俱舍論記 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

Regarding '[The question] now to be investigated is [...] they definitely arise together': below this, the second major section of this chapter explains co-arising phenomena (sahabhū-dharma), namely analyzing functions with respect to co-arising. Within it, [there are two parts]: first, directly explaining the co-arising of material phenomena (rūpa-dharma); second, extensively analyzing the distinctions. Within the first section, [there are two parts]: first, explaining the co-arising of material phenomena; second, explaining the simultaneous arising of the four classes. Below this is the first [part], explaining the co-arising of material phenomena, which introduces the topic by raising a question. Within it, [there are]: first, the question; second, the answer. This is the question. We should now investigate whether all conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta), just as their substantial characteristics are not identical, also arise separately and distinctly from one another when they arise, or whether there are phenomena that definitely arise together. Another explanation: it forms a single comprehensive question. All conditioned phenomena, just as their substantial characteristics are not identical, also arise distinctly from one another. Among these conditioned phenomena of distinct substances and separate arisings, are there phenomena that definitely arise together?

4.4

Regarding 'There are [phenomena that] definitely arise together [...] are not spoken of here': within the reply, [there are]: first, a general reply; second, a specific explanation. This is the general reply: there are necessarily conditioned formations (saṃskāra) that definitely arise together. Generally speaking, phenomena are briefly categorized into five classes. As for why the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) is not mentioned: this chapter clarifies the functions of phenomena, and therefore it only explains the former four classes of phenomena. Among them, matter (rūpa) and mind (citta) have been extensively explained in the 'Dhātu-nirdeśa' and are not separately demonstrated again; only their co-arising is analyzed. Mental factors (caitasika) and non-associated [formations] (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) have not been discussed previously; this chapter explains them extensively and temporarily analyzes their co-arising.

4.5

Regarding 'Now, first to analyze matter [...] ten entities when having other faculties': this is the specific reply, explaining the co-arising of matter. All matter is briefly of two kinds: first, aggregations of atomic particles (paramāṇu-saṃghāta), namely the five faculties and the five sensory objects; second, non-aggregations of atomic particles, namely unmanifest matter (avijñapti-rūpa). Here, it temporarily analyzes the aggregations of atomic particles. An atomic aggregation is nominal (prajñapti), and the nominal must depend on the real (dravya). Real entities differ in being many or few; thus, with respect to nominal aggregations, the number of real entities is clarified.

4.6

Regarding 'The treatise says [...] without subtraction of any one': within the prose commentary, [there are]: first, explaining the verse text; second, incidentally explaining the higher realms; third, differentiating through questions and answers; fourth, putting an end to disputes. Within explaining the verse text, [there are]: first, the direct explanation; second, explaining external objections. Below this is the direct explanation, which explains the first two lines. In the desire realm (kāma-dhātu), the aggregation of matter that is extremely subtle, lacking sound and lacking faculties, such as external mountains and rivers, still has eight [entities] arising together without the reduction of any one, establishing the name 'subtle aggregation' (aṇu-saṃghāta / saṃghāta-paramāṇu) to indicate that there is nothing subtler than this. The term 'subtle aggregation' indicates an aggregation that is subtle and minute; that is, the minimal, subtle aggregation among aggregations of matter is called a 'subtle aggregation'. That is to say, the subtlety itself is an aggregation; it is not that a single atomic particle (paramāṇu) is called a 'subtle aggregation'. Furthermore, the tenth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra states: 'Such numerous atoms intimately combining and definitely not separating from one another is termed an atomic aggregation (that treatise names it atomic aggregation because it is an aggregation of atoms. Each relies on one perspective, and they do not contradict each other).' It should be understood that there are two kinds of atoms: first, the material aggregation atom, which is the minimal eight entities arising together that cannot be reduced, which is what this treatise relies on in its explanation; second, the ultimate atomic particle (paramāṇu), which is the extreme minimum of matter that can no longer be divided, which is what the Nyāyānusāra relies on in its explanation.

4.7

Regarding 'What are the eight entities?': this is a question.

4.8

Regarding 'Namely the four great elements [...] visible matter, odor, taste, and tangibility': the answer lists the number, which is understandable.

4.9

Regarding 'Lacking sound but having faculties [...] because their locations are distinct': this explains the lower two lines. If, internally, there is no sound but there are faculties, among the aggregations of atoms, an aggregation possessing the body faculty has nine entities arising together: the eight entities as before, with the body faculty being the ninth in external places lacking sound. Aggregations possessing the other eye, ear, nose, and tongue faculties have ten entities arising together: the nine entities as before with the body faculty present, plus one—the eye faculty or the like. The eye, ear, nose, and tongue are necessarily not separated from the body, because they function relying on the body, showing that the body is definitely present. Because the four faculties such as the eye and the others have mutually distinct locations, it shows that they do not belong to the same aggregation.

