俱舍論疏 1.166

1.166

論「有情名聲至非有情名」，此釋有情名、非有情名聲也。此說有情名是語表業，非謂一切語表業皆有情名也。《正理》云「此語表業復有二種，謂依名起及不待名。」又准此文，有情名聲是執受大種一分；非有情名聲，是非執受大種為因聲全，及有執受一分。有情名聲定是有執受大種為因。又下〈業品〉云「身、語表業定是有執受大種為因。」故知此論有情名聲，定是有執受大種因發，是有情數，有得得故。非化人語，諸化人語非是執受大種為因聲故。若依《正理》第一云「有執受大種為因聲、無執受大種為因聲，有情數聲非有情數聲。」述曰：此文執受大種為因聲，即是有情數聲。無執受大種為因聲，即是無情數聲。又云「八中唯有初二應理，以有情數、非有情數，即是有執受及無執受大種為因聲所攝故。」准此論文，無執受為因聲中，無有情名聲及有情數聲，亦無有得得，有得得聲是有情數故。准此論文分聲四種，不須四句寬狹不同，但據義別分為四種。造定、道戒大種相擊發聲，非此所明。或可彼大不自相擊發聲。《婆沙》亦許有四大不相擊發聲。問：若爾，何故《入阿毘達磨》第一云「聲有二種，謂有執受及無執受大種為因有差別故。墮自體者名有執受（自體者自身也），是有覺受義，與此相違名無執受。前所生者名有執受大種為因，謂手、語等聲。後所生者名無執受大種為因，謂風、林等聲。此有情名、非有情名差別為四，謂前聲中，語聲名有情名聲，餘聲名非有情名聲。後聲中，化語聲名有情名聲，餘聲名非有情名聲。」准此論文，取化人語是無執受為因有情名聲，然不說是業。准此論文，與此論、《正理》相違。此論有情名聲，唯語表業，唯是執受大種為因聲。《正理》有情數聲，唯是執受大種為因聲，化人語同許非執受大種為因聲，故知非是有情數聲及有情名聲。《入阿毘達磨》許非執受，而言化語是有情名聲者，豈不相違？答：各依一義，故不同也。此論等據此聲無得得故，非是有情名聲《正理》非是有情數聲。《入阿毘達磨》據有情心發故，名有情名聲。問：若爾，何故《婆沙》十三云「聲處有八種，謂執受大種因聲、非執受大種因聲，此各有二，謂有情名聲、非有情名聲，此復各有可意、不可意別，故成八種。」答：此師與《入阿毘達磨》意同，然非正義。《正理》、此論兩文，不用此義。故《婆沙》百二十二云「問：諸化語是業不？有作是說：彼是語業，由心發故。有餘師說：彼非語業，但名語聲，以所化身無執受故。」問：《婆沙》兩說無評，何者為是？答：非業為正。所以得知？以此論〈業品〉中，身、語表業唯執受大種為因故。化人語既同許是非執受大種為因，故知非業。又准《正理》六十四解發語中云「此居口內名語，亦業。流出外時但名為語，不名語業。」准彼論文，化人語離身遠響，如何成業？問：既非是業，有得得不？答：既非有情，無得得也。問：如何得知化聲無得？答：一准《正理論》云「非執受大種為因聲，與非有情數聲無寬狹故，化人同許非執受故。」故知不成就也。二准《婆沙》評家義及此論下文「色界身作欲界化，所化香味如莊嚴具尚不成就，如何離質化語得成就耶？」有人引《婆沙》一百三十二云「有成就欲界繫所造色，亦色界繫所造色，謂生欲界得色界善心。若生色界作欲界化，發欲界語。」准此論文，若化語不成就者，如何說此成二界色耶？破曰：此不成證，通異解故。前引文證，化人無得，文是決定。此文容有兩釋，故不成證。此說即質化色、觸二境，及即自身以欲界化心發欲界語，故作是說，非謂此是離質化人所發語也。所以得知？身生色界作欲界化，一說不化香味；一說化而不成就，如莊嚴具。離質化人既更疎遠身莊嚴具，如何說語有成就義？餘如前說。問：若爾，何故《婆沙》上下無文說不成就離質化語。答：此不在疑，故不別說。即是入總不成就無情法中此已說故，故不別說。如不別說一樹、一石等名不成就。又如說髮毛爪等非執受者，非有情數，無得得故。此物親於離質化人尚不成就，如何離質化語須更別說？問：化人語及簫笛等雖非成就，為有名不？答：定無有名，下論文云「名是有情數故。既無得得，何得有名？」

Regarding the treatise text: "Sounds signifying sentient beings […] not signifying sentient beings": this explains sounds signifying sentient beings and not signifying sentient beings. This states that sounds signifying sentient beings are vocal intimation; it does not mean that all vocal intimation signifies sentient beings. The Nyāyānusāra says: "This vocal intimation again has two kinds: namely, that which arises based on names and that which does not depend on names." Moreover, according to this text, sounds signifying sentient beings are one portion of [sounds caused by] appropriated great elements; sounds not signifying sentient beings are the entirety of sounds caused by non-appropriated great elements as well as one portion of [sounds caused by] appropriated [great elements]. Sounds signifying sentient beings definitely have appropriated great elements as their cause. Furthermore, the "Chapter on Karma" below says: "Bodily and vocal intimation definitely have appropriated great elements as their cause." Therefore, we know that in this treatise, sounds signifying sentient beings are definitely produced with appropriated great elements as their cause; they belong to the category of sentient beings and are possessed by acquisition (prāpti). They are not the speech of apparitional beings, because the speech of all apparitional beings is not sound caused by appropriated great elements. If we rely on the first fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra, it says: "Sounds caused by appropriated great elements and sounds caused by non-appropriated great elements; sounds belonging to the category of sentient beings and sounds not belonging to the category of sentient beings." Commentary: In this text, sounds caused by appropriated great elements are precisely sounds belonging to the category of sentient beings. Sounds caused by non-appropriated great elements are precisely sounds belonging to the category of non-sentient things. It also says: "Among the eight, only the first two are logically sound, because sounds belonging to the category of sentient beings and those not belonging to the category of sentient beings are subsumed under sounds caused by appropriated and non-appropriated great elements." According to this treatise text, among sounds caused by non-appropriated elements, there are neither sounds signifying sentient beings nor sounds belonging to the category of sentient beings; nor is there possession by acquisition, because sounds