action rely, preventing it from giving rise to unwholesome actions and so forth. It is also said to guard against past and present unwholesome courses of action and so forth, because the term 'courses of action' and so forth designates the objective locus upon which those unwholesome courses of action and so forth rely. If, other than guarding against the objective locus on which unwholesome courses of action rely, one spoke solely of guarding against the intrinsic nature of the dependent unwholesome courses of action themselves, then one should only say that it arises solely from future dharmas and guards solely against the future. Discipline can only guard against future offences so that they do not arise; it does not guard against the intrinsic nature of past and present unwholesome courses of action and so forth. Because the past has already perished and the present has already arisen, discipline has no guarding function with respect to them to prevent them from arising. The master of the Kośa refutes this, saying: Merely adding the word "locus" leaves no doubt about the meaning; why not add it, instead of laboriously offering divergent explanations? Can it be that because discipline is generated and obtained from dharmas of that time, it guards against unwholesome courses of action and so forth of that time? Although the generation of discipline extends across the three times, guarding against faults without exception resides solely in the future. To counter-challenge by forcing it to guard against the future—this is indeed truly as we have said.