4.10

Regarding 'In the aforementioned aggregations [...] arisen caused by the great elements': this specifically shows additions. Among the aforementioned aggregations of eight, nine, ten, and so forth, if sound arises, the eight increases to nine, the nine increases to ten, and the ten increases to eleven.

4.11

From 'Because in a place having sound' onward, it resolves an implicit objection. The implicit objection means: external sound has an obvious characteristic, and this can be known; how can there be sound internally where faculties are present? Therefore, it now resolves it by saying that because in a place having sound, it arises without departing from the faculties. That is, it arises caused by the 'appropriated' (upātta) great elements; this directly shows sound that does not depart from the faculties. Another explanation: internal sound is subtle in its characteristic, which is why it is singled out for clarification, whereas external sound has an obvious characteristic, so it is not separately discussed. Another explanation: external sound is not mentioned because it can be understood through implication. Question: In the internal body, if sound is newly added to make ten or eleven, why does the Jñānaprasthāna state: 'If one possesses the body, one definitely possesses visible matter, sound, and tangibility'? And it also says: 'The realms of body, visible matter, sound, and tangibility are possessed in the desire and form realms, but not possessed in the formless realm.' According to the text of that treatise, the bodies of internal sentient beings always possess sound; how can this treatise say that sound is newly added? The resolution is: although sound in the internal body is definitely possessed in unbroken continuum (saṃtati), it cannot generally pervade all parts of the body. The statement of 'possession' in the Jñānaprasthāna is based on its unbroken continuum within a single body. The statement of 'absence' in this treatise is based on a portion of the body where sound is not produced. Each relies on one perspective, and they do not contradict each other at all. Therefore, the ninetieth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: 'Regarding the statement that the realms of body, visible matter, sound, and tangibility are possessed in the desire and form realms, but not possessed in the formless realm: Question: The realms of body, visible matter, and tangibility may be so, but how can the sound realm be constantly possessed? Some say: The conjunction and disjunction of the great elements definitely produce the sound realm. If sentient beings are in the desire or form realms, the great elements are constantly present, and therefore they constantly produce sound. The critique says: They should not state this. If the four great elements must constantly produce sound, by what great elements would this produced sound be created (bhūta)? If it is created by these very ones, then multiple resistant material entities (sapratigha-rūpa) would arise from a single set of four great elements; if it is said to be created by other [great elements], then those other four great elements would again necessarily produce sound. Proceeding in this manner, there would be the fault of infinite regress. One should rather say: In the bodies of sentient beings born in the desire and form realms, many sets of four great elements exist within a single body; when there are those that strike one another, they produce sound, and when there are those that do not strike one another, no sound arises. Although the sound realm is necessarily present within a single body, it is not that all parts of the body universally produce sound (end of treatise text).' An ancient master said: The body can universally produce sound, but that sound is subtle. When the treatise speaks of no sound, it means no coarse, loud sound. This explanation is incorrect; atomic aggregations are based on substance (dravya), irrespective of being small or coarse. This explanation is rather crude. If sound pervaded the body, it would still be identical to what was refuted by the redactor of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Question: One master of the old Mahāvibhāṣā said: All four great elements are definitely not separated from visible matter and sound; all desire-realm matter is definitely not separated from odor and taste. Another master said: All four great elements do not necessarily have visible matter and sound; all desire-realm matter does not necessarily have odor and taste. Furthermore, between these two theories, which is correct, and which theory does this treatise align with? Dharma Master Nian explained: Neither master holds the correct doctrine; each takes only a partial truth before it can be correct. One should say that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible matter, but do not necessarily have sound. All desire-realm matter is definitely not separated from odor and taste. Therefore the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya states: 'The atom in the four faculties is of ten kinds, one should know; the body faculty has nine, and the other eight are said to belong to the stage having odor and taste.' Dharma Master Nian's meaning is that since the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya does not mention the presence of sound, it clearly knows that this sound is not constantly possessed. Dharma Master Tai explained: If Dharma Master Nian makes this interpretation, it is a great error. The Jñānaprasthāna states: 'Who possesses the retention of sound? Answer: The desire and form realms.' Moreover, the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya states: 'Sentient beings without ideation enter into the nature of the ten sense bases.' Since sound is constantly possessed, we therefore know that the first master of the Mahāvibhāṣā—who holds that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible matter and sound, and all desire-realm matter is definitely not separated from odor and taste—is the correct doctrine. However, the reason the verses of the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and the Abhidharmakośa do not mention sound is that sound is produced due to the collision of the great elements, and is not constantly present like visible matter and the like; therefore the Abhidharmakośa adds it separately, while the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya omits it for brevity. Dharma Master Tai's meaning is that since sound is constantly possessed, we clearly know that all four great elements are definitely not separated from sound. Now, examining the two venerable masters, each has right and wrong. Dharma Master Nian's explanation that both masters are incorrect and each takes a partial truth—that one should say all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible matter and do not necessarily have sound, and all desire-realm matter is definitely not separated from odor and taste—this is correct. But if he says sound is not constantly possessed, this is incorrect, because the treatises state that sound is definitely possessed. Dharma Master Tai's explanation that sound is definitely possessed—this is correct. But if he says the first master is correct in holding that all four great elements are definitely not separated from visible matter and sound—this is incorrect; they can only definitely not be separated from visible matter, so how could they necessarily not be separated from sound? Based on the doctrine of the redactor of the Mahāvibhāṣā, there are four great elements that do not depart from sound, and there are four great elements that depart from sound; how can one say that all four great elements are definitely not separated from sound? If one says that all great elements universally produce sound, it still falls under the refutation of the redactor of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and therefore it is also unreasonable.

