俱舍論記 7.4

7.4

「頌曰至增上即能作」者，答。初一句舉數標名，第二句明因體，第三、第四句明等無間，第五句明所緣，第六句明增上。又《婆沙》一百七云「因者，如種子法。等無間者，如開避法。所緣者，如任杖法。增上者，如不障礙法。」問：如《婆沙》十六云「問：為因攝緣、緣攝因耶？答：互相攝，隨其事。謂前五因是因緣，能作因是餘三緣。有作是說：緣攝因，非因攝緣。謂前五是因緣，能作因是增上緣。等無間緣及所緣緣非因所攝。」然無評家。此論同《婆沙》後說。於二說中明其相攝，為約體說？為約用說？若約體說，應能作因攝彼四緣，增上一緣攝彼六因，體皆寬故。若約用說，六因、四緣作用各別，如何相攝？解云：夫六因、四緣展轉相攝，有其二義：一約體以明、二據用相似。《婆沙》初師約體以明，因緣攝五；能作攝三，若據能作體寬，實攝四緣；增上體寬，能攝六因。所以但言能作攝三、增上攝一者，此師意說：六因、四緣相對明攝，且據一相攝體盡即休，故說因緣攝五、能作攝三。為能作因外有餘五因，增上緣外有餘三緣，明其相攝，故不別說能作攝四、增上攝六。問：若據體性明相攝者，體性恒有，是即六因、四緣無別，如何相攝？故《婆沙》云「我說作用，何為因果？諸法實體恒無轉變，非因果故。」解云：據體無變，因與緣同；以體從用，故說差別。若《婆沙》第二師及此論，據用相似以辨相攝。若論六因、四緣，作用各別互不相攝。然說因緣攝五因、增上攝能作因者，據用相似以明相攝也。其等無間及所緣緣不似因故，故因不攝。問：能作因中生等五因，四緣中因緣攝？為增上緣攝？解云：生等五因是因緣攝。故《婆沙》十七通無時非因難正義家云「應說彼依六因作論，因名所表通六因故。」解云：彼文據因緣為問答。既正義解因緣具說六因，明知因緣亦攝能作因中生等五因。又《婆沙》一百三十一云「大種與所造色為幾緣？答因、增上。因謂生因、依因、立因、持因、養因，增上謂不礙生及唯無障（解云：彼文據四緣為問答，因者即是四緣中因緣。以此明知，生等五因，因緣攝也）。」問：若據此解因緣，亦攝能作少分，能作亦攝因緣少分，何故此論、《婆沙》明相攝中不說？解云：理實亦攝，而不說者，以非全攝，略而不說。又解：生等五因是增上緣攝。所以得知？故《婆沙》一百二十七云「問：造是何義？為是因義？為是緣義耶？設爾何失？俱見其過。若是因義，此四大種於所造色五因皆無，如何可言能造諸色？若是緣義，諸所造色各除自體，餘一切法無不皆是此增上緣，如何但言大種所造？答：應作是說，造是因義。問：此於造色五因皆無，如何因義？答：雖同類等五因皆無，而別有餘五種因義，謂生因、依因、立因、持因、養因，由此能造。有餘師言：造是緣義。問：諸所造色各除自體，餘法皆是此增上緣，如何但言大種所造？答：增上緣義，有親有疎、有近有遠、有合不合、有在此生有在餘生。諸親、近、合、在此生者，說名為因；疎、遠、不合、在餘生者，說名為緣。由此義故，說諸大種與所造色為因、增上，亦不違理（已上論文）。」《五事論》亦有此兩說，竝無評家。今引彼文，意以後師為證，故知生等五因增上緣攝。而言因者，就增上緣中有親勝用，別立因名，非是四緣中因緣也。若《婆沙》前師即順前解。問：前解生等五因是因緣攝，後解是增上緣攝，何者為正？解云：《婆沙》、《五事》既無評文，兩說不同，誰能輒定。又解：前解為正。《婆沙》釋造色中，前解即言應作是說，後解即云有餘師言。又通無時非因難中，正義家云：應說彼依六因作論。以此故知，前解為正。

