俱舍論記 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

5.2

Chapter 2: Analysis of Faculties, Part 3

"Having thus explained... sameness-share, sentient beings and so forth": the following is the second major section, which clarifies sameness-share (sabhāgatā). It concludes the question and answers with a verse. 'Sameness-share' takes up the topic heading. 'Sentient beings and so forth' is the direct explanation. Existing as substantial entities of equal class is called 'sameness' (sa-), which distinguishes this from the Sautrāntikas, who posit that the substance of sameness-share is nominal. 'Share' (bhāga) means distinction; although sharing a class, their substances are distinct, which distinguishes this from the sāmānya category (padārtha) of the Vaiśeṣikas, who posit that a single entity pervades multiple dharmas. Since the share itself is sameness, it is called sameness-share (sabhāgatā); this is a karmadhāraya compound. 'Sentient beings' distinguishes them from non-sentient beings, citing that which is based upon. 'And so forth' distinguishes them from what is unequal, directly revealing the substance of the sameness-share that is based [upon them]. Another explanation: Having identical bodily forms and so forth is called 'sameness', revealing the produced fruit. 'Share' means cause, thus called 'share', revealing the productive cause. It is the share of sameness, hence called sameness-share; this is a tatpuruṣa compound. This derives its name from both fruit and cause. Therefore Nyāyānusāra 12 states: 'Here, bodily forms, actions, and inclinations are mutually similar, and are therefore called "sameness". "Share" means cause; there is a distinct real entity that is the cause of this sameness, and is therefore called "sameness-share".'

5.4

Regarding the passage from "The treatise says" to "reciprocally similar in kind": in the prose portion, there are: first, an exposition of their own tenet; second, questioning and answering to determine [the doctrine]. Within the exposition of their own tenet, there are: first, a brief explanation of the verse; second, harmonizing different names; third, detailed explanations; fourth, proving that it has real substance; and fifth, explaining acquisition and abandonment. This [passage] is the brief explanation of the verse.

5.5

"There is a distinct real entity called commonality (sabhāgatā)": this presents the thesis. "All sentient beings" indicates the supported phenomena; "reciprocally similar in kind" indicates the supporting commonality. Or, "all sentient beings being reciprocally similar in kind" adduces the effect to reveal its cause, which causes all sentient beings to be reciprocally similar in kind.

5.6

"The fundamental treatise (mūla-śāstra) calls this generic commonality (nikāya-sabhāgatā)": this is the second part, harmonizing different names. Many substances being similar in kind is called 'generic sameness' (nikāya-sabhāga); 'portion' (bhāga) means distinction. Another explanation: the cause of similarity among many phenomena is called generic commonality. Another explanation: the cause of mutual sameness among many sentient beings is called generic commonality.

5.7

Regarding the passage from "Furthermore, this is of two kinds" to "because each is equally possessed": this begins the third part, detailed explanations. Therein, first, generic commonality of sentient beings is explained; second, generic commonality of phenomena is explained. This section explains the commonality of sentient beings. This commonality is furthermore of two kinds: The first is non-differential, meaning that 'all sentient beings' indicates the supported [basis], and 'commonality of sentient beings' indicates the supporting [entity]. Because the commonality of sentient beings upon all sentient beings is equally possessed by all sentient beings respectively, it is called non-differential commonality. That is to say, this commonality can cause sentient beings to be reciprocally similar in kind. The second is differential, meaning that among sentient beings, there are the distinct commonalities of the three realms, the nine stages, the five destinies (gati), the four modes of birth (yoni), castes such as brāhmaṇas, clans such as Kāśyapa and Gautama, male bodies, female bodies, the five precepts, lay disciples (upāsaka), fully ordained bhikṣus with the great precepts, the four stages of approach (pratipannaka), the three fruits, learners (śaikṣa), and arhats who are beyond learning (aśaikṣa); because each is possessed equally by a given class of sentient beings, and because there are these many [classes], it is called differential. Sentient beings, realms, and so forth indicate the supported [bases], while each distinct commonality indicates the supporting [entity], because through this commonality realms and so forth can be made reciprocally identical. Question: In relation to a single sentient being, are non-differential commonality and so forth each single in substance, or each multiple in substance? Explanation: Correspondingly, their substance may each be one, like the life-faculty (jīvitendriya); or their substance may each be multiple, like the supported phenomena. Furthermore, *Nyāyānusāra* fascicle 14 says: "What is maturation (vipāka)? It refers to the commonality of destinies and births such as the hells and egg-born beings. What is uniform outflow (niṣyanda)? It refers to all commonalities of realms, stages, spheres, lineages, clans, śramaṇas, brāhmaṇas, learners, non-learners, and so forth. Other masters say: among the various commonalities, those produced and drawn forth by past karma are maturation commonalities; those arising through present effort are uniform-outflow commonalities."

