俱舍論記 9.81

9.81

「若執有始至芽必不生」者，有外道計，或化地部計。初念法不從因生，第二念已去方從因生。彼計有始，後位應不從因生，以是生故，猶如初位。初位應從因生，以是生故，猶如後位。若初、後位皆無因生，便違現量。現見芽等因種等生，隨其所應，由何方處、由何時節俱決定故。又由火等為因，熟變等果生。由此定無無因起法。常因論，如前已遣。是故生死決定無初，然有後邊。由惑、業因盡故，生果必依惑、業因故，若惑、業因滅壞之時，生果必亡。理定應爾。如種因滅壞，芽等果必不生。

"If one posits a beginning […] a sprout will surely not arise": some heterodox views, or the Mahīśāsaka view, posit that phenomena in the first moment do not arise from causes, and only from the second moment onward do they arise from causes. If they posit a beginning, the subsequent stages should not arise from causes, because they are arisen, just like the initial stage. The initial stage should arise from causes, because it is arisen, just like the subsequent stages. If neither the initial nor subsequent stages arose from causes, this would contradict direct perception. It is directly observed that sprouts and the like arise from seeds and the like as their causes, because their respective location and time are both determined accordingly. Furthermore, with fire and the like as causes, fruits such as cooked transformation arise. Therefore, there are definitely no phenomena that arise without causes. The doctrine of permanent causes has already been refuted earlier. Therefore, saṃsāra definitely has no beginning, yet it has a final end. Because the causes of affliction and karma are exhausted, and since the fruit of birth must depend on the causes of affliction and karma, when the causes of affliction and karma perish, the fruit of birth must be eradicated. By reason it must definitely be so. Just as when the cause, the seed, perishes, the fruit, the sprout and the like, will surely not arise.