Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

俱舍論記 2.47

English (machine translation) 2.47

Language
English

2.47

Regarding the passage: "The treatise says […] therefore the word 'only' is used," the fourth fascicle of the *Nyāyānusāra* criticizes, saying: "The master of the treatise explains: 'Because their modes of activity are coarse and they operate via external gates.' This reason is illogical, for we observe that when the mental consciousness operates via internal gates, it is also always associated with them." The intent of his criticism: we observe that the internal-gate mental consciousness of the first dhyāna is accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, which shows that operating via external gates is not a definitive proof. In Kāmadhātu and the first dhyāna, the internal-gate mental consciousness is accompanied by vitarka and vicāra. The Kośa master rescues [the thesis], saying: first, that their modes of activity are coarse is the general reason; second, that they operate via external gates is the specific reason. The five sensory consciousnesses possess both; although the internal-gate mental consciousness lacks operation via external gates, it has a coarse mode of activity, and hence has vitarka and vicāra. The external-gate mental consciousness of higher stages, although possessing operation via external gates, lacks a coarse mode of activity, and hence lacks vitarka and vicāra.

Linked texts (1)