俱舍論疏 15.33

15.33

論「以一切佛至無減前過」，答也。《婆沙》一百二十云「問：若別解脫律儀唯於現在有情處得，非於去、來蘊、界、處者，則諸如來、應、正等覺律儀不等。所以者何、過去諸佛出現世時，無量有情為律儀境。彼有情類已入涅槃，釋迦牟尼於彼境上不得律儀。」今釋：迦佛出現世時，無量有情為律儀境。彼有情類已入涅槃，慈氏如來於彼境上不得律儀。境有寬、狹，律儀亦爾。豈不諸佛律儀不等（此是各別發戒家難）？「答：應作是說：律儀境界雖有多、少，而律儀體前、後無異，俱從一切有情境處總發得故（此第一師，境別戒同答）。有作是說：三世如來律儀不等亦無有失。問：若爾，《施設論》說當云何通？如彼說『一切如來、應、正等覺皆悉平等』。答：由三事等故名平等。一修行等，謂諸如來皆於過去三無數劫勤修四種波羅蜜多究竟圓滿得菩提故；二利益等，謂諸如來等於無量應化有情作利樂事此究竟故；三法身等，謂諸如來皆具十力、四無所畏、三念住、大悲、十八不共等勝功德故。由此三義故言平等，非律儀體無多、少異。又由根等故說等言，以一切如來皆住上品根故。又由戒等，一切如來皆得上品戒故。此是別別有情，戒各別也。有餘師說：一切如來、應、正等覺所有律儀，皆於一切有情處得，故說等言，非體無異。謂過去佛律儀所從諸有情境，設今猶在，釋迦牟尼從彼境上亦得律儀。然無此理，釋迦如來、應、正等覺律儀所從諸有情境，設當在者，慈氏如來從彼境上亦得律儀。然無此理，故說等言亦無有失（此第三師意。前後佛所發戒境各別不同，如一有情前年住現在蘊，與今年住現在蘊，體各別故，前佛戒境至於後佛必無此理。假設至今亦能發戒，以力停故名之為等。今論主同第三釋也）。」又次下文云「此中有說：彼七支戒，一一於一切有情處得，而所得是一（云云。同前第一師）有說：此七支戒，一一於一切有情處得，而所得各異。如有情數量，所得戒亦爾（此師所說一一有情各得七支，三善根同。是第二師也）。有餘師說：別解脫律儀，隨因差別成二十一。此中有說：二十一種，一一於一切有情處得，而所得不異（云云）。有說：此二十一種，一一於一切有情處得，而所得各異。如有情數量，所得戒亦爾（已上三牒說，皆無評文也）。」下文又云「問：有於外物中得律儀不？若有得者，所得律儀應有增、減。謂生草枯時、酒味壞時應減，即彼生時、熟時應增（云云）。如是說者，於外法中亦得律儀。問：若爾，律儀應有增、減。答：無增、減、以總得故。謂此律儀總於一切生草等上得一無表、而世間無有無生草等時。總於一切蒲桃等酒、則不壞時得一無表。世間無有無諸酒時、是故律儀無有增、減。」准此評文，故知一切有情上同發七支為正。又准道理，此說為正。所以得知？且如眾生無邊，即有無邊七支無表。此等無表非俱有因，各別四大所造。一念戒體既無邊故，能造四大又多於戒、是對礙法，如何六尺之身容爾所四大？故知總發於理為善。