5.8

"Furthermore, there is the commonality of phenomena, which corresponds to the aggregates, bases, and elements": this explains the commonality of phenomena. Within commonality there is furthermore the commonality of phenomena, corresponding to the aggregates, bases, and elements. This adduces the supported phenomena to reveal the supporting commonality, because through this commonality the phenomena of the aggregates, bases, and elements are caused to be reciprocally identical. Following the model of the commonality of sentient beings, the commonality of phenomena should also be spoken of as having two kinds; that it is not spoken of is because it is omitted for brevity. Whether the commonality of phenomena has a single substance or multiple substances should be understood by following what precedes. Question: As for the commonality of sentient beings and the commonality of phenomena, are their substances distinct, or are they different conceptual aspects of a single substance? Explanation: Their intrinsic substances are distinct. That which causes sentient beings to be similar is called the commonality of sentient beings; that which causes the gateways of phenomena to be similar is called the commonality of phenomena. Because the meanings of sentient beings and gateways of phenomena are different, the two commonalities are not identical; therefore, the treatises all speak of two kinds. Although apart from phenomena there are no distinct sentient beings, with respect to meaning there is a difference, and the commonalities are distinct; former masters also established that the intrinsic substances of the two commonalities are distinct. Another explanation: Apart from phenomena, sentient beings have no distinct intrinsic substance, but sentient beings are established upon phenomena. Knowing by this analogy, upon the commonality of phenomena the commonality of sentient beings is established; they are two commonalities spoken of as conceptual aspects of a single substance, not distinct substances. If gathering phenomena to form sentient beings, then one does not speak of the commonality of phenomena; if setting aside sentient beings to discuss phenomena, then one does not speak of the commonality of sentient beings; if discussing phenomena and sentient beings together, then both kinds of commonality are spoken of simultaneously. For this reason, various treatises either speak of only one, or discuss both kinds together; each relies on one meaning, and they do not contradict each other. Question: Why does the text of the verse only speak of sentient beings? Explanation: For brevity, it does not speak of the commonality of phenomena. Or it may be that the text of the verse also subsumes the commonality of phenomena, and speaking of sentient beings is to exclude non-sentient things.

5.9

Regarding the passage from "If there were no real entity" to "should be understood accordingly": this is the fourth part, proving that it has a real substance and interrogating the Sautrāntikas to prove that it has an actual substance. When sentient beings are not one, it is called 'sentient beings, sentient beings'; their being identical as sentient beings is called 'equal without distinction'. If there were no real entity of non-differential character called the commonality of sentient beings, then among the sentient beings that are reciprocally differentiated across the desire realm, form realm, and so forth, the discerning wisdom of 'sentient beings, sentient beings' as equal without distinction, and the designation and verbal expression of 'sentient beings, sentient beings' as equal without distinction, would not be possible, because discerning wisdom must take an object as condition, and verbal expression must signify a real phenomenon. Since wisdom and expression arise, it is clearly known that there is an entity. This challenges [the opponent] with reference to the non-differential commonality of sentient beings; because it is pervasive, it is adduced specifically for the interrogation; differential [commonality] is not pervasive, so it is not discussed in that regard. Furthermore, it analogously explains the commonality of phenomena, saying: in the same way, the discerning wisdom of aggregates and so forth as equal without distinction, and the designation and verbal expression as equal without distinction, would not be possible. Therefore it says, "should be understood accordingly."

5.10

Regarding the passage from "Can there be death and birth" to "refers to states other than the previous ones": this is the fifth part, explaining acquisition and abandonment. Pairing death and birth with the abandonment and acquisition of commonality, one should make four alternatives: The first alternative is that there is death and birth, yet neither abandonment nor acquisition of the commonality of sentient beings; this refers to dying in a certain place and being reborn in that same place, as appropriate. The second alternative is that there is abandonment and acquisition of the commonality of sentient beings, yet neither death nor birth; this refers to abandoning the commonality of ordinary worldlings (pṛthagjana) and acquiring the commonality of noble ones (ārya) at the time of entering the stage of the realization of correctness (samyaktva-niyāma). The third alternative is that there is death and birth, and also abandonment and acquisition of the commonality of sentient beings; this refers to dying in one destiny and being born in another destiny, and so forth. The fourth alternative refers to states other than the previous ones. The expression 'commonality of sentient beings' excludes non-sentient things; as appropriate, it is specific commonality, not the general commonality of sentient beings, because the general commonality of sentient beings can only be abandoned upon entering nirvāṇa without remainder.

