俱舍論記 4.178

4.178

「頌曰至不相應行」者，心不相應，簡異心所。行謂行蘊，簡色、心、無為，非行蘊故。又解：心不相應，簡行蘊中諸心所法。行謂行蘊，簡色、受、想、識及與無為，非行蘊故。二定謂無想定、滅盡定。相謂四相。等謂等取句身、文身。類謂流類，即是得等。今案此論，心不相應行但有十四；若依《正理》，加和合性。故《正理》十二云「等者等取句身、文身及和合性。」二論既說不同，無容竝是，假興賓主問答研尋。俱舍師問云：此和合性如何證知？正理師解云：如破僧時捨和合性，明知別有。正理師問云：如我所立別有體性，汝不立者，何法中收？俱舍師解云：此和合性，眾同分攝。正理師難云：凡言同分必依法得，和合同分依何法得？俱舍師解云：依戒而得。謂受戒時得二同分，一和合同分、破僧時捨。二大戒同分，破僧不捨，以成戒故。正理師復難云：若依戒得，破僧之時戒既不捨，如何捨彼和合同分？俱舍師解云：諸法不定，何必因彼而得、與彼同捨？如因十戒得勤策同分，受大戒時不捨十戒而捨勤策同分，以得苾芻眾同分故。正理師復難云：誰言受大戒時捨勤策同分？引不極成此中為喻。俱舍師復反詰言：若不捨者，即應一人亦名苾芻亦名勤策。正理師解云：從強立稱偏名苾芻，以不捨勤策同分，如大戒身中亦成十戒而名苾芻。俱舍師復引極成喻云：如因戒得持戒同分，遇犯戒緣雖不捨彼戒體而捨持戒同分。此既極成，不應違拒。俱舍師復反問彼正理師言：汝立和合性，復依何法得耶？正理師解云：我和合性依戒而得。俱舍師難云：破僧之時戒既不捨，如何捨彼和合性耶？正理師解云：如持戒同分受戒時得，後犯戒時非與持戒同捨。還同汝立和合同分，依戒而得非與戒同捨。俱舍師復難云：破僧之時捨和合同分不？正理師答云：捨。俱舍師復難云：若破僧時不捨和合同分，可使別捨和合性。破僧之時既捨和合同分，何須別捨和合性耶？由斯理證，故知同分攝和合性。其和合性異說不同，故須研究。和合同分，宗必許有。隨何和合法上即有和合同分，所以不別研尋。問：破僧不和合，即是非得攝，何妨僧和合以彼得為體？解云：夫論其得必有所得，和合無別所得，故體非是得收。又解：諸法不必皆相翻立。如以凡翻聖，凡性是非得；不可以聖翻凡，聖性唯得。然諸聖法皆名為聖性。若依《品類足》第一，十三同《俱舍》，不說非得；然別說有依得、事得、處得。彼論解云「依得云何？謂得所依處。事得云何？謂得諸蘊。處得云何？謂得內外處。」又云「復有所餘如是類法，與心不相應。」《法蘊足論》第十同《品類足論》。若依《雜心》，十三同《俱舍》，不說非得，然說異生性。問：諸論不同，如何會釋？解云：《品類足》說依、事、處得，約法別說，應知即是得中攝也。不說非得，即是復有所餘不相應攝，即是此論非得所收。《雜心》說異生性，應知即是非得少分，如變化心是通果少分。《雜心》略舉一邊，非為盡理。又《正理》解頌中類字，言類者顯餘所計度法即前種類，謂有計度離得等、有蘊得等性。解云：餘所計度，謂說一切有部中後代不正義浪作計度，離得等外計有蘊得、處得、界得、退等性，今顯彼計隨其所應即得等攝。若作俱舍師救，類言即顯此十四種同流類，故非顯餘計。