possessed by acquisition belong to the category of sentient beings. According to this treatise text, sound is divided into four kinds without needing a tetralemma of differing extensions; it is divided into four kinds merely on the basis of distinct meanings. The sound produced by the mutual striking of great elements that constitute the precepts born of absorption or the Path is not what is clarified here. Alternatively, those elements may not strike each other to produce sound. The Vibhāṣā also allows that the four great elements may produce sound without striking each other. Question: If so, why does the first fascicle of the Abhidharmāvatāra say: "Sound is of two kinds, because of the distinction between having appropriated or non-appropriated great elements as cause. That which pertains to one's own body is called appropriated ('one's own body' means one's own physical person); it has the sense of being felt; the contrary of this is called non-appropriated. What is produced by the former is called having appropriated great elements as cause, namely the sounds of hands, speech, and so on. What is produced by the latter is called having non-appropriated great elements as cause, namely the sounds of wind, forests, and so on. These are differentiated into four as signifying sentient beings or not signifying sentient beings: among the former sounds, vocal sound is called sound signifying sentient beings, and the remaining sounds are called sounds not signifying sentient beings; among the latter sounds, apparitional speech is called sound signifying sentient beings, and the remaining sounds are called sounds not signifying sentient beings"? Relying on this text, it takes the speech of an apparitional person as a sound signifying sentient beings that is caused by non-appropriated [elements], yet does not state that it is karma. Relying on this text, it contradicts both this treatise and the Nyāyānusāra. In this treatise, sounds signifying sentient beings are exclusively vocal intimation, and are exclusively sounds caused by appropriated great elements. In the Nyāyānusāra, sounds belonging to the category of sentient beings are exclusively sounds caused by appropriated great elements; and apparitional speech is mutually agreed to be sound caused by non-appropriated great elements; therefore we know it is neither a sound belonging to the category of sentient beings nor a sound signifying sentient beings. The Abhidharmāvatāra admits it is non-appropriated, yet asserts that apparitional speech is a sound signifying sentient beings—how could this not be a contradiction? Answer: Each relies on a different meaning, hence they differ. This treatise and others rely on the fact that this sound is not possessed by acquisition, and thus it is not a sound signifying sentient beings; in the Nyāyānusāra, it is not a sound belonging to the category of sentient beings. The Abhidharmāvatāra relies on the fact that it is emitted by the mind of a sentient being, and thus calls it a sound signifying sentient beings. Question: If so, why does fascicle 13 of the Vibhāṣā say: "The sense-base of sound has eight kinds: namely, sounds caused by appropriated great elements and sounds caused by non-appropriated great elements; each has two kinds, namely sounds signifying sentient beings and sounds not signifying sentient beings; these further each have the distinction of being agreeable and disagreeable, thus making eight kinds"? Answer: This master agrees in intent with the Abhidharmāvatāra, but it is not the orthodox position. Both the Nyāyānusāra and this treatise do not adopt this view. Thus fascicle 122 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Question: Is all apparitional speech karma or not? Some say: It is vocal karma, because it is emitted by the mind. Other masters say: It is not vocal karma, but is merely called vocal sound, because the emanated body is non-appropriated." Question: The two explanations in the Vibhāṣā are without an authoritative verdict; which is correct? Answer: Not being karma is correct. How is this known? Because in the "Chapter on Karma" of