俱舍論疏 19.86

19.86

Regarding the text stating, "Namely, with respect to the prior extreme... views have not been abandoned": this cites the sixty-two views from the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, such as complete eternalism and partial eternalism, to prove the reason why ordinary persons do not abandon the defilements of view. To serve as proof: among the sixty-two views, there are eighteen discriminations concerning the prior extreme (pūrvānta), namely: four doctrines of complete eternalism, four doctrines of partial eternalism, two doctrines of arising without a cause, four doctrines of finitude and infinitude, and four doctrines of evasive equivocations (amarāvikkhepa). There are forty-four views of discrimination concerning the posterior extreme (aparānta), namely: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilationism, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Discriminative views arising based on the past are called the prior extreme; discriminative views arising based on the future are called the posterior extreme; those based on the present are indeterminate, or they are called posterior because they are after the past, and called prior because they are before the future. As for the four doctrines of complete eternalism: first, by recollecting aeons (kalpa)—namely, through being able to recollect one aeon of destruction and formation, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; second, by recollecting lives—namely, through being able to recollect the events of one life, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand lives, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; third, by seeing death and rebirth—namely, through seeing with the divine eye the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and rebirth, one thereby clings that both the self and the world are eternal; fourth, by reasoning and investigating (vitarka-vicāra)—namely, through such false reasoning and investigation, one clings that both the self and the world are permanent and eternal. These four complete eternalisms take the view of permanence as their nature. As for the four partial eternalisms: first, through Great Brahmā—namely, having passed away from the Brahmā world and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of recollection of past dwellings, one holds such a clinging: 'We were all created through transformation by the Great Brahmā King; Brahmā the King, being able to create, abides there eternally, while we, being what was created, are therefore impermanent'; second, through the great elements or the mind—namely, hearing the Great Brahmā say that either the great elements or the mind is eternal, one then holds this clinging: 'Taking the Great Brahmā King as the measure, one part of the world is permanent and eternal, and one part is impermanent'; third, the gods corrupted by play (krīḍāpradūṣika)—namely, having previously died from the gods corrupted by play and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one then holds this clinging: 'Those who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness abide there eternally; we, through excessive play and loss of mindfulness, died from that place and are therefore impermanent'; fourth, through the gods corrupted by mind (manaḥpradūṣika), which is also the same as above (these four partial eternalisms likewise take the view of permanence as their essence). As for the two doctrines of causelessness (ahetuvāda): first, having died from the non-conceptual [realm] and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one can recollect the state of mind emerging from non-conceptualization and the subsequent states, but cannot recollect the states prior to emerging from that mind, and thus says: 'I arose originally from nonexistence'; second, false reasoning and investigating—namely, investigating that since one can recollect all the experiences undergone in prior states within this very life, if there were things experienced in a prior life, one should also be able to recollect them within this very life; since one cannot recollect them, one therefore knows they do not exist. These are subsumed under wrong view. 'Et cetera' includes the four doctrines of finitude and the four doctrines of evasive equivocations. If those who have already departed from desire for lust raise these above views with regard to desire-realm phenomena, it is not that form-realm defilements arise with the desire realm as their object, because they have already departed from greed regarding the desire-realm sphere. 'It is certain that the views of the desire realm have not been abandoned' is the concluding proof.