俱舍論記 4.26

4.26

「應知此中至類無別故」者，此即通也。應知此中大種雖多，但說四者依體類說，諸四大種流類相似無差別故。造色差別，故約處說。若依《正理》第十，總有三說。初說同此論，後二說云「或唯依體，亦無有失，由此中說定俱生故。形色等體非決定有，光、明等中則無有故。或唯依處，然為遮遣多誹謗故，別說大種。多誹謗者，或復謗言：大種、造色無別有性。或復謗言：無別觸處所造色體。或復謗言：非一切聚皆具一切。或復謗言：數不決定。別說大種，此謗皆除（解云：初說唯依體說，若分形等即有形而非顯。顯而非形，聚各_差別，便非決定，故不應分。若總言色決定恒有，乃至輕重分別亦然，四大便定，未曾減一。故說八等亦無有過。第二說唯依處說，應唯有四，為遮大、多誹謗故，覺天論師及譬喻尊者立四大外無別造色；室利邏多說於觸中無所造觸，許餘造色；諸經部師許有色聚無四大種，故言非具。或言定有大種不必具四，故言數不定。今說造色有四，別立四大種，四謗皆除，故復偏說）。」

"One should know that here ... because their classes are without distinction": this is the resolution. One should know that here, although the great elements are many, stating only four is done based on their types of entity, because the varieties of the four great elements are similar in their stream and have no distinctions. The created matters have distinctions; hence they are spoken of in terms of āyatanas. If one relies on the tenth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra, there are altogether three explanations. The first explanation is identical to this treatise. The latter two explanations state: "Or, relying solely on real entity, there is also no fault, because here it is spoken of as definitely co-arising. Real entities such as shape are not definitely present, because in light, brightness, and so forth, they do not exist. Or, relying solely on āyatana, yet in order to ward off many false allegations, the great elements are separately spoken of. As for the 'many false allegations': some falsely allege that the great elements and created matter have no distinct natures; or some falsely allege that there is no distinct entity of created matter in the tactile āyatana; or some falsely allege that not all aggregates are equipped with all [elements]; or some falsely allege that the number is not definite. By separately speaking of the great elements, these false allegations are all eliminated." (The explanation states: The first explanation speaks solely based on real entity: if one differentiates shape and so forth, then there would be shape without color, or color without shape; aggregates having respective distinctions would then not be definite, and so they should not be differentiated. If one speaks generally of visible matter as definitely always existing, and the differentiation of lightness and heaviness is also like this, the four great elements are then definite and have never lacked one. Therefore, speaking of eight and so forth also has no fault. The second explanation speaks solely based on āyatana: there should only be four, but to ward off great and numerous false allegations—Master Dharmatrāta and the Venerable Dārṣṭāntika posited that outside the four great elements there is no distinct created matter; Śrīlāta stated that within touch there is no created touch, while admitting the remaining created matters; the Sautrāntikas admitted that there are material aggregates lacking the four great elements, hence stating they are not fully equipped; or some said that the great elements definitely exist but do not necessarily comprise all four, hence stating the number is indefinite. Now, by stating that created matters are four and separately positing the four great elements, the four false allegations are all eliminated; therefore they are specially spoken of again).