俱舍論記 2.146

2.146

「無如是失至名能作晝」者，識見家答。無如是失，世間人同許眼根識生時，說此眼是見。由彼識生時，說眼能見色，不言眼識色。又解：世人同許眼識生時說眼是見。由彼識生時，說眼能見色，不言識色。又解：世間同許眼識是見者。此文應言同許眼根是見，而言眼識者，此舉能依顯所依事。又解：應言同許眼根是見，而言眼識，於所依因立能依果名。又解：世間同許眼識是見，識體微細世不了知，但言眼見，言眼見時即是識見。由彼識生時說眼能見色，不言眼根能識色。問：若眼不名識色，何故前文言「又如經言眼所識色可愛可樂，然實非此可愛樂色是眼所識。」准彼前文，色是眼所識，眼即是能識，於所依根立能識號。何故後文不言識色？解云：前文約典說眼能識，後文據俗眼非能識。又解：前約法救、大眾部等引經，亦復異部別解，故不同也。識見家言，何但我作斯解，《毘婆沙》中亦作是說「若眼所得說名所見」，明知眼名能見。眼識所受，同文故來，此即證眼名能見，不名能識。又解：眼識所受說名所見，明知眼識名能見，此即證識名見。若眼所得，同文故來。又解：若眼所得說名所見，此即證眼名能見，不名能識。眼識所受說名所見，此即證識名能見。是故但說眼名能見，不名能識。唯識現前說能識色，譬如說日名能作晝，即日名晝，非離日外別有其晝。其識亦爾，識現前時即名能識，非離識外別有能識。上來雖復眼見、識見兩家異諍，看其文勢，論主意朋識見。

"There is no such fault […] is called making the day" is the reply by the proponent of consciousness seeing. There is no such fault. The world commonly accepts that when the consciousness of the visual organ arises, one says that this eye is seeing. Because when that consciousness arises, one says that the eye can see forms, but one does not say that the eye cognizes forms. Another explanation: The people of the world commonly accept that when visual consciousness arises, one says that the eye is seeing. Because when that consciousness arises, one says that the eye can see forms, but does not say it cognizes forms. Another explanation: Regarding "the world commonly accepts that visual consciousness is seeing": this text should say "commonly accepts that the visual organ is seeing"; in stating "visual consciousness," it mentions the supported to reveal the supporting entity. Another explanation: It should say "commonly accepts that the visual organ is seeing"; in stating "visual consciousness," it applies the name of the supported effect to the supporting cause. Another explanation: The world commonly accepts that visual consciousness is seeing, but the entity of consciousness is subtle and not understood by the world; they merely speak of the eye seeing, and when speaking of the eye seeing, it is indeed consciousness seeing. Because when that consciousness arises, one says that the eye can see forms, but does not say that the visual organ can cognize forms. Question: If the eye is not said to cognize forms, why does the earlier text say, "Furthermore, as a sūtra says: 'Forms cognized by the eye are pleasing and delightful; however, in reality it is not that these pleasing and delightful forms are cognized by the eye.'" According to that earlier passage, form is that which is cognized by the eye, so the eye is that which cognizes, applying the designation of 'cognizer' to the supporting organ. Why does the later text say it does not cognize forms? Explanation: The earlier text speaks of the eye being able to cognize in reliance on the scriptures, whereas the later text is based on conventional usage where the eye is not that which cognizes. Another explanation: The earlier passage cites the sūtra according to Dharmatrāta, the Mahāsāṃghika, and others, which are different explanations by different schools, and thus they do not agree. The proponent of consciousness seeing says: Not only do I make this explanation, but it is also said in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*: "That which is obtained by the eye is called 'that which is seen.'" From this it is clear that the eye is called that which sees. "That which is experienced by visual consciousness" occurs together in the text; this proves that the eye is called that which sees, and is not called that which cognizes. Another explanation: "That which is experienced by visual consciousness is called 'that which is seen'" makes it clear that visual consciousness is called that which sees; this proves that consciousness is called seeing. "If obtained by the eye" occurs together in the text. Another explanation: "If obtained by the eye it is called 'that which is seen'" proves that the eye is called that which sees and is not called that which cognizes. "That which is experienced by visual consciousness is called 'that which is seen'" proves that consciousness is called that which sees. Therefore, one only says that the eye is called that which sees, not that it cognizes. Only when consciousness is directly present is it said to cognize forms, just as one speaks of the sun being able to make the day: the sun itself is the day, and apart from the sun there is no separate day. Consciousness is also like this: when consciousness is directly present, it is called that which cognizes, and apart from consciousness there is no separate cognizer. Although the two schools of the eye seeing and consciousness seeing have disputed back and forth as described above, observing the flow of the text, the treatise master's intent leans toward consciousness seeing.