this treatise, bodily and vocal intimation have exclusively appropriated great elements as their cause. Since apparitional speech is mutually agreed to have non-appropriated great elements as its cause, we know it is not karma. Furthermore, according to the explanation of emitting speech in fascicle 64 of the Nyāyānusāra: "While residing within the mouth, it is called speech and also karma; when flowing out into the exterior, it is merely called speech and is not called vocal karma." According to that text, how could the speech of an apparitional person, echoing at a distance from the body, constitute karma? Question: Since it is not karma, is there possession by acquisition or not? Answer: Since it is not [a part of] a sentient being, there is no possession by acquisition. Question: How is it known that an apparitional sound lacks acquisition? Answer: First, according to the Nyāyānusāra: "Sounds caused by non-appropriated great elements have no broader or narrower scope than sounds not belonging to the category of sentient beings, and apparitional persons are mutually agreed to be non-appropriated." Therefore we know it is unacquired. Second, according to the verdict of the Vibhāṣā commentator and the text below in this treatise: "When a form-realm body creates a desire-realm apparition, even the emanated smell and taste—being like bodily ornaments—are not acquired; how could apparitional speech detached from the physical body be acquired?" Someone might cite fascicle 132 of the Vibhāṣā: "There is acquisition of derived matter bound to the desire realm, as well as derived matter bound to the form realm, namely when one born in the desire realm attains a wholesome mind of the form realm; or when one born in the form realm creates a desire-realm apparition and emits desire-realm speech." According to this text, if apparitional speech were not acquired, how could it say that one possesses derived matter of the two realms? Refutation: This does not constitute proof, because it is open to another interpretation. The text cited earlier proves that apparitional persons lack acquisition; that text is definitive. This text admits of two interpretations, and therefore does not constitute proof. This refers to the two sense-spheres of visible form and tangible matter emanated directly upon one's own physical body, and to emitting desire-realm speech directly from one's own body using a desire-realm apparitional mind; hence it states this, not that this is speech emitted by an apparitional person detached from the physical body. How is this known? When a body born in the form realm produces a desire-realm apparition, one explanation says that it does not emanate smell or taste; another explanation says that it emanates them but does not acquire them, like ornaments. Since an apparitional person detached from the physical body is even more distant than bodily ornaments, how could its speech have the sense of being acquired? The rest is as explained before. Question: If so, why is there no text anywhere in the Vibhāṣā stating that speech detached from the body is not acquired? Answer: This is not subject to doubt, so it is not stated separately. That is, it is already subsumed under the general statement of not acquiring non-sentient phenomena, so it is not stated separately. It is just as one does not separately state that an individual tree, an individual stone, and so on are unacquired. Furthermore, it is like non-appropriated hair, fur, nails, and so on, which do not belong to the category of sentient beings and have no acquisition. Since these things, which are closer [to the person] than an apparitional being detached from the physical body, are still not acquired, why would apparitional speech detached from the body need to be stated separately? Question: Although the speech of an apparitional person, flutes, pipes, and the like are not acquired, do they possess names? Answer: They definitely lack names. A text below in the treatise says: "Because names belong to the category of sentient beings. Since there is no possession by acquisition, how could there be names?"