俱舍論記 26.88

26.88

「論曰至越此十六」者，釋上句。《正理》七十三云「豈不有說盡、無生智必自了知我生盡等。此不相違，前已說故。謂前已說無漏觀後，世俗智中作此行相，非無漏智此行相轉。由盡、無生引起俗智，推功於本，言彼了知。故許此智離空、非我。」又云「若爾，既有無漏他心智，應越十六有、無漏行相。謂他心智皆以一實自相為境，道等行相皆以聚集共相為境，彼此既殊，知離十六決定別有無漏行相。非定許故，所難不然。謂我所宗非決定許共相行相但緣聚集，許有受、心二念住故。如觀一受體是非常，此智生時以共相行相觀一實自相為境極成。如是寧不許無漏他心智以共相行相緣一實自相？謂知他心是真道等，即緣一實是道等相。若謂應如受、心念住總緣三世所有受心，為非常等共相行相。無漏他心智亦總緣三世他無漏心等為道等行相，便違自宗他心智起唯緣現在一實自相。此亦不然，加行異故。此智加行為欲知他現能緣心有貪等別，修非常等念住加行為總厭背諸有漏法。由前加行勢力有殊，至成滿時現總緣別，是故無有應相例過。若謂非常非受自體，故應觀受為非常時，非緣一實自相為境。寧可引此喻他心智？則彼應許受非非常，不應於受起非常觀。如受與心其體各別，必定無有觀受為心。雖即觀受以為非常，而無一物有多體過。領納非常，體無別故。如損、益等，非離領納所餘行相。餘法亦然（已上論文）。」

[On the text from] "The treatise says" down to "[there is no knowledge] going beyond these sixteen": this explains the first line. The *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle seventy-three, states: "Does it not say that the knowledge of exhaustion and non-arising must self-cognize that 'my rebirth is exhausted' and so forth? This is not contradictory, as has been explained before. That is, as explained before, after the unpolluted contemplation, this aspect is formed in conventional knowledge; it is not that this aspect operates in unpolluted knowledge. Because the knowledge of exhaustion and non-arising gives rise to conventional knowledge, the merit is attributed to the root, saying that it cognizes it. Therefore, this knowledge is admitted to be free from emptiness and non-self." It also states: "If so, since there is unpolluted knowledge of another's mind, it should go beyond the sixteen polluted and unpolluted aspects. For knowledge of another's mind in all cases takes a single real specific characteristic as its object, while the aspects of the path and so forth all take an aggregated common characteristic as their object; since these two are distinct, one knows that apart from the sixteen, there must definitely be other unpolluted aspects. [Answer:] Because we do not definitively grant this, your objection is unsound. That is, our school does not definitively grant that common-characteristic aspects only take aggregates as their object, for we admit the two applications of mindfulness on sensation and mind. Just as when contemplating the essence of a single sensation as impermanent, when this knowledge arises, taking a single real specific characteristic as its object by means of a common-characteristic aspect is fully established. In this way, why not admit that unpolluted knowledge of another's mind takes a single real specific characteristic as its object by means of a common-characteristic aspect? Knowing another's mind to be the true path and so forth is taking a single real [entity] as the aspect of the path and so forth. If you say: it should be like the applications of mindfulness on sensation and mind, which comprehensively take all sensations and minds of the three times as the common-characteristic aspect of impermanence and so forth; and unpolluted knowledge of another's mind should also comprehensively take the unpolluted minds of others across the three times as the aspect of the path and so forth, which would contradict our own school's [thesis] that knowledge of another's mind only arises taking a single present real specific characteristic as its object. This is also not so, because the preparatory practices differ. The preparatory practice of this knowledge is undertaken wishing to know another's present cognizing mind, distinguishing whether it has greed and so forth; the preparatory practice of cultivating the applications of mindfulness on impermanence and so forth is undertaken in order to comprehensively turn away from and loathe all polluted dharmas. Because the force of their prior preparatory practices differs, when reaching fulfillment, one presently takes the single while the other takes the comprehensive; therefore, there is no fault of improper analogy. If you say that impermanence is not the intrinsic nature of sensation, and therefore when contemplating sensation as impermanent it does not take a single real specific characteristic as its object, how could this be adduced as an analogy for knowledge of another's mind? Then one would have to admit that sensation is not impermanent, and one should not give rise to the contemplation of impermanence in regard to sensation. Just as sensation and mind have distinct entities, there is certainly no contemplating of sensation as mind. Although one contemplates sensation as impermanent, there is no fault of a single entity having multiple essences. Experiencing and impermanence do not differ in entity. Just as harm and benefit are not aspects apart from experiencing, other dharmas are likewise." (Thus far the treatise text.)