俱舍論疏 19.138

19.138

論「於劣於等至總說為慢」，《正理論》云「豈不此二俱於境中如實而轉，不應成慢。方劣言勝、方等言等，稱量而知，何失名慢？於可愛事心生愛染，如實而轉，如何成貪？此既耽求諸可意事，無有顛倒，應非煩惱。然由此起能染惱心，既許成貪，是煩惱性。如是雖實勝、劣處生，而能令心高舉染惱，名慢煩惱。於理何失？故先略述慢總相中說，託有、非有二俱容起慢，如於處、非處憤恚俱名瞋。」

On the Śāstra's words, "Toward the inferior, toward the equal ... it is generally called pride": The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Would not these two both operate in accord with reality regarding the object, so they should not constitute pride? When, relative to the inferior, one says one is superior, or relative to the equal, one says one is equal, knowing this through appraisal, how could it wrongly be called pride? [Answer:] When an affectionate attachment arises in the mind toward lovely matters, operating in accord with reality, how does it constitute greed? Since this is an indulgence in seeking pleasing matters and contains no inversion, it ought not to be a defilement. Yet, because that which arises from this can taint and distress the mind, it is conceded to constitute greed and is by nature a defilement. Likewise, although pride arises with respect to what is truly superior or inferior, because it can cause the mind to be exalted, tainted, and distressed, it is called the defilement of pride. What flaw is there in this principle? Therefore, in the earlier brief presentation of the general characteristic of pride, it was stated that pride can arise relying on both the existent and the non-existent, just as anger arising toward the proper object or the improper object is alike called aversion (dveṣa)."