"The verse states: up to: 'predominance is the productive'" provides the answer. The first line presents the number and specifies the names; the second line explains the nature of the cause; the third and fourth lines explain the immediately contiguous; the fifth line explains the objective support; and the sixth line explains predominance. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 107, states: "Cause is like the principle of a seed. The immediately contiguous is like the principle of opening a way and giving place. The objective support is like the principle of leaning on a staff. Predominance is like the principle of non-obstruction." Question: Fascicle 16 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* asks: "Question: Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume one another, in accordance with their particulars. That is to say, the preceding five causes are the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), while the productive cause (kāraṇa-hetu) is the remaining three conditions. There is [another] master who says: 'Conditions subsume causes, but causes do not subsume conditions. That is to say, the preceding five are the cause-condition, and the productive cause is the condition of predominance (adhipati-pratyaya). The immediately contiguous condition (samanantara-pratyaya) and the condition of objective support (ālambana-pratyaya) are not subsumed by cause.'" However, no critical arbiter is provided there. This treatise agrees with the latter statement of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In explaining their mutual subsumption between these two accounts, is it stated in terms of entity (substance) or in terms of function? If it is stated in terms of entity, then the productive cause should subsume those four conditions, and the single condition of predominance should subsume those six causes, because both entities are extensive. If it is stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and the four conditions are each distinct; how could they subsume one another? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explaining it in terms of entity; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explains it in terms of entity: the cause-condition subsumes five [causes], while the productive [cause] subsumes three [conditions]; if considered in terms of the extensiveness of the productive [cause's] entity, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and because the entity of predominance is extensive, it can subsume the six causes. As to why it merely says that the productive subsumes three and predominance subsumes one: this master's intention is that in explaining subsumption by contrasting the six causes with the four conditions, it stops once it has exhausted the subsumed entities from one standpoint; therefore, he states that the cause-condition subsumes five and the productive [cause] subsumes three. Since outside of the productive cause there are the other five causes, and outside of the condition of predominance there are the other three conditions, in clarifying their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the productive subsumes four and predominance subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on essential nature, essential nature is eternally existing; in that case, there would be no distinction between the six causes and the four conditions—how could they mutually subsume one another? Thus the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "I speak of function; what constitutes cause and result? The actual entities of all phenomena are eternally without change, because they are not causes and results." The explanation says: Considering that entities are changeless, causes and conditions are identical; taking entities according to their functions, distinctions are therefore stated. If one turns to the second master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and this treatise, they distinguish mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. If one speaks of the six causes and the four conditions, their functions are each distinct and do not mutually subsume one another. Yet the statement that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and predominance subsumes the productive cause is made by clarifying mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. Because the immediately contiguous and objective support conditions do not resemble causes, they are not subsumed by cause. Question: Among the productive causes, are the five causes beginning with production (janma) subsumed by the cause-condition among the four conditions, or are they subsumed by the condition of predominance? The explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition. Therefore, when the orthodox authority in fascicle 17 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* resolves the objection that "there is no time that is not a cause," he states: "One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes, because the name 'cause' denotes and extends to the six causes." The explanation says: That passage conducts questions and answers on the basis of the cause-condition. Since the orthodox authority interprets the cause-condition as fully speaking of the six causes, we clearly know that the cause-condition also subsumes the five causes beginning with production within the productive cause. Furthermore, fascicle 131 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "As how many conditions do the primary elements serve for derived matter? Answer: Cause and predominance. 'Cause' refers to the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; 'predominance' refers to not hindering production and merely being without obstruction (The explanation says: that passage conducts questions and answers based on the four conditions; 'cause' is precisely the cause-condition among the four conditions. From this we clearly know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition)." Question: If according to this explanation the cause-condition also subsumes a small portion of the productive [cause], and the productive [cause] also subsumes a small portion of the cause-condition, why is this not stated in this treatise and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* when explaining mutual subsumption? The explanation says: In principle, they indeed subsume them; that it is not stated is because it is not total subsumption, so it is omitted for brevity. Another explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. How is this known? Thus fascicle 127 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "Question: What is the meaning of 'making' (upādāya)? Is it the meaning of 'cause', or is it the meaning of 'condition'? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it is the meaning of 'cause', these four primary elements lack all five causes with respect to derived matter; how could it be said that they can make derived matter? If it is the meaning of 'condition', with the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, there is not a single remaining phenomenon that is not its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: It should be stated as follows: 'making' is the meaning of 'cause'. Question: Since these lack all five causes with respect to derived matter, how is it the meaning of 'cause'? Answer: Although they lack the five causes such as the homogeneous cause, there are distinctly five other meanings of cause: namely, the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; on account of these they are able to make [derived matter]. There are other masters who say: 'making' is the meaning of 'condition'. Question: With the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, all other phenomena are its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: The meaning of the condition of predominance has close and distant, near and far, conjoined and non-conjoined, present in this life and present in another life. Those that are close, near, conjoined, and in this life are called 'causes'; those that are distant, far, non-conjoined, and in other lives are called 'conditions'. Due to this meaning, to say that the primary elements serve as cause and predominance for derived matter is also not contrary to principle (the above is the textual passage)." The *Pañcavastuka* also contains these two explanations, neither of which has a critical arbiter. Now, in citing that passage, the intention is to use the latter master as proof; hence we know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. And as for saying 'cause', within the condition of predominance there is an intimate and superior function for which the name 'cause' is distinctly established; it is not the cause-condition among the four conditions. As for the earlier master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, he follows the previous explanation. Question: The previous explanation states that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition, while the latter explanation states that they are subsumed by the condition of predominance; which one is correct? The explanation says: Since neither the *Mahāvibhāṣā* nor the *Pañcavastuka* contains a critical verdict and the two explanations differ, who can rashly decide? Another explanation says: The previous explanation is correct. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s exposition of derived matter, the previous explanation says 'it should be stated as follows', whereas the latter explanation says 'there are other masters who say'. Furthermore, in resolving the objection that 'there is no time that is not a cause', the orthodox authority says: 'One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes.' Based on this, we know that the previous explanation is correct.