俱舍論疏 19.108

19.108

論「有太過失至皆迷苦故」，自此已下有其四難：一太過失難、二無別相難、三即執見疑難、四集滅邪見難。此即第一太過失難。迷苦諦故是見苦斷，有太過失。五部所斷緣有漏惑，皆迷苦故，應皆見苦斷。《正理》救云「唯見苦所斷，緣牛戒等故。但計麁果為彼因故，由此已遮經主所難迷苦諦故有太過失，緣有漏惑皆迷苦故。以非一切緣有漏惑，皆以苦果為所緣故，如何得有太過失耶？」有人敘《俱舍》釋云：苦下戒禁緣有漏，即於果處生。餘有漏惑亦於有漏，寧非果處起？今詳此是重述前難，此破未得《正理論》意。且如集下邪見，尋苦因謗，雖緣有漏非迷苦果，如何例同緣牛戒等？又《正理》釋云「若違見道強，則見道所斷。」此意欲說牛戒等但迷苦果即計為道，不尋餘義。非如計迷道邪見為如理覺，此即先由執餘為清淨因。今將無道為如理覺，此雖所緣是其苦諦，迷道諦義強，非見苦斷。《正理》既言但計麁果為彼因故，已遮餘斷更兼異義，因何難令兼其餘義惑同但計麁果惑耶？

[As for] the Śāstra's [statement]: "There would be the excessive fault [...] because they are all deluded regarding suffering": from here on down there are four objections: first, the objection of excessive fault; second, the objection of no distinctive characteristic; third, the objection of clinging directly to view and doubt; fourth, the objection of wrong views regarding arising and cessation. This is the first: the objection of excessive fault. If [something] is abandoned by seeing suffering because of delusion regarding the truth of suffering, there would be an excessive fault. The defilements taking the contaminated as cognitive object that are abandoned by the five categories are all deluded regarding suffering, so they should all be abandoned by seeing suffering. The Nyāyānusāra rescues [this, saying]: "It is abandoned solely by seeing suffering because it takes the bovine vows and the like as its cognitive object. It is because one merely conceives a gross effect to be their cause; by this, the objection of the Master of the Sūtras—that there is an excessive fault because of delusion regarding the truth of suffering since all defilements taking the contaminated as cognitive object are deluded regarding suffering—is already refuted. For not all defilements taking the contaminated as cognitive object take the effect of suffering as their cognitive object; how could there be an excessive fault?" Someone, narrating an explanation of the Kośa, says: The rules and vows under suffering take the contaminated as cognitive object, which arises right at the locus of the effect. Other contaminated defilements are also regarding the contaminated; why would they not arise at the locus of the effect? Now, examining this: this is a restatement of the earlier objection; this refutation fails to grasp the intention of the Nyāyānusāra. Consider, for instance, the wrong view under arising: it investigates the cause of suffering and slanders it; although it takes the contaminated as its cognitive object, it is not deluded regarding the effect of suffering; how could it be analogized to taking the bovine vows and the like as its cognitive object? Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra explains: "If it strongly contradicts the seeing of the path, it is abandoned by seeing the path." This intention means: regarding the bovine vows and the like, one is merely deluded regarding the effect of suffering and thereupon conceives it as the path, without investigating other meanings. It is not like conceiving the wrong view that is deluded regarding the path to be correct discernment; this is due first to clinging to another as the cause of purification. Now, taking the absence of the path as correct discernment: although its cognitive object is the truth of suffering, the sense in which it is deluded regarding the truth of the path is stronger, so it is not abandoned by seeing suffering. Since the Nyāyānusāra already said that it is because one merely conceives a gross effect to be their cause, it has already precluded other abandonments that additionally involve different meanings; why then raise an objection requiring that defilements involving those other meanings be the same as those that merely conceive a gross effect?