俱舍論記 5.233

5.233

「又若有執至而不應許」者，敘異執破。又若有執，名如四相與義俱生。破云：現在世名，目去、來義，不應得有，以不俱故。子等漸大，父等立名，即顯初生非名俱也。若初名俱，如何後立？有為有生容許名俱，無為無生應無有名，執名如生等相而不應許。

On "Moreover, if someone maintains... it should not be accepted": this presents a heterodox view and refutes it. Moreover, if someone maintains that words arise simultaneously with their referents just as the four conditioned characteristics (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa) do, it is refuted by saying: A word of the present time denoting a past or future referent could not exist, because they are not simultaneous. As a child gradually grows, the parents assign a name; this shows that at the initial birth, it was not simultaneous with the name. If it were simultaneous with the name at the beginning, how could it be assigned later? Conditioned dharmas have arising, so one might allow them to be simultaneous with a name; but unconditioned dharmas have no arising, so they would have no names. Therefore, holding that names are like characteristics such as arising is untenable.