俱舍論記 16.76

16.76

「貪等不應至未作事故」者，論主敘餘師計為難。凡論加行，助彼有用，執持刀等作殺等事，貪等不應能為加行。非唯心起不起身、語加行即成，唯起心時未作加行事故，故說貪等非是加行。故《正理》四十一云「有餘師說：貪等不應能為加行，非唯心起加行即成，未作事故。如是說者，貪等雖非所作事性，而彼貪等緣境生時非無力用，由有力用得加行名，方便引生諸業道故。」《正理》以後說為正，此論以前師為難，即以前師為正。作論意異，不為加行據親無力，能為加行據疎有力。

Regarding "Covetousness and the like cannot ... because they have not performed the action": The author of the treatise cites another master's position as an objection. Whenever one discusses preparation, it aids that [act's] function, such as wielding a sword to perform the act of killing; covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation. One does not accomplish preparation merely by the arising of mind without initiating bodily or vocal preparations, because at the mere arising of mind, the preparatory action has not been performed; therefore, it is said that covetousness and the like are not preparation. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 41, states: "Other masters say: Covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation, for preparation is not accomplished merely by the arising of mind, as no action has been performed. According to this explanation: Although covetousness and the like do not have the nature of an action performed, yet when covetousness and the like arise with reference to an object, they are not without power and function; by virtue of having power and function, they obtain the name 'preparation', because they conveniently induce the various paths of action." The Nyāyānusāra takes the latter explanation as correct; this treatise raises the former master's [view] as an objection, and thus takes the former master's [view] as correct. The intentions of the treatise-writers differ: [the view that they] do not serve as preparation is based on immediate lack of power; [the view that they] can serve as preparation is based on remote possession of power.