5.11

Regarding the passage from "If there were a distinct real entity" to "because there is no distinct human-nature": below this is the second part, questioning and answering to determine [the doctrine], which has six sections in total. Below this is the first, stating the five objections of the Sautrāntikas: first, the objection regarding the non-existence of ordinary-worldling nature; second, the objection regarding it being imperceptible and useless; third, the objection regarding commonality of non-sentient things; fourth, the objection regarding a distinct commonality; fifth, the objection regarding similarity to the Vaiśeṣikas. This is the first objection, concerning the non-existence of ordinary-worldling nature. Therein: first, stating the objection according to the text; second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra*; third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa*. The other objections are analogous to this, all forming three sections. As for 'stating the objection according to the text': the commonality of ordinary worldlings is distinct from that of the noble ones; what use is there in separately establishing an ordinary-worldling nature? Just as outside the commonality of humans one does not separately establish a human-nature, why should one separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature outside the commonality of ordinary worldlings? Second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Is it not that the nature of an ordinary worldling is just the commonality of ordinary worldlings? This is not correct, because their functions are different. That is to say, the cause of their mutual similarity in physical form, activities, and desires is called commonality. That which is incompatible with the acquisition of the noble path and is the cause of being an ordinary worldling is called ordinary-worldling nature. When entering the realization [of correctness], one both abandons and acquires with respect to generic commonality; with respect to ordinary-worldling nature, one only abandons it and does not acquire [an ordinary-worldling nature]." The meaning of the *Nyāyānusāra* is: because ordinary-worldling nature and the commonality of ordinary worldlings have different functions, an ordinary-worldling nature is separately established outside the commonality of ordinary worldlings. Outside the commonality of humans there is no distinct human-nature, because their functions are identical; outside the commonality of humans, no human-nature is established. Furthermore, when entering the noble state, regarding commonality, one abandons the commonality of ordinary worldlings and acquires the commonality of noble ones; regarding ordinary-worldling nature, one merely abandons ordinary-worldling nature and does not acquire ordinary-worldling nature; one should not say one does not acquire noble nature, because noble dharmas themselves are called noble nature. Third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa* says: If one did not abandon commonality upon entering the noble state, it might indeed be necessary to separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature. Since one does abandon commonality upon entering the noble state, why is it necessary to separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature? If you say that because their functions are distinct one must separately establish the commonality of humans, then since the functions of human-nature would also be distinct, why not separately establish self-similar likeness called the commonality of humans, and incompatibility with non-humans called human-nature?

5.12

Regarding the passage "Moreover, neither does the world... of what use is it?": this is the second objection, that it is imperceptible and useless. Furthermore, neither does worldly direct perception empirically observe the substance of this commonality, because it is not matter (rūpa); nor can the reasoning of discerning inferential cognition comprehend it, because it has no distinct function. Although worldly people also do not understand that the commonality of sentient beings has a distinct real substance, they still generate discernment and verbal expression of non-differentiation regarding sentient beings; therefore, even if it had a substance, of what use would it be? Second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Since commonality is not matter, how is it known to have the function of producing non-differentiated categories of things? Because through observing its effect, one knows that it exists. Just as observing the effect obtained from present karma, one knows that there was karma previously performed in past lives. Moreover, practitioners of contemplation directly realize and know it." Explanation: from "Since commonality is not matter" to "non-differentiated categories of things" recounts the intention of the objection in the *Kośa*. From "Because through observing its effect" downward is the explanation and resolution in the *Nyāyānusāra*. Third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa* says: If causes and conditions could not produce an effect of that same kind, it might be necessary for commonality to produce it. Since causes and conditions can of themselves produce that effect, why is it necessary for commonality to produce it? Non-Buddhist practitioners of contemplation also say they have directly realized a self; how could one believe that they possess an actual substantial self?

5.13

Regarding the passage from "Moreover, for what reason do you not accept" to "because they are mutually similar": this is the third objection, regarding commonality of non-sentient things. Non-sentient things such as grains are also mutually similar; why not establish commonality for them? Āmra is the name of a fruit whose shape resembles a papaya; its shape and color remain similar from beginning to end, so ripeness and unripeness are hard to discern. Panasa is also the name of a fruit whose shape is like a winter melon; its taste is sweet and delicious, and its trees are extremely numerous. Second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Why not accept that there is commonality of non-sentient things? One should not reprove [us] in this way, because there would be an excessive fault. You also accept destinies such as humans and devas, and modes of birth such as womb-born and egg-born; why do you not also accept destinies such as āmra, and modes of birth such as mung beans?" It also says: "Because those grasses, trees, and so forth have no reciprocal activities and mutual similarity in desires, among them one does not speak of separately establishing a commonality." Third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa* says: 'Destiny' refers to the five destinies, and 'birth' refers to the four modes of birth; non-sentient things are not these, so indeed they may not be destinies or births; but because their substances and kinds are similar, they should have commonality. Furthermore, to refute [the point that] because desires and so forth are identical one must separately establish commonality: mung beans and the like are also identical; why not establish commonality [for them]?