The treatise says: "Because for all Buddhas... there is no fault of deficiency relative to the former."
This is the answer. *Vibhāṣā* 120 says: "Question: If the prātimokṣa-saṃvara is acquired only in relation to present sentient beings and not in relation to past or future aggregates, elements, and sense-spheres, then the saṃvara of the Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas would not be equal. Why is that? When the Buddhas of the past appeared in the world, immeasurable sentient beings served as the object of their saṃvara. Those classes of sentient beings have already entered nirvāṇa, and Śākyamuni does not acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects." Now we explain: when Śākyamuni Buddha appeared in the world, immeasurable sentient beings served as the object of his saṃvara. Those classes of sentient beings have already entered nirvāṇa, and Maitreya Tathāgata will not acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. The objects having breadth and narrowness, the saṃvara would likewise be so. Would not the saṃvara of the Buddhas then be unequal? (This is the objection from the master who holds that precepts are generated individually.) "Answer: It should be said: Although the objective spheres of the saṃvara are more or fewer, the essence of the saṃvara does not differ between earlier and later, because in both cases it is generated and acquired collectively in relation to the objective sphere of all sentient beings. (This is the first master, who answers that the objects differ while the precepts are identical.) Some say: There is no fault even if the saṃvara of the Tathāgatas of the three periods of time are unequal. Question: If so, how do you reconcile what the *Prajñaptiśāstra* says? As it says there: 'All Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas are all entirely equal.' Answer: They are called equal because of equality in three matters. First, equality in practice: that is, all Tathāgatas diligently practiced the four pāramitās over three incalculable eons in the past to ultimate perfection and attained bodhi. Second, equality in benefit: that is, all Tathāgatas equally perform actions that benefit and gladden immeasurable sentient beings who are fit to be converted, and this is ultimate. Third, equality in the Dharma-body: that is, all Tathāgatas possess the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three applications of mindfulness, great compassion, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and other supreme virtues. It is because of these three meanings that they are spoken of as equal; it does not mean that there is no difference in the quantity of the essence of their saṃvara. Furthermore, they are spoken of as equal because of the equality of their faculties, since all Tathāgatas abide in superior faculties. Furthermore, because of the equality of precepts, all Tathāgatas acquire superior precepts. This refers to distinct sentient beings, with the precepts also being distinct. Other masters say: All the saṃvara possessed by the Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas are acquired in relation to all sentient beings; therefore they are spoken of as equal, not that their essence is without difference. That is to say, if the objective spheres of all the sentient beings from which the past Buddhas derived their saṃvara were still present today, Śākyamuni would also acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. But this is impossible. If the objective spheres of all the sentient beings from which the saṃvara of Śākyamuni Tathāgata, Arhat, and Samyaksambuddha was derived were to still exist in the future, Maitreya Tathāgata would also acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. But this is impossible. Therefore, speaking of equality is also without fault. (This is the intent of the third master. The objects in relation to which precepts are generated by earlier and later Buddhas are distinct and different. Just as the aggregates of a single sentient being abiding in the present last year and those abiding in the present this year are different in essence, it is impossible that the objects of the precepts of an earlier Buddha should extend to a later Buddha. Hypothetically, if they persisted until now, they would also be able to generate precepts; and because their capacity is equivalent, they are termed equal. The author of the present treatise agrees with this third explanation.)" Further down, the text says: "In this regard, some say: Each of those seven branches of precepts is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, and that which is acquired is one (and so on; this is the same as the first master above). Some say: Each of those seven branches of precepts is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, but that which is acquired differs in each case; just as there are quantities of sentient beings, so too are the acquired precepts (what this master says is that seven branches are acquired individually for each single sentient being, while the three wholesome roots are identical; this is the second master). Other masters say: Depending on the differences in causes, the prātimokṣa-saṃvara becomes twenty-one kinds. Here, some say: Each of the twenty-one kinds is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, and that which is acquired does not differ (and so on). Some say: Each of the twenty-one kinds is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, but that which is acquired differs in each case; just as there are quantities of sentient beings, so too are the acquired precepts (the above three presentations are all without a definitive assessment in the text)." Further down, the text says: "Question: Is saṃvara acquired in relation to external things? If it is acquired, the acquired saṃvara should increase and decrease: that is, when live grass withers or when the taste of liquor spoils, it should decrease; and when that very [grass] sprouts or [liquor] ferments, it should increase (and so on). The correct opinion is: Saṃvara is also acquired in relation to external phenomena. Question: If so, saṃvara should increase and decrease. Answer: There is neither increase nor decrease, because it is acquired collectively. That is, this saṃvara acquires a single non-informative [form] collectively in relation to all growing grass and the like, and in the world there is never a time without growing grass and the like. It acquires a single non-informative [form] collectively in relation to all grape wine and the like when it has not spoiled; and in the world there is never a time without wines; therefore saṃvara has neither increase nor decrease." In accordance with this definitive assessment, we know that the simultaneous generation of the seven branches in relation to all sentient beings is the correct view. Furthermore, in accordance with reasoning, this explanation is correct. How do we know this? For instance, if sentient beings are boundless, there would be boundless non-informative forms of the seven branches. These non-informative forms are not coexistence-causes (*sahabhū-hetu*), and each is created by distinct great elements. Since the precept-essence in a single thought-moment would be boundless, the creating great elements would also be more numerous than the precepts; and these are obstructive phenomena (*pratigha-dharma*): how could a six-foot body accommodate so many great elements? Therefore, we know that generating them collectively is sound in principle.