俱舍論疏 19.86

19.86

論「謂於前際至諸見未斷」者，引《梵網經》六十二見中全常、一分常等，證凡夫不斷見惑所以。為證者，六十二見中前際分別中十八，謂四遍常論、四一分常論、二無因生論、四有邊等論、四不死憍亂論。後際分別見有四十四，謂十六有想論、八無想論、八非有想非無想論、七斷滅論、五現法涅槃論。依過去起分別見名前際，依未來起分別見名後際，依現在世不定。或是過去後故名後，未來前故名前。四遍常論者，一由憶劫，謂由能憶一壞成劫，或二、或三，乃至八、十，彼便執我、世間俱常。二由憶生，謂由能憶一生，或二、或三，乃至、百、千生事。彼便執我、世間俱常。三由見死生，謂由天眼見諸有情死時生時諸蘊相續，由斯便執我及世間俱常。四由尋、伺，謂由如是虛妄尋、伺，執我、世間俱常住。此四遍常，常見為性。四一分常者，一由大梵，謂從梵世來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，作如是執：我等皆是大梵天王化作，梵王能化在彼常住，我等所化故是無常。二由大種或心，謂聞大梵說大種或心隨一是常，便作是執：我以大梵天王為量，世間一分常住、一分無常。三極戲忘念天，謂有先從戲忘天沒來生此間，由得宿住通故，便作是執：諸有不極遊戲忘失念者在彼常住，我等由極遊戲忘念，從彼處沒故是無常。四由意憤天，亦同上（是四一分常，亦常見為體）。二無因論者，一從無想沒來生此間，由得宿住通故，能憶出無想心及後諸位，而不能憶出心已前諸位，而作是言：我本無而起。二虛妄尋、伺，謂尋思之即身前位所受既皆能憶，前生若有彼所更事，即此身中亦應能憶；既不能憶，故知彼無。邪見攝也。等者，等取四有邊、四不死矯亂論。此上所有已離欲染，於欲界法起上見者，非色界惑緣欲界生，於欲界境已離貪故。「定是欲界諸見未斷」者，結證也。

Regarding the text stating, "Namely, with respect to the prior extreme... views have not been abandoned": this cites the sixty-two views from the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, such as complete eternalism and partial eternalism, to prove the reason why ordinary persons do not abandon the defilements of view. To serve as proof: among the sixty-two views, there are eighteen discriminations concerning the prior extreme (pūrvānta), namely: four doctrines of complete eternalism, four doctrines of partial eternalism, two doctrines of arising without a cause, four doctrines of finitude and infinitude, and four doctrines of evasive equivocations (amarāvikkhepa). There are forty-four views of discrimination concerning the posterior extreme (aparānta), namely: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilationism, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Discriminative views arising based on the past are called the prior extreme; discriminative views arising based on the future are called the posterior extreme; those based on the present are indeterminate, or they are called posterior because they are after the past, and called prior because they are before the future. As for the four doctrines of complete eternalism: first, by recollecting aeons (kalpa)—namely, through being able to recollect one aeon of destruction and formation, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; second, by recollecting lives—namely, through being able to recollect the events of one life, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand lives, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; third, by seeing death and rebirth—namely, through seeing with the divine eye the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and rebirth, one thereby clings that both the self and the world are eternal; fourth, by reasoning and investigating (vitarka-vicāra)—namely, through such false reasoning and investigation, one clings that both the self and the world are permanent and eternal. These four complete eternalisms take the view of permanence as their nature. As for the four partial eternalisms: first, through Great Brahmā—namely, having passed away from the Brahmā world and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of recollection of past dwellings, one holds such a clinging: 'We were all created through transformation by the Great Brahmā King; Brahmā the King, being able to create, abides there eternally, while we, being what was created, are therefore impermanent'; second, through the great elements or the mind—namely, hearing the Great Brahmā say that either the great elements or the mind is eternal, one then holds this clinging: 'Taking the Great Brahmā King as the measure, one part of the world is permanent and eternal, and one part is impermanent'; third, the gods corrupted by play (krīḍāpradūṣika)—namely, having previously died from the gods corrupted by play and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one then holds this clinging: 'Those who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness abide there eternally; we, through excessive play and loss of mindfulness, died from that place and are therefore impermanent'; fourth, through the gods corrupted by mind (manaḥpradūṣika), which is also the same as above (these four partial eternalisms likewise take the view of permanence as their essence). As for the two doctrines of causelessness (ahetuvāda): first, having died from the non-conceptual [realm] and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one can recollect the state of mind emerging from non-conceptualization and the subsequent states, but cannot recollect the states prior to emerging from that mind, and thus says: 'I arose originally from nonexistence'; second, false reasoning and investigating—namely, investigating that since one can recollect all the experiences undergone in prior states within this very life, if there were things experienced in a prior life, one should also be able to recollect them within this very life; since one cannot recollect them, one therefore knows they do not exist. These are subsumed under wrong view. 'Et cetera' includes the four doctrines of finitude and the four doctrines of evasive equivocations. If those who have already departed from desire for lust raise these above views with regard to desire-realm phenomena, it is not that form-realm defilements arise with the desire realm as their object, because they have already departed from greed regarding the desire-realm sphere. 'It is certain that the views of the desire realm have not been abandoned' is the concluding proof.