4.12

Regarding 'If the four great elements [...] can be apprehended and not the others': below this is the second [part], resolving objections. Within it, [there are]: first, resolving objections concerning the four great elements; second, resolving objections concerning derived matter (upādāya-rūpa). Within resolving objections concerning the four great elements, [there are]: first, the question; second, the answer. This is the question. If it is said that the four great elements arise without departing from one another, then within material aggregations, how is it that any one of solidity, wetness, warmth, or motility can be apprehended, and not the other [three] great elements? Just as in gold and the like, only solidity is apprehended; in water and the like, only wetness is apprehended; in flame and the like, only warmth is apprehended; and in space/wind and the like, only motility is apprehended.

4.13

Regarding "In that aggregation [...] together with flour produces taste": below is the second part, the answers. In total there are three teachers. This is the first, a Sarvāstivāda master, who explains it in terms of an increase in function. In that aggregation, although the substantial entities [of all four] are simultaneously present, their functions have superiority and inferiority. Whichever has superior force and function is distinctly apprehensible in accordance with what is appropriate, while the remaining entities are not absent. Just as when a needle and a counter touch the body at the same time, the needle, being strong, is felt first, whereas the counter, being inferior, is difficult to perceive; and just as when the tastes of salt and parched flour powder are sampled at the same time, the force of the salt is felt first, whereas the function of the flour is difficult to perceive. In fascicle 5 of the Nyāyānusāra, [Saṃghabhadra] takes an increase in substantial entities among the four great elements as the correct view, extensively refuting an increase in function. Thus that text states: "Just as when vinegar is mixed with water, good medicine is mixed with poison, or salt is mixed with water, etc.: although both are equal in number, their functions differ. How can it be said that for form [increase] is spoken of in terms of substantial entities?" [To this we say:] This is not contradictory. Because although the tactile atoms of vinegar and water are equal, their tastes differ—the vinegar taste atoms are many and the water taste atoms are few; therefore, vinegar is subtly superior, and this still constitutes an increase in substantial entities. In various aggregations, because objects such as taste are stronger in terms of an increase in substantial entities, people take it to be an increase in function. With respect to good medicine, poison, and the like, because there are differences in the principles of dependent origination, their substantive categories are such that although small [in amount] they can overcome what is large; it is not that a distinct function arises apart from their substantive category. Hence to cling to an increase in function is an erroneous view. Furthermore, that treatise says: "Or, just as there are differences in kinds, there are likewise differences in grades. Therefore, the Cittamatra and so forth speak of increase in terms of function, whereas with respect to all material dharmas, increase is spoken of in terms of substantial entities, just as they are established based on many or based on one." The explanation is: This reveals the distinction between matter and mind. Just as the natures and categories of matter and mind differ, their superior and inferior grades must also differ. That is, for matter, superiority and inferiority are in terms of substance; for mind, superiority and inferiority are in terms of function. Just as matter is established based on one—meaning based solely on matter—mind is established based on many—meaning generally based on both matter and mind. He should not draw an analogy from mind to matter, asserting that it is merely an increase in function. If we make a defense on behalf of the Kośa master: take, for instance, one gō of vinegar mixed with one shō of water: one perceives only the taste of vinegar and does not perceive the bland taste of water; thus we clearly know there is an increase in function. Furthermore, one cannot say that the bland taste in the water is present in some places and absent in others, which would incur the fault of separation. Now to assert an increase in function is exceedingly correct doctrine. A further objection states: The Nyāyānusāra master [Saṃghabhadra] did not acknowledge this explanation because the author of the treatise, Vasubandhu, had set forth and refuted the proponent of the increase in function in his treatise on the ultimate truth. However, fascicle 131 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "With respect to the four great elements, some speak of an increase in substance and some speak of an increase in function," yet there is no arbitrating judgment. The Kośa aligns with an increase in function, while the Nyāyānusāra aligns with an increase in substance. Thus an increase in function is an internal doctrine of our own school. Why would one be unable to defend it, and instead refute one's own school?

4.14

Regarding "How is it known that the others also exist there?": this is a further inquiry. Since it is said that the entities of the others are not absent, how is it known that the remaining three great elements also exist in that aggregation?