5.14

As for "Moreover, [if] these various generic conformities (sabhāgatā) ... [why should they not directly] generate cognitions and designations?": this is the fourth objection, [namely,] the objection concerning an additional generic conformity. The substances of phenomena that possess generic conformity are mutually distinct; they achieve conformity through a distinct generic conformity. In relation to each other, the agents of conformity are also distinct; how then, without any further generic conformity making them conform, do they give rise to undifferentiated apprehending cognition and give rise to undifferentiated designated terminology? If there were further generic conformity, that would in turn incur the fault of an infinite regress. Second, the Nyāyānusāra defends [the Sarvāstivāda view], stating: "Because the generic conformities are the cause of similarity for homogenous entities, they serve as the cause of reciprocating similarity in cognition and designation for the same class. Just as the eyes, ears, and so forth become material (rūpa) only by being made up of the primary elements (mahābhūta), yet the primary elements, though not made up of other primary elements, still constitute material nature." Third, the master of the Kośa refutes this, stating: "If you say that because they are causes of conformity their nature is intrinsically conformant, then since generic conformities of their own class lack any separate generic conformity, their conformity alone serves as the cause of cognition and designation. It would likewise be acceptable that those things which possess conformity, in their own class and the like, need no generic conformity [at all] to serve as the cause of cognition and designation. Moreover, the cited analogy has the fault of contradicting your own school's tenets. The materiality of the eye and so on is perpetually fixed throughout the three times; how can you say that they become material only by being made up of the primary elements? You should only say 'they are made up of the primary elements,' and should not say 'they become material only by being made up of the primary elements.'"

5.15

As for "Furthermore, this would clearly turn out to be ... arose from this": this is the fifth objection, [namely,] the objection that it would be identical to the Vaiśeṣika. In Sanskrit it is Vaiśeṣika, which is translated here as "Sheng-lun" (School of Distinction); formerly it was called Peisheshe or Weisheshe, which are corruptions. You of the Sarvāstivāda maintain that there is a separate generic conformity upon phenomena, which would also clearly turn out to be what the Vaiśeṣika maintains. That school maintains a category of "universal sameness" (sāmānya). Because it extends through all phenomena, it is called "universal sameness." Upon all phenomena, the expression of universal sameness and the cognition of universal sameness arise from this category of universal sameness. They also maintain a category of "sameness and difference" (sāmānya-viśeṣa). Among many different classes of entities, looking at those of the same class is called "sameness," while looking at those of different classes is called "difference." Sameness is pervasive among identical phenomena, while difference is pervasive among different phenomena. Upon phenomena of many different classes, expressions of sameness and difference and cognitions of sameness and difference arise from this category of sameness and difference. Another explanation is: your statement of "undifferentiated generic conformity" clearly turns out to be the Vaiśeṣika category of universal sameness; and "differentiated generic conformity" clearly turns out to be the Vaiśeṣika category of sameness and difference. According to the ancient masters of the Vaiśeṣika school, six categories (padārtha) were established: first, substance (dravya); second, quality (guṇa); third, action (karma); fourth, existence (bhāva / sattā); fifth, sameness and difference (sāmānya-viśeṣa); and sixth, inherence (samavāya). Later masters, such as Master Candramati (Huiyue), established ten categories, as established in the Daśapadārtha-śāstra: first, substance, explained as the substantial essence of phenomena, which is the substrate of qualities and the rest; second, quality, explained as the moral quality belonging to substance; third, action, explained as movement being the activity belonging to substance; fourth, sameness, explained as the nature pervading substance and the rest having identical existence, hence called sameness; fifth, difference, explained as residing solely in substances to make them distinct; sixth, inherence, explained as the cause of production and arrival for phenomena; seventh, potency (sāmarthya), explained as when substances and the rest produce their own effects, they produce effects only with the assistance of this potency; eighth, impotency (asāmarthya), explained as obstructing the production of other effects; ninth, commonality (sādharmya), explained as nature pervading substance, quality, action, etc., being both same and different, hence called commonality; tenth, non-existence (abhāva), explained as the statement of absence. What is the category of substance? It refers to nine kinds of substance. What are the nine? 1. earth, 2. water, 3. fire, 4. wind, 5. ether, 6. time, 7. space, 8. self (ātman), 9. internal organ (manas); these are the nine substances. What is earth? That which possesses form, taste, smell, and tangibility is earth. What is water? That which possesses form, taste, tangibility, fluidity, and viscidity is water. What is fire? That which possesses form and tangibility is fire. What is wind? That which possesses only tangibility is wind. What is ether? That which possesses only sound is ether. What is time? It is the cause of cognition and conceptualization of that, this, simultaneous, non-simultaneous, slow, fast, and approved; this is time. What is space? It is the cause of expression and cognition of east, south, north, and so on; this is space. What is the self? It is the inherent condition of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, dharma, adharma, and so on, characterized by the arising of knowledge; this is the self. What is the internal organ? It is the non-inherent condition of the activity of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, dharma, and adharma, characterized by the arising of knowledge; this is the internal organ. What is the category of quality? It refers to twenty-four qualities. What are the twenty-four qualities? 1. form/color, 2. taste, 3. smell, 4. tangibility, 5. number, 6. measure, 7. separateness, 8. conjunction, 9. disjunction, 10. otherness, 11. thisness, 12. cognition, 13. pleasure, 14. pain, 15. desire, 16. aversion, 17. effort, 18. heaviness, 19. fluidity, 20. viscidity, 21. disposition, 22. merit (dharma), 23. demerit (adharma), 24. sound; these are the twenty-four qualities, as detailed in the Daśapadārtha-śāstra. What is the category of action? It refers to five kinds of action. What are the five? 1. upward throwing, 2. downward throwing, 3. contraction, 4. expansion, 5. going; as explained in detail in the Daśapadārtha-śāstra. What is the category of sameness? It refers to existence. What is existence? It refers to that which inheres in all substances, qualities, and actions; grasped by all faculties, it is the cause of expression and cognition of existence in substances, qualities, and actions; this is existence. What is the category of difference? It refers to that which occurs in substances relying on an individual substance, being the cause of excluding that cognition and revealing this cognition; this is called the category of difference. What is the category of inherence? It refers to the uniting of substances and the rest without separation, being the cause of this expression and cognition; moreover, its nature is singular; this is called the category of inherence. What is the category of potency? It refers to the inherence in substance, quality, and action, whether collectively or individually, definitely required for producing their respective effects; this is called the category of potency. What is the category of impotency? It refers to the inherence in substance, quality, and action, whether collectively or individually, definitely required for not producing other effects; this is called the category of impotency. What is the category of commonality? It refers to substantiality, qualitative nature, and active nature, as well as their inherence in a single meaning, such as earthness, formness, upwardness, and so forth; this is called the category of commonality, as explained in detail in the Daśapadārtha-śāstra. What is the category of non-existence? It refers to five kinds of non-existence. What are the five? 1. prior non-existence, 2. posterior non-existence, 3. mutual non-existence, 4. non-existence of non-conjunction, 5. absolute non-existence; these are the five non-existences, as explained in detail in the Daśapadārtha-śāstra. Question: How do the six categories and ten categories subsume one another? Explanation: Among the ten categories, the three of substance, quality, and action are precisely the substance, quality, and action categories of the six categories. The fourth category, sameness, is precisely the fourth category of existence in the six categories. The sixth, inherence, is precisely the sixth category of inherence in the six categories. The fifth, difference, the seventh, potency, the eighth, impotency, and the ninth, commonality, are subsumed under the category of sameness and difference among the six categories. By 'sameness and difference,' viewing one's own class is called sameness, while viewing different classes is called difference. The tenth, non-existence, is not subsumed under the six categories. Why is this? The six categories only discuss existent entities, and therefore only speak of six; the ten categories discuss both existence and non-existence, and therefore speak of the tenth. Each is based on one perspective and they do not contradict each other. The 'universal sameness category' in this treatise is precisely the sameness category in the ten categories, and is also the existence category in the six categories; because it can make all phenomena exist, its name differs from the sameness category, but its meaning is the same. The 'category of sameness and difference' in this treatise is precisely the fifth category of sameness and difference among the six categories. For instance, in relation to the nine phenomena in the substance category, viewing one's own class is called sameness, while viewing different classes is called difference. The rest should all be understood accordingly. Moreover, it corresponds to the fifth category of difference, seventh category of potency, eighth category of impotency, and ninth category of commonality in the ten categories.

