俱舍論記 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.2

Chapter 1: Exposition of the Elements (Part 2)

Regarding "Furthermore... [up to] ...how many are unrecorded?": From here below is the third major section, the distinctions by various categories; there are twenty-two categories in total distinguishing the eighteen elements. As for why they are not distinguished according to skandhas and āyatanas, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 4, states: "Because within the elements, the faculties, objects, and consciousnesses are fully revealed. The classes of meanings across various categories are easily understood, so here we provisionally distinguish them according to the eighteen elements. By this, the classes of meanings for the skandhas and āyatanas are already accomplished." From here down explains the first three categories. Approaching the explanation, a question is raised.

2.4

Regarding "The verse states... [up to] ...unrecorded; the rest are of three kinds": In the verse's answer, the first line is the category of visible and non-visible; the next line is the category of with-resistance and without-resistance; the bottom two lines are the category of the three natures.

2.5

"The treatise states: ... [the verse says:] the rest are spoken of as invisible" means: because this visible form-realm (rūpa-dhātu) can be pointed out as distinct here and there, and there is speech capable of indicating it as "here" or "there," it is named "visible" (sanidarśana). Here, speech is called "seeing" [or "indication" (nidarśana)]; by this standard the rest are invisible. According to Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 4, there are three explanations in all, which state: "Because of two meanings: First, this form definitely accompanies sight (cakṣus), and is therefore named visible. Because form arises concurrently with the eye, just as one has a companion. Second, this form admits of indication, and is therefore named visible. Because it admits of the distinction of being indicated here or there, just like having an objective support. Some say: this form has a reflection that can appear in mirrors and the like, and is therefore named visible. Because it can be shown like that, this is also so. One cannot say that sound, having echoes and the like, should thereby be visible, because [sound and echo] do not arise simultaneously." Fascicles 75 and 128 of the Vibhāṣā also present three explanations, all identical to the Nyāyānusāra. The first master takes the eye as "sight" because it observes and illuminates form. The second explanation takes speech as "sight" [or "indication"] because it can demonstrate. The third explanation takes the reflected image as "sight" because "seeing" means "manifesting". Question: Why does this treatise not fully present all three? Explanation: It was spoken according to what the author of the treatise preferred to say. Another explanation: The Sautrāntika posits that the eye has no real function to be called "seeing"; when the three—sense-faculty, object, and consciousness—come together, it is metaphorically designated that "the eye sees," but it is not a real eye seeing. Furthermore, there is no real matter of a reflected image. The author of the treatise sided with the Sautrāntika; not speaking of the eye seeing and not speaking of the manifestation of reflections, defining indication as "sight" does not contradict the Sautrāntika, and he therefore relied on this explanation. Although one explanation agrees, his intention nevertheless went against the other two explanations. Question: In Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, fascicle 1, wisdom is also called "sight"; hence that treatise says: "Furthermore it is said: all realms are visible, because they are the domain of the wisdom-eye (prajñā-cakṣus)." Why does this treatise not mention it? Explanation: In distinguishing the characteristics of dharmas, the intent lies in differentiation. If one speaks of the seeing of wisdom, all eighteen realms would be named visible; having none that are invisible, there would be no differentiation. That the author of the treatise did not state it was intended for this reason, or he simply omitted discussing it.

2.6

"It has thus been explained ... because their cognitive objects are distinct" means: the root verse only clarified obstructive resistance (pratigha), but the prose conveniently clarifies three kinds of resistance (sapratigha). "Resistance" (pratigha) means obstruction; obstruction is of two kinds: first, obstructive resistance (āvaraṇa-pratighāta); second, restrictive resistance (bandhana-pratighāta). Obstructive resistance is the obstruction of hindrance. Cognitive-field resistance (viṣaya-pratighāta) and objective-support resistance (ālambana-pratighāta) are the obstruction of restriction. This then marks the headings.

2.7

"Obstructive resistance ... or mutual resistance between two" refers to aggregated matter mutually obstructing one another. "Or mutual resistance between two" refers to a hand and a stone resisting each other. Pointing to the evident, it speaks provisionally of hand and stone; in discussing resistance, it actually extends to the ten [physical kinds].

2.8

"Cognitive-field resistance ... cognitive-field resistance" refers to the twelve realms: the five sense-faculties, the seven consciousness realms in full, and all dharmas possessing cognitive objects that are associated with a part of the dharma-realm. Because they are restricted by cognitive fields such as visible form, they are named "possessing cognitive-field resistance". The Prajñaptiśāstra is one title among the six pādas [of the Abhidharma], composed by Mahākātyāyana. Citing its two pairs of water-land and day-night can be understood. A piśāca, rendered into the Tang language as "eater of blood and flesh," is another name for a ghost (preta). A śiśumāra is a type of beast (tiryag-yoni), shaped like a gecko; the small ones are twenty feet long, and the large ones reach even a hundred feet.

2.9

"Objective-support resistance ... with respect to their own objective supports" means that minds and mental factors are restricted by their own objective supports, and are therefore named "possessing objective-support resistance".