4.15

Regarding "Because there are the activities of cohesion, maturation, distension, and support": this is the comprehensive explanation, proving existence in terms of activity. Because in an aggregation of form there are the four kinds of active function—cohesion of water, maturation of fire, distension of wind, and support of earth—it is clearly known that the substantial entities of the four great elements pervade all aggregations. Thus fascicle 131 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Question: How is it known that these four great elements are constantly inseparable? Answer: Because their intrinsic characteristics and operations are all apprehensible in every aggregation. That is to say, in a solid aggregation, because the intrinsic characteristic of the earth element is presently apprehensible, its existence is thoroughly established. In this aggregation, if the water element were absent, gold, silver, tin, and the like could not be melted. Furthermore, if water were absent, they would scatter and disperse. If the fire element were absent, fire would not be produced when stones and the like are struck together. Furthermore, if fire were absent, there would be nothing capable of maturing, and they would rot and decay. If the wind element were absent, there would be no motion. Furthermore, if wind were absent, there would be no growth or expansion. In a liquid aggregation, because the intrinsic characteristic of the water element is presently apprehensible, its existence is thoroughly established. In this aggregation, if the earth element were absent, it would not turn into ice when reaching extreme cold. Furthermore, if the earth element were absent, boats and the like would sink. If the fire element were absent, there would be no warm season. Furthermore, if fire were absent, it would rot and decay. If the wind element were absent, it would not move. Furthermore, if wind were absent, there would be no growth. In a warm aggregation, because the intrinsic characteristic of the fire element is presently apprehensible, its existence is thoroughly established. In this aggregation, if the earth element were absent, the flames of lamps and candles could not turn. Furthermore, if earth were absent, it could not support objects. If the water element were absent, a stream would not flow. Furthermore, if water were absent, flames would not gather together. If the wind element were absent, it would not flicker. Furthermore, if wind were absent, there would be no expansion. In a moving aggregation, because the intrinsic characteristic of the wind element is presently apprehensible, its existence is thoroughly established. In this aggregation, if elements such as earth were absent, it would not rebound when striking obstacles like walls. Furthermore, if earth were absent, it could not support objects. If the water element were absent, there would be no cold wind. Furthermore, if water were absent, it would scatter and disperse. If the fire element were absent, there would be no warm wind. Furthermore, if fire were absent, it would rot and decay."

4.16

Regarding "Some say that upon encountering conditions [...] the functions have superiority and inferiority": this is the second Sarvāstivāda master, who reveals existence in terms of conditions, still relying on an increase in function. For example, when hard objects such as gold, silver, copper, and iron encounter conditions such as fire, they exhibit the characteristics of flowing, moisture, heat, and movement; therefore we know that water and the others previously existed in that aggregation. And as in an aggregation of water, due to extreme cold it turns into frozen snow. On this frozen snow there is a drying function, which is called the arising of the characteristic of warmth. Although cold and warmth are not separated, the function of cold is increased. Although cold is not water itself, it is an effect of water; therefore, by revealing the cause in terms of the effect, 'cold' is spoken of here. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Because water and wind are increased, it is cold" (this concludes the treatise text). Furthermore, as when rain is about to fall, there is an aggregation of water in the sky. Due to extreme cold, flashes of lightning strike forth, which is called the arising of the characteristic of warmth. Moreover, as when it is extremely cold, well water becomes warm. As in the hells, suffering is superior and equanimity is inferior, so it is said merely that one experiences suffering; and as in the third dhyāna, bliss is superior and equanimity is inferior, so it is said merely to be the feeling of bliss. This is stated in terms of the situation, not based on an individual moment. Just as when a drum is beaten, although both the hand and the drum produce sound, the drum is superior and the hand is inferior, so it is referred to simply as the sound of the drum.