5.16

As for "The Vaibhāṣikas say ... up to the detailed explanation": this is the second, [namely,] the Vaibhāṣikas' defense. Among the five objections, they cannot defend against the first four, but only defend against the fifth regarding the charge of being identical to the Vaiśeṣikas: "Those two categories maintained by them differ in meaning and type from this generic conformity of ours, for they say that a single entity functions across many, whereas we say that generic conformity has a distinct substance on each phenomenon. Since the meanings of multiplicity of substances and a single substance are different, how can you make out that we are clearly identical to the Vaiśeṣikas? Furthermore, whether or not it clearly turns out to resemble those Vaiśeṣika outsiders, this generic conformity must be a real entity. Sūtras speak of generic conformity, so one clearly knows it exists separately."

5.17

As for "Although they say this ... is called generic conformity": this is the third, [namely,] the Sautrāntika objecting again that it is identical to the Vaiśeṣika, which can be understood. What they said about citing the sūtra to prove reality must be considered impermissible.

5.18

As for "If that is so, what is the generic conformity you speak of?": this is the fourth, [namely,] the Vaibhāṣikas cross-examining the Sautrāntikas: "Since you do not accept that generic conformity is real as we have stated, what is the generic conformity spoken of by your school?"

5.19

As for "It is precisely when saṃskāras of such a class ... the generic conformity of beans and so forth": this is the fifth, [namely,] the Sautrāntika answering: "When conditioned phenomena of similar classes arise, one nominally posits human generic conformity and so forth among them without any separate real substance, just as the generic conformity of various grains and so forth is not real."

5.20

As for "This is not well-spoken, because it contradicts our tenets": this is the sixth, [namely,] the Vaibhāṣika making this statement when their reasoning is exhausted and words have run out.

5.21

As for "Generic conformity has already been distinguished ... the maturation residing in the Bṛhatphala": below this is the third major section, explaining non-ideation (asaṃjñi-samāpatti / asaṃjñika). The upper two lines explain the essence of non-ideation; the lower line differentiates it through two aspects. The upper 'non-ideation' is the non-ideation maturation; the lower 'non-ideation' is the non-ideation heaven, encompassing both with mind and without mind.

5.22

As for "The treatise says ... like damming a river": this explains the previous two lines. If one is born among the non-ideational sentient beings' heaven, there is an unassociated conditioned phenomenon (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) that is a maturation-fruit dharma, able to cause future minds and mental factors to cease; this is named 'non-ideation.' The essential nature of this phenomenon is a real entity, which is why it can obstruct future minds and mental factors, preventing them from arising temporarily for five hundred kalpas, like damming a river; therefore one knows it is real. Fearing that it might be confused with grass and the like, it says 'sentient beings.'

5.23

As for "This phenomenon is strictly a maturation fruit": differentiated among the five categories [of conditioned dharmas], it is solely maturation.

5.24

As for "The maturation of what?": this is a question.

5.25

"It refers to the non-conceptual concentration (asaṃjñi-samāpatti)," answers the text. Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 118, states: "Some say that the non-conceptual concentration produces the non-conceptual [state] and material vipāka. The life-faculty and the generic similarity (nikāya-sabhāga) are the vipāka of that dhyāna endowed with mind, while the remaining skandhas are the vipāka of both together. Others say that the non-conceptual concentration produces the non-conceptual [state] and material vipāka, the life-faculty is the vipāka of that dhyāna endowed with mind, and the remaining skandhas are the vipāka of both together. Others say that the non-conceptual concentration produces the non-conceptual vipāka, while the remaining skandhas are the vipāka of both together. Others say that when there is mind, it also produces the vipāka of the mindless skandhas, and when there is no mind, it also produces the vipāka of the minded skandhas. Evaluation: It should be stated as follows: The non-conceptual vipāka is produced solely by the non-conceptual concentration. All life-faculties, generic similarities, and physical faculties such as the eye are produced by karma. The remaining skandhas are produced by both." The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 12, agrees with the incorrect view of the first master of the Mahāvibhāṣā; this treatise agrees with the evaluator of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Question: If this treatise agrees with the evaluator of the Mahāvibhāṣā that the life-faculty and physical faculties are not produced by the non-conceptual concentration, why does it state below, regarding projectful and fulfilling [karma], only that the two concentrations and attainment cannot produce the generic similarity, without mentioning that they do not produce the life-faculty and physical faculties? Explanation: The text below clarifies the two kinds of [karma], projectful and fulfilling, merely stating that the two concentrations and attainment cannot project, but can fulfill; it does not mean that within fulfillment, they can produce everything.

5.26

"Where do non-conceptual sentient beings dwell?" asks the text.

5.27

"They dwell in [the Heaven of] Vast Fruit (Bṛhatphala)... called the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings (Asaṃjñisattva)," answers the text. This clarifies their dwelling place. In the Heaven of Vast Fruit, there is a sublime, elevated place where non-conceptual sentient beings dwell. Just as in the intermediate dhyāna, the Great Brahmā dwells separately on an elevated terrace among the Brahma-purohita heavens; this is also like that, and is named the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings.

5.28

"Are they constantly without ideation, or do they also have ideation?" asks the text.

5.29

"In the states of birth and death... ideation arises again," answers the text. In those states of birth and death, sentient beings have ideation for a long time. However, it is called 'non-conceptual' because in the interval between after their birth and before their death, ideation does not arise for the vast span of five hundred great kalpas; it is named non-conceptual from the predominance of this period, as cited in the sūtra to verify the re-arising of ideation. Question: For non-conceptual sentient beings, are the initial moments of mind more numerous, or are the final moments of mind more numerous? Answer: In fascicle 154, the evaluator states: To put it thus, this matter is not fixed; either the earlier are more and the later fewer, or the earlier are fewer and the later more, because they differ according to their inclinations. Furthermore, according to the evaluator of the Mahāvibhāṣā, the mind emerging from the non-conceptual [state] may be innate good, defiled-unspecified, or undefiled-unspecified, and it is abandoned by any of the five divisions. Question: As for the mind entering the non-conceptual [state], how many natures does it admit? By how many divisions is it abandoned? Explanation: Although no text is seen, by analogy with the emerging mind, the entering mind is likewise. Question: The sūtras state that all sentient beings subsist on food. Since the four foods are absent in the non-conceptual state, how can they subsist? Answer: Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 12, states: "They take past karma and the immediately antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya) as sustaining food. That is to say, past karma projects the generic similarity, the life-faculty, and so on; and because the mind that links rebirth and the mind immediately preceding entry into the non-conceptual fruition draw forth and assist them, they also have past contact and so forth as sustaining food. In the mindless state, there are only past contact and so forth as food, with none in the present; in the minded state, both are present." Explanation: Taking past karma as the food of intention, taking the mind linking rebirth and the mind immediately preceding entry as drawing forth and assisting to constitute the food of consciousness, and taking the contact associated with consciousness as the food of contact—therefore, the mindless state has only the three past foods and none in the present, whereas minded states also possess present food. Although the non-conceptual entity itself is not born from that immediately antecedent condition, its substance is only able to arise through the traction and assistance of its force. Without the preceding mind and so forth, its substance could not possibly arise.

5.30

"After passing away from there... karma to be reborn in heaven," this clarifies the place of rebirth upon falling. Having passed away from the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings, among the three realms one is bound to be reborn in the desire realm, not elsewhere. Why is this? The first master explains: Because the causal force of having previously cultivated the non-conceptual concentration has been exhausted, or because the causal force of minded and mindless concentrations has been exhausted, they cannot produce further fruit. Dying from there, they are reborn back into the desire realm, because they cannot cultivate the non-conceptual concentration again in that heaven. Or, because of minded and mindless concentrations, they are not reborn in that realm: just as an arrow shot into the sky falls to the ground when its force is exhausted, one should know that being reborn back into the desire realm is also like this. If sentient beings are to be born in the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings, they necessarily have karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths (aparaparyāya-vedanīya) in the desire realm. Just as one born in the Northern Continent necessarily has karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths in heaven, by having karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths in the desire realm, they are reborn solely in the desire realm and not in other realms. Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 154, states: "Some say: If one creates karma to be experienced in the next rebirth (upapadya-vedanīya) in the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings, by natural order one also creates karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths in the desire realm. Just as when one creates karma to be experienced in the next rebirth in Uttarakuru, by natural order one also creates karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths in the heavens of the desire realm." Question: In which destiny of the desire realm are they born? Explanation: It is not fixed among the five destinies. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 154, states: "Question: Where are they definitely born? Answer: Some say they are born in the hells; some say they are born in the evil destinies. The proper statement is: They are definitely born in the desire realm, but the location is not fixed; they may be born in the evil destinies, among the gods, or among humans." Question: When is this subsequent karma of the desire realm created? Explanation: It is created at the time of preparatory application (prayoga) when about to cultivate the non-conceptual [concentration]; because it is strong and superior, it is experienced first now. That is to say, when non-Buddhists are about to cultivate the non-conceptual [concentration], they may give rise to wrong views slandering the nirvāṇa of the Śākya clan, or give rise to the attachment to views (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) taking it to be true, or give rise to attachment to rules and rituals (śīlavrata-parāmarśa) taking it to be the path; such afflictions are the causes for the evil destinies. But since cultivating this concentration also requires detachment from desire, they may give rise to innate, hearing-based, or thinking-based [wholesomeness]; such wholesome states are the causes for the good destinies. Although there is karma to be experienced in subsequent rebirths from other lives, because what was created in preparatory application is strong in force, they take rebirth by virtue of it. Alternatively, wholesomeness may also be created in later arising states. One should know that for those about to be born in Uttarakuru, the karma for the desire-realm heavens is also created in the human realm during the preparatory application of cultivating the contemplation of selflessness. Because it is strong and superior, it is experienced first now; or it may also extend to being created in later arising states. Because the karma of those about to be born in the Northern Continent is purely wholesome, upon passing away from there they are born in heaven; whereas for those about to be born in the non-conceptual [heaven], wholesome and unwholesome states arise mixed together, and therefore, upon passing away from there, they may be reborn in any of the five destinies.

5.31

"Having distinguished the non-conceptual, what are the two concentrations?" Below, this is the fourth major section, clarifying the two concentrations. Within this: first, clarifying the non-conceptual concentration; second, clarifying the concentration of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti); third, clarifying the differences based on the physical support. Below, clarifying the non-conceptual concentration begins with a preliminary inquiry. Within this: first, general; second, specific. This is the general question.

5.32

"They refer to the non-conceptual concentration and the concentration of cessation," is the general answer.

5.33

"What is the characteristic of the first, the non-conceptual concentration?" is the specific question.

5.34

"The verse states: ... / Not by noble ones; attained in one period," is the specific answer. The first line clarifies its entity. 'The final dhyāna' clarifies its supporting stage; 'seeking release' clarifies the mental orientation; 'wholesome' clarifies its inclusion by nature; 'only experienced in the next rebirth' clarifies its bringing about of fruition; 'not by noble ones' clarifies the person who cultivates it; 'attained in one period' clarifies its possession.

5.35

"The commentary says: ... / identical to the non-conceptual," as explained before, there is a non-conceptual vipāka dharma that can make the mind and mental factors cease, which is called the non-conceptual. Likewise, there is another dharma not associated with mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) that can make the mind and mental factors cease, which is the entity of the non-conceptual concentration. The absence of ideation in the body is called 'the non-conceptual one'; the concentration of the non-conceptual one is the non-conceptual concentration, which is a genitive compound (tatpuruṣa). Or, the concentration itself being without ideation is the non-conceptual concentration, which is an appositional compound (karmadhāraya). The verse's use of the word 'likewise' merely indicates that this concentration's cessation of mind and mental factors is identical to the previous non-conceptual vipāka heaven, not that it is identical in all respects. According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 151, the mind entering the non-conceptual concentration and the mind emerging from the non-conceptual concentration are both sāsrava wholesome minds of the fourth dhyāna. They cannot be described in full.

5.36

"In which stage is this?" asks the text.

5.37

"It is in the final dhyāna... and not elsewhere," answers the text. It is only in the fourth dhyāna, not in the other upper or lower stages. Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 151, states: "Furthermore, the lower stages have joyful and sorrowful feelings, whose modes of activity are coarse and agitated, and difficult to eradicate. The fourth dhyāna has only neutral feeling, whose mode of activity is subtle and easy to extinguish. Therefore, there is no non-conceptual concentration in the lower stages. Question: Why is that concentration absent in the formless realm? Answer: Only ordinary beings mistakenly practice this concentration, believing it capable of realizing non-conceptual nirvāṇa. In the formless realm, there is no non-conceptual vipāka to be conceived as such, so the non-conceptual concentration is also absent there. Furthermore, ordinary beings fear annihilation; that realm is without form, so if mind were further extinguished, it would be total annihilation. Since they fear this, the non-conceptual concentration does not exist in that realm."

5.38

"Cultivating the non-conceptual concentration is for the sake of seeking what?" asks the text.

5.39

"Seeking liberation... one cultivates the non-conceptual concentration," answers the text. One who cultivates the non-conceptual [concentration] does so seeking liberation and nirvāṇa; grasping the non-conceptual vipāka as true liberation and nirvāṇa, they cultivate the non-conceptual concentration to make it the path of departure (niḥsaraṇa) in order to realize it.

5.40

"Previously it was said that the non-conceptual... vipāka of the five skandhas," because the non-conceptual [state] was previously said to be vipāka, its inclusion under the unspecified nature is established without saying, so it is not stated separately. This concentration is solely wholesome, capable of bringing about the vipāka of the five skandhas in the Heaven of Non-Conceptual Beings: at initial rebirth and at subsequent death, there are mind and mental factors, and thus all five skandhas are fully present.

5.41

"Since it is of a wholesome nature, to what experience does it conform?" asks the text.

5.42

"It is only experienced in the next rebirth... entry into the certainty of rightness (samyaktva-niyāma)," it is only experienced in the next rebirth, as can be understood from the text. One explanation in the Nyāyānusāra agrees with this treatise. Another explanation is that a group of masters holds this definite view, saying that it is experienced in the next rebirth and of indefinite experience. Why is this? One who has accomplished this concentration is also permitted to enter the certainty of rightness; once entered, they will definitely never manifest this concentration again. Thus, the designation of the non-conceptual concentration as a concentration of ordinary beings is made with respect to its active manifestation, not with respect to its possession.

5.43

"Furthermore, it is accepted that this concentration... definitely do not cultivate it," distinguishes ordinary beings from noble ones: it is obtained solely by ordinary beings. Because the non-conceptual concentration produces a great fruition of five hundred kalpas of birth and death, which is futile with nothing gained, noble ones revile it and turn away from it as if seeing a deep pit, taking no delight in entering it. It requires grasping the non-conceptual vipāka as true liberation and nirvāṇa, and generating the idea that the non-conceptual concentration can bring departure from birth and death, to cultivate this concentration. No noble ones grasp the sāsrava non-conceptual vipāka as true liberation and nirvāṇa, nor do they grasp the sāsrava non-conceptual concentration as the true noble path of departure; therefore, they definitely do not cultivate this concentration.

5.44

"When noble ones... the non-conceptual concentration or not?" Below, this clarifies possession. Question: When noble ones through cultivation obtain the concentration of the fourth dhyāna, they inevitably obtain all minded concentrations of beginningless past and future. As with the dhyānas, do they also obtain the non-conceptual concentration previously practiced in beginningless past and future, or not?

5.45

"Others do not obtain it either," answers the text. When other ordinary persons through cultivation obtain the fourth concentration, they likewise do not obtain the non-conceptual concentration of past and future, let alone noble persons.

5.46

"Why is this?" inquires the text.

5.47

"Although they previously practiced it... there is no future cultivation," although that non-conceptual concentration was previously practiced in the past, because it is mindless, it must be obtained by cultivation through great preparatory application and expedients; therefore, when initially obtained, one obtains only the present moment. Just as when initially receiving and obtaining the prātimokṣa vows, one also only accomplishes the present. Having obtained this concentration, from the second moment onward until it has not yet been abandoned, one also possesses the past. After emerging, until it has not yet been abandoned, one possesses only the past. Because it is mindless, there is no future cultivation.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese