俱舍論記 4.77

4.77

Regarding "Diligence (vīrya) means having the nature of making the mind courageous": Diligence means having the nature of making the mind courageous, which means diligently severing the two evils and diligently cultivating the two wholesomes without regressing. It is opposed to sloth (kausīdya). Therefore the *Abhidharmāvatāra* states: "Energy (vīrya) has courage as its nature in matters of the arising and cessation of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas. That is to say, for those sinking in the mud of saṃsāra, it has the meaning of being able to stimulate the mind to make it emerge quickly."

According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, delight (prāmodya) and disgust (nirvid) are further mentioned among the wholesome dharmas. The meaning of that treatise is: The verse says "and" twice, which also subsumes delight and disgust. Disgust means turning away with aversion, as when taking duḥkha and samudaya as objects. Delight means yearning with joy, as when taking nirodha and mārga as objects. These two arise mutually exclusively; they definitely cannot co-arise in a single mind. Although they are strictly wholesome, they do not pervade all wholesome minds, and therefore are not individually specified among the great wholesome ground-dharmas.

Furthermore, the *Abhidharmāvatāra* states: "Delight means yearning with joy for the category of cessation: having seen its benefits, it causes the mind to yearn for it and accord with the cultivation of the wholesome; because the mind possesses this, it delights in nirvāṇa; association with this is called attention with delight. Disgust means weariness with the category of transmigration: having seen its faults, it causes the mind to feel disgust and turn away, according with detachment from defilement; because the mind possesses this, it loathes birth and death; association with this is called attention with disgust."

Furthermore, *Mahāvibhāṣā* 28 states: "Appraisal: There is a separate dharma called disgust, which is neither wisdom nor non-greed; it is a mental factor associated with the mind. This is said to be subsumed under 'there are further other such kinds of mental factors associated with the mind.' However, when the Aggregate of Views says that the tolerances and knowledges of duḥkha and samudaya are able to feel disgust, it is because those tolerances and knowledges are associated with disgust that they are called able to feel disgust, not that disgust is their intrinsic nature." Furthermore, in *Mahāvibhāṣā* 196, the arbiters separately state that there is an entity of disgust, identical to the earlier text. This disgust is strictly wholesome, and extends to sāsrava and anāsrava. Furthermore, *Mahāvibhāṣā* 143 also separately posits delight and disgust.

Based on the above treatises, delight and disgust definitely exist. However, that they are not separately stated in this treatise is because they do not arise constantly or do not arise simultaneously; therefore they are not stated as great wholesome ground-dharmas.