2.10

"What further distinction is there between a cognitive field and an objective support?" asks about the distinction between the two.

2.11

"If toward that dharma ... is named an objective support" answers cognitive-field resistance. If toward that cognitive field of visible form or the like, this eye, ear, etc. have the capacity to apprehend the object such as seeing or hearing, then that visible form or the like is said to be the cognitive field of this eye and the like. That upon which capacity relies is named a "cognitive field". Just as when a person has superior ability in a certain area, they then declare that to be "my field". This is based on possessing the capacity, not necessarily on activating the function; therefore, the tat-sabhāga is still named "possessing resistance". "Possessing objective-support resistance" means that mind and mental factors, by nature being weak and frail, do not arise without an object, just as a frail person cannot stand up without a staff. Taking hold of the objective-support field, they only then arise and manifest; "manifesting" means giving rise to that function of seizing a fruit. That objective support is named an "objective support" with respect to the mind and the like; this is based on their function being able to arise when having an object, and not arising without an object. They are all named "possessing resistance" without necessarily having arisen; therefore, future minds and the like are also named "possessing resistance". If it is cognitive-field resistance, it is based on obstructing the function of apprehending an object; if it is objective-support resistance, it is based on obstructing the function of seizing a fruit. For instance, in the case of a tat-sabhāga eye, although it does not face an object, its function of seizing a fruit arises spontaneously. Yet that eye and the like do not possess objective-support resistance; therefore one knows that obstructing the function of apprehending an object is named cognitive-field resistance, and obstructing the function of seizing a fruit is named objective-support resistance. Another explanation: on the side of obstructing the essence, it is named objective-support resistance; on the side of obstructing the function, it is named cognitive-field resistance. For instance, although the essence of a tat-sabhāga eye is constantly present, it lacks the capacity to see form, so it is not named cognitive-field resistance. By this we may know that cognitive field concerns function, while objective support is based on essence. Another explanation: obstructing the function of apprehending an object is named cognitive-field resistance, and obstructing the function of taking an object as cognitive support is named objective-support resistance.

2.12

"How is it that the eye and the like ... are said to possess obstruction?" asks about the meaning of obstruction. How is it that when the eye and the like operate upon their own cognitive fields, they are said to possess obstruction? This asks about cognitive-field resistance. How is it that when eye-consciousness and the like operate upon their own objective supports, they are said to possess obstruction? This asks about objective-support resistance. Here, the word "own" means: the five sense-faculties and five consciousnesses each apprehend their own fields and cannot apprehend others, which is named "own," not that they cannot be grasped as objects by others. The manas and mental consciousness apprehend the dharma-field and are therefore named "own," not that they cannot apprehend others. Another explanation: apprehending the thirteen realms is named "own," because they are not apprehended by the five sense-faculties and five consciousnesses. Another explanation: among the eighteen realms, whatever is apprehended is immediately named "own".

2.13

"Going beyond that, with respect to others ... because they operate in conjunction" answers. It means that when this eye and the like take form and the like as objects, going beyond that form and the like, toward other sounds and the like, this eye and the like do not operate. This is restriction being called obstruction. Or again, obstruction is the meaning of conjunction; that is, when dharmas like the eye operate in conjunction with their own cognitive fields, and when they operate in conjunction with their own objective supports, they cannot arise with respect to other sounds and the like. This word "conjunction" is still restriction being named obstruction.

2.14

"It should be known that herein ... the rest are spoken of as resisting nothing" means: generally explaining that there are three kinds of resistance in all, it should be known that in this verse it is spoken of only in terms of obstructive resistance; hence it merely says ten possessing form are resistant. Because the aggregation of atoms mutually obstruct one another, by this implication the rest are spoken of as resisting nothing. Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 4, states: "Speaking of 'possessing form' means that, excluding avijñapti, it is subsumed under the remaining form aggregate (rūpa-skandha). Changing and obstructing is called form; because it has the meaning of changing and obstructing, it is called possessing form. Some say: form means speech that can indicate 'here' or 'there'; possessing this speech of 'here' and 'there,' it is therefore named possessing form. Some say: forms possess their own essence, and are therefore named possessing form. Because it is easy to speak of, the expression 'possessing form' is used only with respect to the essence of form." Explanation: The first explanation refers to possessing the function of form that changes and obstructs, hence it says possessing form. The second master refers to possessing the words that can indicate form, hence it is named possessing form. The third master refers to the essence being form itself, hence it says possessing form. Question: In the view of the second master, among the ten forms, the form-realm can be spoken of as having indicative words, but the other nine cannot; how can they be spoken of as having indicative words? How can they be called form? Explanation: Although the other nine are invisible, they can also be spoken of as being here or there, just as one says "in this place there are eyes, ears, and so forth." Another explanation: because the other nine are spoken of by association, following form they can be said to be here or there.

2.15

"If a dharma is a cognitive-field ... it refers to the five sense-faculties, the eye and the like" refers to the fourfold permutation (catuṣkoṭi) regarding the three kinds of resistance. According to the Vibhāṣā: if one inquires about the broad with the narrow, it is answered by an affirmative subsequent clause; if one inquires about the narrow with the broad, it is answered by an affirmative prior clause; if they are mutually broad and narrow, it is distinguished by the fourfold permutation; if broad and narrow are similar, it is answered with a corresponding clause. Cognitive-field resistance extends to mind but not objects; obstructive resistance extends to objects but not mind; because they are mutually broad and narrow, they form four alternatives. The seven consciousness realms and the associated dharma-realm are the first alternative: because they are restricted by objects, they possess cognitive-field resistance; because they do not mutually obstruct, they do not possess obstructive resistance. The five fields of form and the like are the second alternative: because they mutually obstruct, they possess obstructive resistance; because they are not restricted by cognitive fields, they do not possess cognitive-field resistance. The five faculties of the eye and the like are the third alternative: because they are restricted by fields, they possess cognitive-field resistance; because they mutually obstruct, they possess obstructive resistance. Dharmas not associated [with mind] are the fourth alternative: because they are not restricted by fields, they do not possess cognitive-field resistance; because they do not mutually obstruct, they do not possess obstructive resistance. If one compares cognitive field to objective support, cognitive-field resistance is broad and objective-support resistance is narrow; therefore, the text of this treatise answers with an affirmative subsequent clause. The reason objective support and obstruction are not set against each other for distinction is that they do not mutually subsume each other, so their essences do not overlap. Question: If judged by function, each subsumes differently; if judged by essence, then essence does not have the distinction of cognitive field and the like. How can they subsume each other? Explanation: In discussing functions they differ, and indeed do not subsume each other. Because functions follow essence and are not separate from essence, mutual subsumption is explained.

2.16

"Herein, the Venerable ... this is accepted" refers to Kumāralāta, rendered here as "Noble Youth," who is an ancestral master of the Sautrāntikas. Within the Sautrāntika school he composed the Dṛṣṭāntamālā, the Mohamālā, the Vyaktaśāstra, and so forth. The Sautrāntika school originally emerged from the Sarvāstivāda; taking the sūtras as valid authority (pramāṇa), they are called Sautrāntika; holding reason/principle as valid authority, they are called Sarvāstivāda. Now the intention of this verse is: that which is called "obstruction" means being obstructed by another so that it cannot arise. When directly taking its own object as cognitive support, how can it be called obstruction? Take, for example, the eye-consciousness wishing to arise toward the place of form, but being obstructed by other sounds and the like so that it is prevented from arising. When obstructed by another, it should be known to possess resistance; when directly apprehending form, it is named non-resistant. This differs from this school [the Sarvāstivāda]. The author of the treatise sided with the Sautrāntika, and therefore states "this is accepted." The four lines in the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya agree in text with the Sautrāntika, but the Sanskrit text is not so; the translator erred. An ancient worthy's interpretation that this verse agrees with the Sarvāstivāda is incorrect.

2.17

On the passage that begins, "As has been stated… hence it is called neutral (avyākṛta)": below, this explains the last two lines, distinguishing the eighteen realms according to the three natures (tri-svabhāva). Within this, first it clarifies the eight realms of the eye, etc., and second it clarifies the remaining ten realms. This section clarifies the eight realms of the eye, etc. Because the wholesome is predominant and praiseworthy, it is placed in the white category; because the unwholesome is predominant and blameworthy, it is placed in the black category; hence they are called "determinate" (vyākṛta). What is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy is not subsumed in either category and its entity is indistinct; hence it is called "neutral" (avyākṛta). Regarding the three natures: first, the wholesome (kuśala); second, the unwholesome (akuśala); third, the neutral (avyākṛta). The wholesome briefly has three kinds: first, innate (upapattipratilambhika); second, applied (prayogika), that is, [derived from] hearing (śrutamayī), reflection (cintāmayī), and cultivation (bhāvanāmayī); third, uncontaminated (anāsrava), that is, the learner (śaikṣa), the adept (aśaikṣa), and the ultimate (paramārtha). Within the uncontaminated, the first two are conditioned uncontaminated (saṃskṛtānāsrava), and the last one is unconditioned uncontaminated (asaṃskṛtānāsrava). In all there are seven wholesome kinds: 1. innate, 2. hearing, 3. reflection, 4. cultivation, 5. learner, 6. adept, and 7. ultimate. The unwholesome is only one. The neutral has two kinds: first, obscured (nivṛta); second, unobscured (anivṛta). Within the unobscured there are six: 1. maturation (vipāka), 2. deportment (īryāpatha), 3. craft (śilpasthāna), 4. fruition of supernatural power (abhijñā-phala), 5. self-nature (svabhāva), and 6. ultimate (paramārtha). The first five are conditioned neutrals, and the last one is an unconditioned neutral; together with the obscured mentioned before, there are seven kinds in total. Among the unobscured, the lower text of this treatise mentions only the ultimate; if based on the Nyāyānusāra, it generally explains two kinds: establishing the self-nature neutral within the conditioned, and establishing the ultimate neutral within the unconditioned. Here, six kinds are stated in order to differentiate them. Whatever is not subsumed under the four—maturation and so forth—is all called self-nature. In order to distinguish, within the conditioned it is expanded into five kinds. The wholesome has seven, the unwholesome has one, and the neutral has seven, making fifteen in total; with these fifteen kinds, the eighteen realms are differentiated. As for the differentiation: among the eighteen realms, the five faculties, odor, taste, and tangibles—these eight are exclusively neutral. Those of maturation comprise all eight kinds: the five faculties, odor, taste, and tangibles of maturation. Those of deportment, craft, and fruition of supernatural power comprise odor, taste, and tangibles. Those of self-nature comprise the nurtured (aupacayika) five faculties, odor, taste, and tangibles, as well as external odor, taste, and tangibles. Among the seven neutrals, they do not include the obscured or the ultimate.

2.18

On the passage that begins, "Some say: because it cannot… hence it is called neutral": this recounts a different opinion. It says that "neutral" means that it cannot declare (na vyākaroti) a fruit of maturation, hence it is called neutral.

2.19

On the passage, "If so, the uncontaminated should be exclusively neutral": the author of the treatise endorses the previous explanation, and therefore poses an objection to refute this latter school. If you say that not declaring maturation is the meaning of neutral, then since the uncontaminated cannot declare a fruit of maturation, it should be exclusively neutral. If you say that the conditioned uncontaminated also has maturation, taking analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) as its fruit—with eternal and impermanent being the difference, and attainment being called maturation—this too is incorrect. The conditioned uncontaminated might allow this explanation; but since unconditioned analytical cessation has no fruit whatsoever, how could it be called wholesome? If you say that as an efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu) it has an overarching fruit (adhipati-phala), that contradicts your own school's tenets. Even granting that it does not hinder the acquisition of an overarching fruit, in principle that is also incorrect: neutral phenomena also do not hinder the acquisition of an overarching fruit, so they ought to be called determinate. If you say that analytical cessation is said to be wholesome because its entity is praiseworthy, then that is identical to the previous explanation, making this restatement redundant.

2.20

On the passage, "The remaining ten realms are common to the three, wholesome, etc.": this clarifies the remaining ten realms. Within this, first it gives a general designation, and second a detailed explanation. This is the general designation.

2.21

On the passage that begins, "Namely, the seven consciousness realms… the rest are called neutral": below, this gives the detailed explanation. Within this: first it clarifies the seven consciousness realms; second it clarifies the realm of phenomena; third it clarifies matter and sound. This specifically clarifies the seven consciousness realms. These seven consciousness realms are all common to the three natures. If distinguished separately: the innate refers to the seven consciousness realms. Those of hearing, reflection, cultivation, learner, and adept refer to the mental realm (mano-dhātu) and the mental consciousness realm (manovijñāna-dhātu). The unwholesome refers to the seven consciousness realms. The obscured refers to the eye-, ear-, and body-consciousness [realms], the mental realm, and the mental consciousness [realm]. Those of maturation, deportment, and craft refer to the seven consciousness realms. Those of the fruition of supernatural power refer to the eye- and ear-consciousness [realms]. Being associated with the two supernatural powers is also a fruition of supernatural power, as well as the mental realm and mental consciousness realm. Because maturation, etc., completely exhaust mind, it does not include self-nature. Question: The eye-, ear-, and mental-consciousness realms as well as the mental faculty are all common to the three natures. That nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness are unwholesome and neutral can all be known. How do nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness arise as wholesome? Answer: If arising ordinary and unprompted, the three consciousnesses are not wholesome. But if a practitioner contemplates material food (kavaḍīkārāhāra) and so forth, deeply giving rise to a mind of disgust and revulsion, they can give rise to the three consciousnesses as wholesome.

2.22

On the passage that begins, "If the realm of phenomena is… the rest are called neutral": this specifically clarifies the realm of phenomena. In the realm of phenomena, the wholesome has four kinds: 1. wholesome by self-nature (svabhāva-kuśala), namely, the three wholesome roots such as non-greed, as well as moral shame (hrī) and dread of blame (apatrāpya); 2. wholesome by association (saṃprayukta-kuśala), namely, what is associated with the wholesome by self-nature; 3. wholesome by co-arising (samutthāna-kuśala), namely, unmanifest form (avijñapti), possession (prāpti), the four characteristics, and the two absorptions; 4. wholesome in the ultimate sense (paramārtha-kuśala), namely, analytical cessation. In the realm of phenomena, the unwholesome has three kinds: 1. unwholesome by self-nature (svabhāva-akuśala), namely, the three unwholesome roots such as greed, as well as lack of shame (ahrīkya) and lack of dread of blame (anapatrāpya); 2. unwholesome by association (saṃprayukta-akuśala), namely, what is associated with the unwholesome by self-nature; 3. unwholesome by co-arising (samutthāna-akuśala), namely, unmanifest form, possession, and the four characteristics. In the realm of phenomena, excluding the wholesome and unwholesome, the rest are called neutral. Below in this treatise and in the Mahāvibhāṣā, four kinds are stated for both the wholesome and unwholesome. Why here are only three kinds of unwholesome stated, with no mention of the ultimate? Answer: The ultimately unwholesome has an entity that is common to all three natures. Here, the eighteen realms are being differentiated according to the three natures, and for this reason the ultimately unwholesome is not mentioned. If the ultimate were mentioned, there would be no distinction. If distinguished separately, in the realm of phenomena there are sixty-four dharmas in total: unmanifest form, forty-six mental factors (caitasika), fourteen non-associated [formations] (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), and three unconditioned [dharmas]. The innate has thirty dharmas: unmanifest form, ten universal mental factors (mahābhūmika), ten major wholesome factors (kuśalamahābhūmika), investigation (vitarka), analysis (vicāra), torpor (middha), regret (kaukṛtya), possession (prāpti), and the four characteristics. Those of hearing and reflection have twenty-eight dharmas: unmanifest form, ten universal mental factors, ten major wholesome factors, investigation, analysis, possession, and the four characteristics. Those of cultivation have thirty dharmas: unmanifest form, ten universal mental factors, ten major wholesome factors, investigation, analysis, possession, the four characteristics, and the two absorptions. Those of the learner and adept have twenty-eight dharmas: unmanifest form, ten universal mental factors, ten major wholesome factors, investigation, analysis, possession, and the four characteristics. The wholesome in the ultimate sense has one dharma: analytical cessation. The unwholesome has forty-two dharmas: unmanifest form, ten universal mental factors, six major defilements (kleśamahābhūmika), two major unwholesome factors (akuśalamahābhūmika), ten minor defilements (upakleśabhūmika), investigation, analysis, torpor, regret, greed, anger, pride, doubt, possession, and the four characteristics. The obscured has thirty dharmas: ten universal mental factors, six major defilements, deceit (śāṭhya), dissimulation (māyā), and complacency (mada) from among the minor defilements, investigation, analysis, torpor, greed, pride, doubt, possession, and the four characteristics. Those of maturation have twenty-one dharmas: ten universal mental factors, investigation, analysis, torpor, possession, the four characteristics, life-faculty (jīvitendriya), generic resemblance (nikāyasabhāga), and non-ideation (asaṃjñika). Those of maturation, deportment, and craft have eighteen dharmas: ten universal mental factors, investigation, analysis, torpor, possession, and the four characteristics. The Mahāvibhāṣā and the Nyāyānusāra each have another explanation: that torpor is not common to deportment and craft; this will be cited and fully explained when reaching the ten entanglements (paryavasthāna). Those of the fruition of supernatural power have seventeen dharmas: ten universal mental factors, investigation, analysis, possession, and the four characteristics. The neutral by self-nature has ten dharmas: possession, non-possession, the four characteristics, word-set (nāmakāya), phrase-set (padakāya), syllable-set (vyañjanakāya), and generic resemblance. Among the non-associated [formations], whatever is not subsumed under the four—maturation, etc.—all remaining neutrals are subsumed under self-nature. Among mental factors, the four—maturation, etc.—exhaust all neutrals; therefore, the neutral by self-nature does not subsume mental factors. The neutral in the ultimate sense has two dharmas: space (ākāśa) and non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).

2.23

On the passage that begins, "The form realm and the sound realm… the rest are neutral": this specifically clarifies form and sound. In the two realms of form and sound, if co-arisen by the power of a wholesome mind and subsumed under bodily or vocal manifest form, they are wholesome; if co-arisen by the power of an unwholesome mind and subsumed under bodily or vocal manifest form, they are unwholesome; if co-arisen by the power of a neutral mind and subsumed under bodily or vocal manifest form, they are neutral; and form and sound that are not co-arisen are all called neutral. Because among neutral form and sound there are those that are not co-arisen, co-arisen is not separately mentioned. In reality, a neutral mind can also co-arise bodily and vocal manifest karma. If distinguished separately: innate, hearing, and reflection are all common to form and sound, because they can all serve as causal co-arising and as preparation to initiate action, as previously explained. The unwholesome is common to form and sound. The obscured is common to form and sound: that is, in the first dhyāna, obscured defilements of cultivation co-arise body and speech. That of maturation refers to form. Those of deportment, craft, fruition of supernatural power, and self-nature are all common to form and sound. Whatever is not subsumed under the four—maturation and so forth—is all called neutral by self-nature.

2.24

On the passage that begins, "Having explained the wholesome, etc.… the last three are bound to the formless realm": below, this is the fourth [section], explaining the heading of being bound to the three realms. The question and the verse answer.

2.25

On the passage that begins, "The treatise says: … because there is no object": the desire realm has eighteen; the form realm has fourteen, because odor and taste are by nature material food (kavaḍīkārāhāra), and there is no material food there, hence there are no odor and taste. Also the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: "There is no nature of bit-food there, because bodies are subtle" (end of treatise citation). Whenever it is said that a consciousness exists, it must have an object; there, having no objects of odor and taste, there are no two consciousnesses capable of apprehending them. If based on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, the Mahāsāṃghika and others hold that the form and formless realms possess all six consciousness-bodies.

2.26

On the passage, "If so, the tangible realm… because it is by nature material food": this raises an objection concerning the tangible realm. The form realm should have no tangibles either, because they are by nature material food, just like odor and taste.

2.27

On the passage, "The tangibles that exist there are not by nature material food": this resolves [the objection]. Tangibles in the form realm are not material food; therefore tangibles exist in the form realm. Odor and taste are exclusively material food; therefore what belongs to the lower [realm] does not extend to the higher [realm]. This reveals that the stated reason has the fallacy of being unestablished (asiddha).

2.28

On the passage, "If so, the class of odor and taste should also be like that": this raises another objection. If tangibles exist in the form realm, and these tangibles are not material food, what prevents odor and taste from also existing and also not being material food?

2.29

On the passage that begins, "Odor and taste, apart from food… therefore tangibles are not absent": this resolves [the objection] again. Odor and taste have no other utility apart from food; because craving for food is abandoned in the form realm, there are no odor and taste. In the form realm, tangibles have other uses apart from material food: namely, the four great elements, because they are capable of creating, can sustain the physical faculties and can sustain clothing, palaces, and the like; therefore, tangibles are not absent.

2.30

Regarding the passage: "Other masters say […] therefore they do not exist there," this recounts a variant explanation from the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. It means that while abiding in this Kāmadhātu, relying on those four dhyānas, one gives rise to equipoise; one generates the divine eye to see the visible form of higher realms, and generates the divine ear to hear the sounds of higher realms. Pliancy (praśrabdhi) refers to pliancy among the great wholesome mental factors (mahā-kuśala-bhūmika); its function is superior in absorption, so it is separately designated by name. Because tangible sensations occur at the same time as pliancy, it says "arising together." The "extraordinary tangible sensations" are the primary elements (mahābhūta) of Rūpadhātu. Although the body of Kāmadhātu cannot apprehend the tangible sensations of a higher realm, because tangible sensations circulate within the body, they can sustain and benefit the body. Since one whose body is in Kāmadhātu is able to see visible form of that level, hear sounds of that level, and give rise to tangible sensations of that level, these three still follow along upon taking rebirth in that dhyāna. Odors and tastes are not like this; therefore they do not exist there. Another explanation: Pliancy refers to bodily pliancy, which is delicate and smooth touch or light touch; because it occurs at the same time as the two supernormal knowledges (abhijñā), it says "arising together." It can sustain and benefit the body; although visible form and sound are common to both Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, the pliancy induced is only of Kāmadhātu, because it benefits the Kāmadhātu body. Because these three accompany one another in Kāmadhātu, upon being born in Rūpadhātu one is also endowed with the three kinds. Yet another explanation: Pliancy refers to the pliancy among mental factors. "Arising together" means that the extraordinary tangible sensation of Kāmadhātu that is induced and generated arises together with pliancy. According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, which does not refute this, it is indeed a variant explanation from the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. However, Vasumitra, in the commentary on the *Kośa*, says this is the explanation of Śrīlāta. That master's intent was to say: only upon entering absorption is there pliancy, or that it is the wind of pliancy. The reason the *Nyāyānusāra* does not refute it is that in its phrasing it does not contradict [the doctrine], hence it does not refute it.

2.31

Regarding the passage: "If so, the nose and tongue […] because they have no use there," the author of the treatise challenges the previous master. The two faculties of nose and tongue should not exist in Rūpadhātu, because they have no use there, just like odors and tastes.

2.32

Regarding the passage: "Not so, the two faculties […] and for adorning the body," the previous master resolves it. He clarifies that the faculties have a use, showing that the reason established [by the opponent] suffers from the fault of being unproven (asiddha). That is, the tongue has the function of initiating speech, and the nose has the function of adorning the body.

2.33

Regarding the passage: "If it is for adorning the body […] what use are the two faculties?" the author of the treatise challenges again. He clarifies that the faculties have no use, showing that his reason is fully established. For adorning the body and initiating speech, the physical bases (adhiṣṭhāna) are fully sufficient. The faculties are not visible; what would they adorn? Speech arises from the physical base; why is the substance of the faculty required? Therefore, we know that the two faculties have no use there.

2.34

Regarding the passage: "Just as without the male faculty […] the physical base also does not exist," the previous master rescues [his position] again. To show that the faculties have a use, he adduces an analogy to prove it. Just as without the male faculty there is also no physical base, if the two faculties did not exist, their physical bases should also not exist. Since their physical bases do exist, this shows that the faculties have a use. Although not being visible, they serve as the cause for what is visible; although not initiating speech, they serve as the cause for initiating speech. As causes for one another in turn, the faculties still have a use. It is because the faculties exist that the physical bases are produced; because the physical bases are produced, they adorn the body and initiate speech.

2.35

Regarding the passage: "There, it may well be that […] should exist apart from the faculty," the author of the treatise challenges again. In that Rūpadhātu, it may well be that the physical base of the male faculty does not exist, because it has no use in that realm. Supposing that the male physical base had a use in that realm, it should exist apart from the faculty. Because it has no use, it does not exist in that realm. As for the physical bases of the nose and tongue, because they have a use, they should exist apart from the faculties; what use are the two faculties? Since the faculties have no use, the reason remains established.