4.17

Regarding "Other masters say [...] dhātu means seed": this is the explanation of the third, a Sautrāntika master. Other Sautrāntika masters say: according to what is appropriate, in this aggregation of matter where one [element] predominantly increases in actual manifestation, that which is actually manifest has a substantial entity, whereas the others that are not actually manifest possess only seeds and do not yet have substantial entities or characteristics. Therefore the sūtra says: "In an aggregation of water there are various elements (dhātu)." Dhātu means seeds, which are the seeds of fire and the rest. Another explanation is: according to what is appropriate, in this aggregation where earth, water, fire, or wind predominantly increases in actual manifestation, that which is actually manifest has a substantial entity, whereas the remaining three great elements that are not actually manifest possess only the functional capacity of seeds and do not yet have substantial entities or characteristics. The explanation of the sūtra is as before. According to the Sautrāntika school, simultaneous arising has two types: first, simultaneous arising of seeds; second, simultaneous arising of actual manifestations. Simultaneous arising of seeds means that the substantial entity is not yet actually manifest, but there is merely the causal seed's functional capacity capable of producing; according to this aspect, it is called simultaneous arising of seeds. For example, when all aggregations of form encounter conditions, according to what is appropriate, earth, water, fire, wind, color-form, odor, taste, tangible, and so on immediately become actually manifest; thus we clearly know that the aggregation previously possessed seeds. Simultaneous arising of actual manifestations means that the substantial entity is actually manifest and its actual characteristics are distinct; according to this aspect, it is called simultaneous arising of actual manifestations. For example, in an aggregation of form, earth, water, fire, wind, color-form, odor, taste, tangible, and so on, according to what is appropriate, either one is actually manifest, or two arise together, up to having all eight complete, the number being indefinite. Because that school accepts that there is derived form apart from the four great elements—such as sunlight and the like, as well as isolated odors and singly moving tangibles—and also accepts that the four great elements may be complete or incomplete, they are able to put forth this explanation. Furthermore, they accept that one set of four great elements can produce multiple derived forms; in simultaneous arising, they are inseparable in the same locus, down to the point of being analyzed to a single infinitesimal atom, where the four great elements and derived forms, according to their number, interpenetrate in the same locus without obstructing one another, just as the light of multiple lamps occupies the same room. Among those not obstructing each other in the same locus, when the great elements and derived forms are viewed in relation to one another: if viewed as different natures, they do not obstruct each other; if viewed as the same nature, they obstruct each other. Just as a kingdom has no two kings, and heaven has only one sun. It should be known that here, if there is a seed, there is not necessarily that actual manifestation, but if there is an actual manifestation, there is definitely a seed. According to what is appropriate, whether internal or external, in distinguishing the two kinds of simultaneous arising, their characteristics should be stated either in terms of simultaneous arising of actual manifestations, or in terms of simultaneous arising of seeds, or both kinds of simultaneous arising.

4.18

Regarding "How is it known that in wind there is visible form?": below is the second part, explaining the difficulty concerning derived form. Within this, first is the question, second is the answer; this is the question. Since it is said that an external aggregation must possess eight subtle atoms, how is it known that in wind there is visible form?

4.19

Regarding "This principle can be believed [...] because they are inseparable": this is the answer. That there is visible form in wind can only be believed relying on the scriptural teaching, and cannot be known by inference. Or, the odor combined with it can presently be grasped by the nose, and odor and visible form are inseparable. Since there is odor in wind, it is clearly known that there is visible form; this is using odor to prove visible form. Although yellow, black, and other winds can also presently be apprehended, this question and answer are framed based on a subtle, clear wind. Question: In the desire realm, form, odor, taste, and tangibles are definitively inseparable; why is it that here the question asks exclusively about visible form? Explanation: Fearing that the text would become overly voluminous and unable to state everything, because visible form is at the beginning, the beginning is cited to indicate the rest. Another explanation: The characteristics of visible form in clear wind are subtle and difficult to know, which is why it is exclusively questioned. In other aggregations of form, shapes, visible forms, odors, tastes, tangibles, and so forth are evident, and thus they are omitted from discussion. Another explanation: In accordance with what outsiders doubt, questions are raised accordingly; why must everything be cited comprehensively? Question: If it is said that in the desire realm form, odor, taste, and tangibles are definitively inseparable, why does a master explaining the great [elements] in fascicle 2 of the Nyāyānusāra state: "Some say that all aggregations of form and so on possess solidity and so on, and therefore are called 'great.' Aggregations where wind is increased lack form and so on; aggregations where fire is increased lack taste and so on; all aggregations in the form realm lack odor and taste"? According to that master's explanation of the great [elements], wind lacks form and taste, and fire's increase lacks taste and odor; that is to say, even in the desire realm, the eight subtle atoms also admit of separation. How can it be said here that in wind there is visible form, and that the eight subtle atoms of the desire realm are definitively inseparable? Explanation: What is said in the Nyāyānusāra is not the orthodox doctrine. Another explanation: This statement speaks of deficiency based on what is manifest, but based on what is hidden they are not absent. If one makes this interpretation, there is also no contradiction.

4.20

Regarding "Previously it was stated that in the form realm [...] therefore it is not separately stated": this is the second part, which in turn clarifies the higher realm. It explains the form realm by analogy. The previous text fully explained that in the form realm, odor and taste are both absent; therefore where sound is absent there are six, seven, or eight, and where sound is present there are seven, eight, or nine arising simultaneously. This can be understood by analogy, and therefore it is not separately stated in the verse.

4.21

Regarding "Here, the word 'substance' [...] is spoken of in terms of support": below is the third part, distinctions by way of questions and answers. Within this: first the question, second the answer, third the inquiry, fourth the explanation, fifth the objection, sixth the resolution. This is the question.

4.22

Regarding "If so, what fault is there?": this is the answer.

4.23

"Either way there is a fault ... there would be the fault of having too many": this is the objection. Whether based on real entity or based on āyatana, either way there is a fault. If one speaks based on real entity (svabhāva), then eight and so forth would be too few; because in an aggregate of atoms there is not only color, but also necessarily shape, since multiple atoms assemble, the entities ought to be more numerous. Although among light, shadow, brightness, darkness, and so forth, there is color without shape, here we temporarily speak with respect to both shape and color existing together. Of the two natures of heaviness and lightness, one is definitely present. Of the two natures of smoothness and roughness, one is also definitely present. The three of cold, hunger, and thirst are either present or absent; because they are not definitely present, we do not say they are definitely present. Thus, what was stated has the fault of being too few. If one speaks based on the twelve āyatanas, eight and so forth would be too many; since the four great elements are subsumed under the tactile āyatana (spraṣṭavyāyatana), eight should be stated as four, nine should be stated as five, and ten should be stated as six. Thus, what was stated has the fault of being too many. Question: Among the five sensory objects, why is the objection raised only regarding visible matter and touch, and not regarding sound, odor, and taste? Explanation: It depends on the doubt of the questioner; how could broad or brief be fixed? Another explanation: Among the five sensory objects, raising the first and the last makes known the intermediate ones. Another explanation: Visible matter and touch continue uninterruptedly and pervade the realm of desire and the realm of form; hence they are taken as the inquiry. Sound is intermittent, and odor and taste exist only in [the realm of] desire; therefore they are briefly left undiscussed.

4.24

"Neither way has any fault ... that is, the secondary matter dependent [on them]": this is the resolution. One should understand that the "matter" (dravya) here means: the great elements are based on real entity, and the secondary matter is based on āyatana. The meaning of "capable of creating" is strong, so it is spoken of in terms of real entities; the meaning of "that which is created" is inferior, so it is spoken of in terms of āyatanas.

4.25

"If so, the great elements ... since each depends on a set of four great elements": this is the challenge. If the four great elements are spoken of in terms of real entities, the real entities should turn out to be more. Visible matter, odor, taste, and touch—these created matters—each depend separately on one set of four great elements; combined with the four basics, they make five. Eight should turn out to be twenty, nine should turn out to be twenty-five, and ten should turn out to be thirty. If sound arises, twenty becomes twenty-five, twenty-five becomes thirty, and thirty becomes thirty-five.

4.26

"One should know that here ... because their classes are without distinction": this is the resolution. One should know that here, although the great elements are many, stating only four is done based on their types of entity, because the varieties of the four great elements are similar in their stream and have no distinctions. The created matters have distinctions; hence they are spoken of in terms of āyatanas. If one relies on the tenth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra, there are altogether three explanations. The first explanation is identical to this treatise. The latter two explanations state: "Or, relying solely on real entity, there is also no fault, because here it is spoken of as definitely co-arising. Real entities such as shape are not definitely present, because in light, brightness, and so forth, they do not exist. Or, relying solely on āyatana, yet in order to ward off many false allegations, the great elements are separately spoken of. As for the 'many false allegations': some falsely allege that the great elements and created matter have no distinct natures; or some falsely allege that there is no distinct entity of created matter in the tactile āyatana; or some falsely allege that not all aggregates are equipped with all [elements]; or some falsely allege that the number is not definite. By separately speaking of the great elements, these false allegations are all eliminated." (The explanation states: The first explanation speaks solely based on real entity: if one differentiates shape and so forth, then there would be shape without color, or color without shape; aggregates having respective distinctions would then not be definite, and so they should not be differentiated. If one speaks generally of visible matter as definitely always existing, and the differentiation of lightness and heaviness is also like this, the four great elements are then definite and have never lacked one. Therefore, speaking of eight and so forth also has no fault. The second explanation speaks solely based on āyatana: there should only be four, but to ward off great and numerous false allegations—Master Dharmatrāta and the Venerable Dārṣṭāntika posited that outside the four great elements there is no distinct created matter; Śrīlāta stated that within touch there is no created touch, while admitting the remaining created matters; the Sautrāntikas admitted that there are material aggregates lacking the four great elements, hence stating they are not fully equipped; or some said that the great elements definitely exist but do not necessarily comprise all four, hence stating the number is indefinite. Now, by stating that created matters are four and separately positing the four great elements, the four false allegations are all eliminated; therefore they are specially spoken of again).

4.27

"What is the use of analyzing ... the meaning ought to be investigated": this is the fourth [part], cessation of dispute. The author of the treatise advises: As for this matter co-arising, whether separated or united, whether many or few, how is it fixed either? This is not a profound meaning; what is the use of analyzing such words? Words arise from desire; the meaning ought to be investigated.

4.28

"Having thus explained ... conditioned formations are with or without possession": below this, the simultaneous arising of the four categories is explained. It concludes the inquiry and answers in verse.

4.29

"The treatise says ... therefore it says 'or'": mind and mental factors, with respect to one another, definitely co-arise; lacking one, they do not arise. The mental factors of the three natures, with respect to the mind-king, are not without distinctions; spoken of in terms of general characteristics, they are therefore said to definitely co-arise. Conditioned formations are precisely the four dharmas: visible matter and so forth. The words "definitely co-arise with two" in the previous first line extend down here into the second line, meaning that when conditioned formations such as visible matter and mind arise, they definitely arise together with the four conditioned characteristics. When it says "or with possession (prāpti)", this means that among conditioned formations, only sentient dharmas co-arise with possession; the remaining insentient dharmas do not co-arise with possession. To show that possession is not definite, it therefore says "or". If one follows Harivarman of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* and Dharmatrāta's tenet, there are no mental factors, but only the mind-king; through the distinct states of mind, mental factors are nominally designated.

4.30

"It was said earlier that mental factors ... the distinction of the mahābhūmika and so forth": this is the second major section below, broadly explaining the distinctions. Within it, the first explains the existence of mental factors, and the second differentiates the non-associated [formations]. Visible matter and mind are broadly explained in the "Chapter on Dhātus", so they are not separately explained. In explaining the mental factors: first, explaining the dharmas of the five levels; second, explaining definite co-arising; third, explaining similarities and distinctions; fourth, explaining the different various names. In the first part explaining the dharmas of the five levels: first, generally indicating the names and numbers; second, separately explaining the names and real entities. Below this is the first part generally indicating the names and numbers, the inquiry and the answer in verse.

4.31

"The treatise says ... for now there are five categories": that which belongs to mind (citta) is therefore called a mental factor (caitta). One should say "belonging to mind" (citta-saṃprayukta / cittasya bhāva); being abbreviated, it is simply called mental factor (caitta), just like "belonging to self" (ātmīya). Among mental factors, when expanded there are furthermore indeterminate and other dharmas; spoken of in brief, it therefore says "for now there are five".

4.32

"What are the five?": an inquiry.

4.33

"First, the mahābhūmika dharmas ... up to parīttakleśabhūmika dharmas": the answer. The number can be known. If one follows the forty-second fascicle of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explaining the dharmas of the levels, there are agreements and differences with this treatise: mahābhūmika dharmas are ten; kuśalamahābhūmika dharmas are ten; parīttakleśabhūmika dharmas are ten (these three levels are identical to this treatise). It also states kleśamahābhūmika dharmas are ten (identical to the lower text of this treatise, differing in division and combination. However, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* does not state styāna (lethargy) because it complies with samādhi and its fault is light). It also states akusalāmahābhūmika dharmas are five, namely avidyā (ignorance), styāna (lethargy), auddhatya (restlessness), āhrīkya (shamelessness), and anapatrāpya (unscrupulousness) (The explanation states: avidyā is of the nature of anusaya, pervading association with all unwholesome minds. Styāna obstructs wisdom predominantly, and auddhatya obstructs samādhi predominantly; because their faults are grave, they are specifically manifested. With this treatise they also differ in division and combination). It also posits nivṛtāvyākṛtamahābhūmika dharmas as three, namely avidyā, styāna, and auddhatya (The explanation states: avidyā is of the nature of anusaya, pervading association with all obstructed-unspecified minds. Among secondary defilements, styāna obstructs wisdom predominantly, and auddhatya obstructs samādhi predominantly; because their faults are grave, they are specifically manifested. With this treatise they also differ in division and combination). It also states anivṛtāvyākṛtamahābhūmika dharmas are ten, which are precisely the mahābhūmika dharmas of vedanā and so forth (The explanation states: because these ten dharmas are obtainable pervading all unobstructed-unspecified minds, they are specifically noted and manifested. With this treatise they also differ in division and combination).

4.34

"Bhūmi means the domain of activity ... existing in all minds": below this is the second part, separately explaining names and entities. According to the explanations of the five levels, the text is divided into five. In the first, explaining the mahābhūmika dharmas: first, explaining the name; second, determining the entity. This is explaining the name. In saying "mahābhūmika dharmas": bhūmi (ground/level) means the domain of activity, which is precisely the mind-king. If this mind-king is the domain of activity of those mental factors, then this mind-king is said to be the bhūmi of those mental factor dharmas. This is separately explaining the meaning of bhūmi. The ten dharmas such as sensation (vedanā) pervade all minds, and are called great dharmas (mahā-dharma). This bhūmi is the bhūmi of great dharmas, and is called mahābhūmi; this is a tatpuruṣa compound. It refers precisely to the mind-king; this is separately explaining the meaning of mahābhūmi. Among these mental factors, if a dharma belongs to the mahābhūmi, it is called a mahābhūmika dharma; this is a second tatpuruṣa compound. It refers precisely to the ten dharmas such as sensation, meaning dharmas that constantly exist in all minds, hence called mahābhūmika dharmas. This is separately explaining mahābhūmika dharma. If one only says "mahā", it refers to sensation and so forth. If one says "mahābhūmi", it refers to the mind-king. If one says "mahābhūmika dharma", it again refers to sensation and so forth. The intended meaning here is mahābhūmika dharma. The text of the *Nyāyānusāra* largely agrees with this treatise. If one follows the sixteenth fascicle of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*: "Question: What is the meaning of mahābhūmika dharma? Answer: 'Great' refers to the mind. These ten dharmas are the arising-place of the mind; because it is the bhūmi of the great, it is called mahābhūmi. Mahābhūmi is itself dharma, hence called mahābhūmika dharma." Some say: The mind is called great because its entity and function are preeminent. The great is itself the bhūmi, hence called mahābhūmi, because it is the locus of reliance for the mental factors. Because the ten dharmas such as sensation are universally obtainable in all mahābhūmis, they are called mahābhūmika dharmas. Some say: The ten dharmas such as sensation pervade all categories of mind, and are therefore called great. Mind is their bhūmi, and is therefore called mahābhūmi. Sensation and so forth are precisely the property of the mahābhūmi, and are called mahābhūmika dharmas. (The former two explanations differ from this treatise; the latter explanation is identical to this treatise. The text is clear and understandable. The kuśalamahābhūmika dharmas and so forth all have two levels of tatpuruṣa compound, which should be understood by analogy with the mahābhūmika dharmas).

4.35

"What are those dharmas?": below this is the second part, determining the entity, which raises an inquiry prior to explaining.

4.36

"The verse says ... pervading all minds": this is the answer in verse. Since ancient times, various worthy masters have all established or rejected the mahābhūmika and other dharmas based on multiple criteria, each considering their own guide to be unrivaled. All of these waste words, and this treatise cannot describe them in full. Now, according to this treatise, the mahābhūmika and other dharmas are established and rejected each based on a single criterion. This is the competence of the treatise, not a matter of human interpretation. In the West it is called the treatise of brilliance—a reputation that is truly not in vain. Ancient masters established and rejected them based on five criteria; now, according to this treatise, establishing and rejecting the mahābhūmika dharmas based on a single criterion means: pervading all minds is called a mahābhūmika dharma. The remaining mental factor dharmas do not pervade all, so they are not established as mahābhūmika dharmas.

4.37

"The treatise says ... combined and universally present": this explains the fourth line. The masters of the Vibhāṣā hand down the tradition thus: the ten dharmas enumerated are combined and universally present in every single moment of all minds. The treatise master is inclined toward the Sautrāntika, not believing that all ten dharmas have separate real entities; therefore he says "hand down the tradition".

4.38

"Herein, sensation means ... because of the distinction in experiencing": sensation (vedanā) indicates the name; the three kinds present the number. Experiencing the preceding object demonstrates the real entity by means of its function. Suffering refers to painful sensation; pleasure refers to pleasant sensation; neither refers to equanimity (upekṣā); the differences among the three sensations are called distinctions. Although both mind and mental factors ought to be called sensation in terms of experiencing the object, because the experiencing by sensation is strong, it exclusively receives the name sensation. The analogies are as explained earlier in the aggregate of sensation. The tenth fascicle of the *Nyāyānusāra* states: "Experiencing contact that is pleasant, unpleasant, or contrary to both is called sensation." The intention of the *Nyāyānusāra* is to explain the effect, sensation, in terms of that cause, contact. Sensation resembles that contact; in that it resembles contact, it is called experiencing contact. This is also as explained earlier in the aggregate of sensation.

4.39

"Conception (saṃjñā) means grasping specific marks in an object": conception means grasping various specific marks, such as male, female, and so on, in an object; it is able to delimit and draw boundaries within the object, [thinking,] "this is male, etc., and not non-male, etc.," hence it is called "male, etc." The Nyāyānusāra states: "It is the cause of establishing the grasping of specific marks of objects such as male, female, and so on (the explanation says: it means being able to act as the cause that establishes the marks of female, etc., causing the mind and mental factors to grasp the specific marks of objects like female, etc.; this is the cause of specific marks)."

4.40

"Volition (cetanā) means being able to cause the mind to be active": volition has the efficacy to cause the sovereign mind to move toward an object, having the function of fabrication (mental activity). In principle, it actually also causes the other mental factors to be active, but one speaks of the mind because it is predominant. Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra states: "Because of the existence of volition, the mind is made to have active functioning toward objects. It is like the power of a lodestone, which can cause iron to move."

4.41

"Contact (sparśa) means, from the sense-bases and objects... being able to make contact": it is born from the coming together of the three—sense-base, consciousness, and object; this identifies it by citing its cause. It is able to exercise the function of contacting the object before it; this clarifies it by citing its activity. Another explanation: it is able to cause the mind and so forth to make contact with the object before it. Although all minds and mental factors could be called 'contact' in the sense of confronting an object, because its contacting is predominant, it exclusively receives the name 'contact.' Therefore, the Abhidharmāvatāra states: "Contact is born from the coming together of sense-base, object, and consciousness, and causes the mind to touch the object. Because it is able to nurture the mind and mental factors and is concordant with pleasant sensation and so on, it is differentiated into three (the explanation says: it causes the mind [to touch the object] following what is predominant; in principle it actually also causes the mental factors to touch the object)." If one relies on the Nyāyānusāra, it states: "It is able to act as the cause of sensation (the explanation says: citing the effect to reveal the cause)."

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese