俱舍論記 7.4

7.4

"The verse states: up to: 'predominance is the productive'" provides the answer. The first line presents the number and specifies the names; the second line explains the nature of the cause; the third and fourth lines explain the immediately contiguous; the fifth line explains the objective support; and the sixth line explains predominance. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 107, states: "Cause is like the principle of a seed. The immediately contiguous is like the principle of opening a way and giving place. The objective support is like the principle of leaning on a staff. Predominance is like the principle of non-obstruction." Question: Fascicle 16 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* asks: "Question: Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume one another, in accordance with their particulars. That is to say, the preceding five causes are the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), while the productive cause (kāraṇa-hetu) is the remaining three conditions. There is [another] master who says: 'Conditions subsume causes, but causes do not subsume conditions. That is to say, the preceding five are the cause-condition, and the productive cause is the condition of predominance (adhipati-pratyaya). The immediately contiguous condition (samanantara-pratyaya) and the condition of objective support (ālambana-pratyaya) are not subsumed by cause.'" However, no critical arbiter is provided there. This treatise agrees with the latter statement of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In explaining their mutual subsumption between these two accounts, is it stated in terms of entity (substance) or in terms of function? If it is stated in terms of entity, then the productive cause should subsume those four conditions, and the single condition of predominance should subsume those six causes, because both entities are extensive. If it is stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and the four conditions are each distinct; how could they subsume one another? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explaining it in terms of entity; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explains it in terms of entity: the cause-condition subsumes five [causes], while the productive [cause] subsumes three [conditions]; if considered in terms of the extensiveness of the productive [cause's] entity, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and because the entity of predominance is extensive, it can subsume the six causes. As to why it merely says that the productive subsumes three and predominance subsumes one: this master's intention is that in explaining subsumption by contrasting the six causes with the four conditions, it stops once it has exhausted the subsumed entities from one standpoint; therefore, he states that the cause-condition subsumes five and the productive [cause] subsumes three. Since outside of the productive cause there are the other five causes, and outside of the condition of predominance there are the other three conditions, in clarifying their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the productive subsumes four and predominance subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on essential nature, essential nature is eternally existing; in that case, there would be no distinction between the six causes and the four conditions—how could they mutually subsume one another? Thus the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "I speak of function; what constitutes cause and result? The actual entities of all phenomena are eternally without change, because they are not causes and results." The explanation says: Considering that entities are changeless, causes and conditions are identical; taking entities according to their functions, distinctions are therefore stated. If one turns to the second master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and this treatise, they distinguish mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. If one speaks of the six causes and the four conditions, their functions are each distinct and do not mutually subsume one another. Yet the statement that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and predominance subsumes the productive cause is made by clarifying mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. Because the immediately contiguous and objective support conditions do not resemble causes, they are not subsumed by cause. Question: Among the productive causes, are the five causes beginning with production (janma) subsumed by the cause-condition among the four conditions, or are they subsumed by the condition of predominance? The explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition. Therefore, when the orthodox authority in fascicle 17 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* resolves the objection that "there is no time that is not a cause," he states: "One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes, because the name 'cause' denotes and extends to the six causes." The explanation says: That passage conducts questions and answers on the basis of the cause-condition. Since the orthodox authority interprets the cause-condition as fully speaking of the six causes, we clearly know that the cause-condition also subsumes the five causes beginning with production within the productive cause. Furthermore, fascicle 131 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "As how many conditions do the primary elements serve for derived matter? Answer: Cause and predominance. 'Cause' refers to the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; 'predominance' refers to not hindering production and merely being without obstruction (The explanation says: that passage conducts questions and answers based on the four conditions; 'cause' is precisely the cause-condition among the four conditions. From this we clearly know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition)." Question: If according to this explanation the cause-condition also subsumes a small portion of the productive [cause], and the productive [cause] also subsumes a small portion of the cause-condition, why is this not stated in this treatise and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* when explaining mutual subsumption? The explanation says: In principle, they indeed subsume them; that it is not stated is because it is not total subsumption, so it is omitted for brevity. Another explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. How is this known? Thus fascicle 127 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "Question: What is the meaning of 'making' (upādāya)? Is it the meaning of 'cause', or is it the meaning of 'condition'? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it is the meaning of 'cause', these four primary elements lack all five causes with respect to derived matter; how could it be said that they can make derived matter? If it is the meaning of 'condition', with the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, there is not a single remaining phenomenon that is not its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: It should be stated as follows: 'making' is the meaning of 'cause'. Question: Since these lack all five causes with respect to derived matter, how is it the meaning of 'cause'? Answer: Although they lack the five causes such as the homogeneous cause, there are distinctly five other meanings of cause: namely, the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; on account of these they are able to make [derived matter]. There are other masters who say: 'making' is the meaning of 'condition'. Question: With the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, all other phenomena are its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: The meaning of the condition of predominance has close and distant, near and far, conjoined and non-conjoined, present in this life and present in another life. Those that are close, near, conjoined, and in this life are called 'causes'; those that are distant, far, non-conjoined, and in other lives are called 'conditions'. Due to this meaning, to say that the primary elements serve as cause and predominance for derived matter is also not contrary to principle (the above is the textual passage)." The *Pañcavastuka* also contains these two explanations, neither of which has a critical arbiter. Now, in citing that passage, the intention is to use the latter master as proof; hence we know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. And as for saying 'cause', within the condition of predominance there is an intimate and superior function for which the name 'cause' is distinctly established; it is not the cause-condition among the four conditions. As for the earlier master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, he follows the previous explanation. Question: The previous explanation states that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition, while the latter explanation states that they are subsumed by the condition of predominance; which one is correct? The explanation says: Since neither the *Mahāvibhāṣā* nor the *Pañcavastuka* contains a critical verdict and the two explanations differ, who can rashly decide? Another explanation says: The previous explanation is correct. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s exposition of derived matter, the previous explanation says 'it should be stated as follows', whereas the latter explanation says 'there are other masters who say'. Furthermore, in resolving the objection that 'there is no time that is not a cause', the orthodox authority says: 'One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes.' Based on this, we know that the previous explanation is correct.