俱舍論記 26.6

26.6

"The treatise says: ... because it is of the nature of deliberation," this explains the first line. In summary, there are two kinds of discernment: first, sāsrava; second, anāsrava. Only anāsrava discernment is established with the title "noble," because it can truly and correctly contemplate the four truths; therefore it is called noble. Although sāsrava discernment also contemplates the truths, because it is not distinct and clear it is not called noble. Within noble discernment, the eight patiences are not of the nature of knowledge. Decisive determination is called knowledge; doubt is hesitation, and their intrinsic natures are mutually opposed. When the eight patiences arise, they are precisely concurrent with the acquisition of the doubt that they sever; at that time they are in direct opposition in the midst of proper severing; because [doubt] has not yet been severed, there is no decisive determination, and because there is no decisive determination, it is not called knowledge. It can be subsumed under the nature of view, because it is of the nature of deliberation. Although in the stage of the four dharma-patiences of one who has previously detached from desire one's own doubt is already severed, it is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt and belongs to the category of patience; hence it is also not knowledge. Although the various uninterrupted paths of ordinary beings severing defilements are concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, they are not true counteractive antidotes and not radically opposed, and can later regress; yet they still receive the name knowledge. Therefore the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 44, states: "Furthermore, because patience is concurrent with the acquisition of the doubt to be severed, it is not subsumed under knowledge. Even if it is not concurrent, it is of that category. Because the sāsrava uninterrupted path is not a true counteractive antidote, even though it is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, it is also knowledge (end of treatise citation)." Question: Doubt obstructs decisive determination; when patience is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, patience is not called knowledge. Ignorance obstructs deliberation; when patience is concurrent with the acquisition of delusion, patience should likewise not be called view. Explanation: Doubt possesses associated ignorance which aids the acquisition of doubt with strength to oppose patience; solitary ignorance lacks other defilements to aid it against patience, so when concurrent with its acquisition, it can still be called view. If one says that there is also associated ignorance, what is now called 'aiding' refers to a different moment. Another explanation: Re-contemplation is called knowledge; the statement that it has 'not yet been severed' indicates that it has not yet repeatedly cognized. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: 'Question: Why are the various anāsrava patiences not knowledges? Answer: Because they have not yet repeatedly contemplated the viewed objects. That is, from beginningless time they have not seen the four noble truths with anāsrava true discernment; now, although seeing them for the first time, they have not yet re-contemplated them, hence they are not called knowledge; only when homogeneous discernment repeatedly contemplates the object does it become knowledge.' Moreover, Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 196, states: 'This reveals that the various patiences arise concurrently with the acquisitions of the doubt they sever; having not yet repeatedly and definitively determined, they do not obtain the name of knowledge.'"