俱舍論記 28.86

28.86

「若言定中至許生無過」者，經部又牒說一切有部難破。汝若言定中寧有身識起身受樂者。破云：有亦無失。我經部宗許在定中有輕安風觸，從勝定所起。順生身識相應樂受遍觸身根故。汝若謂起身識是外，散故應失壞定者。破云：無如是失。此輕安風觸從勝定生，引內身識相應樂受，還能順起意識相應三摩地故，不失壞定。汝若謂起身識應名出定者。破云：此難不然，由前因故。前因即是此輕安風，從勝定生引內身樂，還能順起三摩地故，不名出定。或可因是所以由前相順，所以不名出定。汝若謂依止欲界身根，不應得生色界觸、色界識，以彼身、觸即自地故。破云：若從散心依欲身根，不發身識緣色界觸。若在定內順起輕安，許依欲身生彼定內緣輕安身識，故無有過。

Regarding the passage "If you say: In absorption... to accept its arising is faultless": The Sautrāntika again takes up the Sarvāstivādin objection to refute it. If you say, "How can there be a body-consciousness in absorption that arises to experience bodily pleasure?" The refutation states: Even if it exists, there is no fault. Our Sautrāntika school admits that within absorption there is a tactile sensation of pliancy-wind (praśrabdhi-vāyu-spraṣṭavya) that arises from superior absorption, because it accords with generating the pleasant sensation associated with body-consciousness and pervades the body-faculty. If you claim that the arising of body-consciousness is external and scattered, so that absorption would be lost and broken: The refutation states: There is no such fault. This tactile sensation of pliancy-wind arises from superior absorption and induces the internal pleasant sensation associated with body-consciousness, and is furthermore able to facilitate the arising of samādhi associated with mental consciousness; therefore, absorption is not lost and broken. If you claim that the arising of body-consciousness should be called emerging from absorption: The refutation states: This objection is incorrect, due to the previous cause. The previous cause is that this pliancy-wind, arising from superior absorption, induces internal bodily pleasure and is furthermore able to facilitate the arising of samādhi; therefore, it is not called emerging from absorption. Or, [one may say that] "cause" is the reason: because of the previous mutual accord, it is not called emerging from absorption. If you claim that relying on the body-faculty of the desire realm, one should not be able to generate the tactile object of the form realm and the consciousness of the form realm, because that body and tactile object are of their own stage: The refutation states: If it is from a scattered mind relying on the body-faculty of the desire realm, it does not produce a body-consciousness taking the tactile object of the form realm as an object. But if, within absorption, it facilitates the arising of pliancy, it is accepted that relying on the body of the desire realm, it generates within that absorption a body-consciousness taking pliancy as its object; therefore there is no fault.