2.36

Regarding the passage: "Although some exist without a use […] yet they are not without a cause," the previous master explains further. If the author of the treatise asserts that the physical bases of the faculties are not produced from the faculties, but rather that a faculty is produced only through functions such as seeing visible forms and hearing sounds, [we reply that] whenever a faculty is produced, it is not necessarily because it has a use. For example, for those who are destined by karma to die while in the womb, although they lack functions such as seeing forms, their faculties are nevertheless produced; hence we know that the production of faculties is not necessarily dependent on having a use. An implicit objection says: since these faculties have no use, they should not be produced from a cause. To resolve this implicit objection, he makes this statement: although some exist without a use, yet they are not without a cause. This provides the general principle. Question: The earlier explanation said the two faculties have a use there, but now it is said they have no use; is this not contradictory? Explanation: The earlier statement that they have a use referred to an indirect, mediate use. The present statement that they have no use means they have no direct, immediate function: they do not presently adorn the body, nor do they presently initiate speech. Or it is a modification of the position under the pressure of the objection.

2.37

Regarding the passage: "From what cause do those faculties come to arise?" the author of the treatise specifically inquires: from what cause are those two faculties, the nose and tongue, produced in Rūpadhātu?

2.38

Regarding the passage: "There is craving for the faculties, which gives rise to extraordinary karma," the previous master replies: there is craving for the faculties, which initiates extraordinary karma; this karma is the cause of the faculties of nose and tongue.

2.39

Regarding the passage: "If detached from craving for sensory objects […] the nose and tongue should not exist," the author of the treatise again challenges on the basis of reason. Now, craving for a faculty intends its use in apprehending an object; it is because there is craving for the object that craving for the faculty arises. From this we know that craving for a faculty arises due to craving for the object. Whenever one is detached from craving for an object, one is definitely detached from the faculty; since they are detached from attachment to odors and tastes, they should not possess nose and tongue. If you claim that the arising of a faculty is not caused by craving for an object, and that despite having no craving for odors and tastes they still have nose and tongue, then one should also concede that despite having no craving for sexual touch, they have craving for the male faculty, and the male faculty should also arise. The fourth fascicle of the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this explanation, saying: "What reason is there here for making such an assumption: that if one is detached from craving for an object, craving for the faculty also does not exist? It is not the case that if craving for a faculty is absent, craving for the physical base is also removed. The faculty and its physical base arise in close proximity, whereas sensory objects are not so; how could one hold such an inverted assumption? The physical base of the male faculty is not produced there, which precisely shows that there is detachment from craving for the male faculty there. Since you concede that the physical bases of the nose and tongue are produced there, we know that there is no detachment from craving for these two faculties there. Therefore, one should not assert that they are detached from craving for the faculties yet not detached from craving for their physical bases." That treatise's intent says: an object is distant in relation to a faculty, whereas a physical base is close in relation to a faculty; why not use what is close as evidence, instead of inverting it and using what is distant as evidence? It is not by the presence or absence of an object that the presence or absence of a faculty is established; rather, the presence or absence of the physical base is fully sufficient to reveal the presence or absence of the faculty. If we come to the rescue of the Kośa master, one should ask him: for what reason does the physical base of the male faculty not exist there? If you say it is because of the absence of sexual touch, then sexual touch is fundamental, and therefore the evidence of the sensory object is stronger, not that of its physical base. If you say it is because it is ugly that it is not produced there, the Tathāgata's concealed organ (kośagata-vasti-guhya) is secret, majestic, and included among the major marks and minor characteristics; how could it be ugly? Furthermore, you said earlier that some faculties arise not because of a use, but solely by the force of causes, arising even without a use. Although the male faculty may be deemed ugly in Rūpadhātu, supposing there were a cause, it should arise in Rūpadhātu. If you say that without a cause the male faculty does not exist, I challenge you in turn: without a cause, the nose and tongue should not exist. If you say that without an object the male faculty does not exist, then since the nose and tongue lack objects, they too should not exist.

2.40

Regarding the passage: "If so, it would contradict […] having no deficiency of faculties," the previous master points out a contradiction with sacred scripture. If one says that the nose and tongue do not exist in Rūpadhātu, this contradicts what the sūtras say: in that Rūpadhātu, there is no defect of bodily limbs, and no deficiency of physical faculties.

2.41

Regarding the passage: "According to whichever faculties […] the male faculty should exist," the author of the treatise resolves it. When the sūtra says "no deficiency," it means according to what is appropriate. If you insist on "no deficiency" [strictly], the male faculty should also exist.

2.42

Regarding the passage: "Properly speaking […] the male faculty does not exist," the author of the treatise gives the correct explanation. The nose and tongue exist there, but without odors and tastes, because craving for the six faculties arises relying on the internal body, not being brought into activity relying on external sensory objects. Through attaining the higher absorptions, one gives rise to craving for the higher realms and craves the body of the higher realm; therefore, being born in Rūpadhātu, one comes to possess the nose and tongue. Craving for the male faculty arises relying on sexual touch; since sexual touch does not exist in Rūpadhātu, the male faculty does not exist. Where sūtras speak of them as "male," it is because they have other masculine characteristics, or because they can remain detached from defilement that they are called "male."