Regarding "The verse says: [...] conditioned forces dissociated [from mind]": "Dissociated from mind" excludes mental factors. "Conditioned forces" refers to the skandha of conditioned forces (saṃskāra-skandha), which excludes form, mind, and the unconditioned, because they are not the skandha of conditioned forces. Another explanation: "Dissociated from mind" excludes the various mental factors within the skandha of conditioned forces. "Conditioned forces" refers to the skandha of conditioned forces, which excludes form, sensation, perception, consciousness, and the unconditioned, because they are not the skandha of conditioned forces. "The two absorptions" refers to the absorption without conceptualization (asaṃjñi-samāpatti) and the absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti). "Characteristics" refers to the four characteristics. "Et cetera" encompasses collections of sentences (padakāya) and collections of phonemes (vyañjanakāya). "And kind" refers to category, namely, acquisition and so forth. Now examining this treatise, there are only fourteen conditioned forces dissociated from mind; however, according to the Nyāyānusāra, the property of harmony (sāmagrī) is added. Therefore Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 12, states: "'Et cetera' encompasses collections of sentences, collections of phonemes, and the property of harmony." Since the two treatises state it differently, they cannot both be correct, so [we] provisionally set up host and guest to inquire into and examine it through questions and answers. The Kośa master asks: "How is this property of harmony proven and known?" The Nyāyānusāra master explains: "Just as when the Saṃgha is schismed, one relinquishes the property of harmony, [by this] one clearly knows it exists separately." The Nyāyānusāra master asks: "As in what I establish there is a separate real entity, if you do not establish it, under which factor is it subsumed?" The Kośa master explains: "This property of harmony is subsumed under generic similarity (sabhāgatā)." The Nyāyānusāra master challenges: "Whenever one speaks of generic similarity, it must be acquired based on a factor; based on what factor is harmonious generic similarity acquired?" The Kośa master explains: "It is acquired based on the precepts. That is to say, when receiving the precepts, one acquires two generic similarities: first, harmonious generic similarity, which is relinquished at the time of schisming the Saṃgha; second, full precept generic similarity, which is not relinquished when the Saṃgha is schismed, because the precepts remain intact." The Nyāyānusāra master challenges again: "If it is acquired based on the precepts, since the precepts are not relinquished at the time the Saṃgha is schismed, how could one relinquish that harmonious generic similarity?" The Kośa master explains: "Phenomena are not fixed; why must it be acquired through that and relinquished along with that? Just as, due to the ten precepts, one acquires novice generic similarity (śrāmaṇera-sabhāgatā), but when receiving the full precepts, one does not relinquish the ten precepts yet relinquishes the novice generic similarity, because one acquires the bhikṣu generic similarity." The Nyāyānusāra master challenges again: "Who says that when receiving the full precepts one relinquishes novice generic similarity? You cite what is unestablished (aprasiddha) as an example here." The Kośa master questions back in return: "If one does not relinquish it, then one single person would be called both a bhikṣu and a novice." The Nyāyānusāra master explains: "The designation is established according to the predominant, being exclusively named 'bhikṣu'; since novice generic similarity is not relinquished, just as within the body possessing the full precepts the ten precepts are also accomplished, yet one is named a bhikṣu." The Kośa master again cites an established (prasiddha) example, saying: "Just as, due to the precepts, one acquires the generic similarity of maintaining the precepts, but upon encountering conditions for violating the precepts, although one does not relinquish that entity of the precepts, one relinquishes the generic similarity of maintaining the precepts. Since this is already established, you should not contradict and reject it." The Kośa master again asks the Nyāyānusāra master in return: "You establish a property of harmony; based on what factor is it acquired?" The Nyāyānusāra master explains: "My property of harmony is acquired based on the precepts." The Kośa master challenges: "Since the precepts are not relinquished when the Saṃgha is schismed, how is that property of harmony relinquished?" The Nyāyānusāra master explains: "Just as the generic similarity of maintaining the precepts is acquired at the time of receiving the precepts, yet later when violating the precepts it is not relinquished along with the [precepts of] maintaining; this is the same as the harmonious generic similarity you establish, which is acquired based on the precepts yet not relinquished along with the precepts." The Kośa master challenges again: "At the time the Saṃgha is schismed, is harmonious generic similarity relinquished or not?" The Nyāyānusāra master answers: "It is relinquished." The Kośa master challenges again: "If at the time the Saṃgha is schismed harmonious generic similarity were not relinquished, one might allow for relinquishing a separate property of harmony. Since harmonious generic similarity is already relinquished when the Saṃgha is schismed, why would one need to separately relinquish a property of harmony? By this logical proof, we therefore know that generic similarity subsumes the property of harmony." Because different teachings disagree on this property of harmony, it must be investigated. The school definitely accepts the existence of harmonious generic similarity. Whatever harmonious factor exists, the harmonious generic similarity is right upon it, which is why it is not separately investigated. Question: "If a schismed Saṃgha is disharmonious, that is subsumed under non-acquisition (aprāpti); why not allow that the harmony of the Saṃgha has that acquisition (prāpti) as its entity?" The explanation: "Generally speaking, where there is an acquisition, there must be something acquired; harmony has nothing separately acquired, so its entity is not subsumed under acquisition." Another explanation: "Phenomena do not necessarily have to be established in mutual opposition. For example, using the ordinary to oppose the noble, the ordinary nature is non-acquisition; one cannot use the noble to oppose the ordinary, such that the noble nature would only be acquisition. Rather, all noble factors are called the noble nature." If one follows the Prakaraṇapāda, fascicle 1, thirteen are identical to the Kośa, without mentioning non-acquisition; however, it separately mentions basis-acquisition (āśraya-prāpti), thing-acquisition (vastu-prāpti), and āyatana-acquisition (āyatana-prāpti). That treatise explains: "What is basis-acquisition? It means acquiring the basis. What is thing-acquisition? It means acquiring the skandhas. What is āyatana-acquisition? It means acquiring the internal and external āyatanas." It also says: "There are furthermore other factors of such kind, dissociated from mind." Fascicle 10 of the Dharmaskandha is identical to the Prakaraṇapāda. If one follows the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya, thirteen are identical to the Kośa, without mentioning non-acquisition, but it mentions the nature of being an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva). Question: "Since the various treatises differ, how are they to be harmonized and explained?" The explanation: "The basis-, thing-, and āyatana-acquisitions stated in the Prakaraṇapāda are spoken separately with reference to factors; one should know that they are subsumed under acquisition. Its not mentioning non-acquisition means that it is subsumed under 'there are furthermore other dissociated [factors],' which is what is subsumed under non-acquisition in this treatise. As for the nature of being an ordinary person stated in the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya, one should know that it is a portion of non-acquisition, just as a mind of magical creation (nirmāṇa-citta) is a portion of the fruit of supernormal mastery (abhijñā-phala). The Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya briefly adduces one aspect, not being the exhaustive truth." Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra explains the word 'kind' in the verse, saying: "'Kind' indicates that other hypothesized factors belong to the aforementioned category, meaning that there are those who hypothesize that apart from acquisition and so forth there exist the nature of skandha-acquisition and so forth." The explanation: "'Other hypothesized' refers to improper, baseless hypotheses made by later generations within the Sarvāstivāda school, positing the nature of skandha-acquisition, āyatana-acquisition, dhātu-acquisition, falling away, and so forth apart from acquisition and so forth; here it is shown that those hypotheses, according to their correspondence, are simply subsumed under acquisition and so forth. If one offers a defense as a Kośa master, the word 'kind' simply indicates that these fourteen kinds belong to the same category; thus it does not indicate other hypotheses."