2.43

Regarding the passage: "Therefore, in Rūpadhātu […] the principle is established," the author of the treatise concludes.

2.44

The passage: "Bound to Ārūpyadhātu […] bound to Ārūpyadhātu," is self-evident.

2.45

Regarding the passage: "Having spoken of the realm-bound […] are named exclusively sāsrava," this is the fifth category: sāsrava and anāsrava. The latter three elements are common to both; the remaining fifteen elements are named exclusively sāsrava, because they are not subsumed under the truth of the path (mārga-satya) or the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), just like the afflictions (kleśa). According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, the five insentient sensory objects and the fifteen elements in the body of an aśaikṣa are not the basis of outflows, so they are all called anāsrava. Although all are anāsrava, they are not subsumed under the truth of the path, just like space (ākāśa) and cessation without deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); therefore, such an inference (anumāna) can be framed. The remaining text is self-evident.

2.46

Regarding the passage: "Having thus spoken of […] the latter three are threefold, the rest are devoid," this introduces the sixth category below: accompanied by investigation (vitarka) and accompaniment by analysis (vicāra). Within this, first is the direct analysis, second is the resolution of objections. This is the direct analysis: question and verse answer. Vitarka and vicāra are similar: within a single mind, either both arise together, or only one exists; therefore this is specifically clarified here. Arrogance (māda) and pride (māna), although also similar, also occur only one at a time, not arising both together. Shamelessness (āhrīkya) and lack of remorse (anapatrāpya), although also similar, also arise both together, never only one. Craving (preman) and veneration (gaurava) are likewise, and therefore are not clarified here.

2.47

Regarding the passage: "The treatise says […] therefore the word 'only' is used," the fourth fascicle of the *Nyāyānusāra* criticizes, saying: "The master of the treatise explains: 'Because their modes of activity are coarse and they operate via external gates.' This reason is illogical, for we observe that when the mental consciousness operates via internal gates, it is also always associated with them." The intent of his criticism: we observe that the internal-gate mental consciousness of the first dhyāna is accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, which shows that operating via external gates is not a definitive proof. In Kāmadhātu and the first dhyāna, the internal-gate mental consciousness is accompanied by vitarka and vicāra. The Kośa master rescues [the thesis], saying: first, that their modes of activity are coarse is the general reason; second, that they operate via external gates is the specific reason. The five sensory consciousnesses possess both; although the internal-gate mental consciousness lacks operation via external gates, it has a coarse mode of activity, and hence has vitarka and vicāra. The external-gate mental consciousness of higher stages, although possessing operation via external gates, lacks a coarse mode of activity, and hence lacks vitarka and vicāra.

2.48

Regarding the passage: "The latter three are […] because it is associated with vicāra," this clarifies the latter three dhātus. Within the dharmadhātu there are four dharmas: first, vitarka; second, vicāra; third, the other associated dharmas; fourth, the unassociated dharmas. Among these four, the other associated dharmas, the manodhātu, and the manovijñānadhātu all encompass all three categories. The unassociated dharmas of dharmadhātu and the vicāra of the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara) also correspond to the third category; vitarka is subsumed under the second category. Lacking a second vitarka shows that it is devoid of vitarka; being associated only with vicāra shows that it possesses vicāra. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes [the argument about] lacking a second vitarka, saying: "Supposing there were a second [vitarka], would you concede that they are associated? There is a second feeling, yet they are not associated; thus the statement that there is no second is not a definitive proof. He himself explains: at all times vitarka is without vitarka and accompanied only by vicāra, because its own nature cannot be associated with its own nature." The Kośa master rescues [his view], saying: supposing there were a simultaneous second vitarka, we would also concede their association. However, there is no second, and therefore they are not associated. Using feeling as an analogy for vitarka is also illogical. You say that whichever of the three feelings is present, the others are called 'second.' From a distinct standpoint, vitarka is also like feeling in having a 'second' vitarka. For example, among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate vitarka, whichever one is present, the others are called 'second'—who says there is no second? When I say there is no second, it means there is no simultaneous second vitarka. Challenging the *Nyāyānusāra* in turn: why is its own nature not associated with its own nature? They must explain: because there is no second vitarka. If they offer this explanation, how does it differ from my explanation? If you claim that my statement 'its own nature is not associated with its own nature' means that the substance of vitarka is not self-associated, we then challenge: although this vitarka is not associated with this vitarka, it could be associated with another vitarka. They must reply: because there is no second vitarka. If they make this explanation, it still coincides with my explanation.

2.49

Regarding the passage: "As for vicāra in Kāmadhātu […] what should it be called?" this is a question. In the dharmadhātu, vitarka, vicāra of the intermediate level, and the remaining associated and unassociated dharmas are subsumed under the three categories according to what is appropriate, as can be known from the above. Under which of the three categories should vicāra in Kāmadhātu and the first dhyāna be subsumed, and what should it be called?

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