俱舍論疏 21.140
俱舍論疏 21.140
- Language
- Classical Chinese
21.140
論「根本靜慮至未至果故」,此第二釋靜慮根本果也。就中有二:一述正義、二述妙音義。此述正義也。依婆沙宗,上地道不許斷下惑,下能斷上。依根本靜慮唯斷上界惑,不斷欲惑。其得修諸道,若依未至,見道能修三界見道斷治,不修修道欲斷治也。若依根本四靜慮,皆通修上二界斷治,以同治故;不修欲界見、修斷治,以非同治故。所得無為得,繫屬斷治道故。所以靜慮根本唯五遍知。《正理》五十六云「豈不依止根本靜慮入見諦時,亦修未來;依未至地欲斷治道,得斷治故,亦應證彼欲見斷法斷無漏離繫得。寧說根本唯得五果?此責不然。爾時所修依未至地斷對治者,唯色、無色斷對治故。根本地道既不能為欲斷對治,彼現起位如何能修欲斷治道?由彼所修未至斷治,唯治上界,故果唯五。」《婆沙》六十三云「問:幾是根本靜慮果?答:五,謂第二、第四、第六及後二。有說:第二、第四及後三為五。」《婆沙》無評,何者為正?此論同何?有人解云:前師所以說得第六不說第七者,據全得彼第六體故。後師所以言得第七不言第六者,據能得彼第七名故。且奪第六與第七名,五下分中雖於欲界見、修所斷不得遍知,能斷上界見斷三結。總相而言五中得三,以少從多,得第七名。若作此解,各據一義並不相違。《俱舍》說五,或同《婆沙》前師、或同《婆沙》後師,文不別顯,隨同無失。今詳此釋未成分別。《婆沙》自有分明評文,《正理》、《俱舍》亦有明文,因何浪釋?《婆沙》六十三成就遍知中云「問:獨覺學位為成就幾?答:部行喻者,如聲聞說。麟角喻者,如菩薩說。」此與《正理》不同。《正理》同聲聞,不同菩薩,無超越道故。論意各別,不應和合。必若欲釋,應云:麟喻獨覺有其二類,一猛利根、一少鈍於上。於猛利根者如菩薩說、少劣上者起次第道。又云「問:菩薩見聖位成就幾耶?答:有多說。一云:如預流向。一說:見斷中唯得色、無色苦、集、滅二遍知,不得欲界三遍知。又問:菩薩何時得色愛盡遍知?一說:道類智位即得。更有兩解。評曰:不應作是說,無一念頃得果、向故。應作是說:菩薩聖位決定不得色、無色界見道斷法斷遍知及色愛盡遍知,總集遍知故,無容修彼斷對治故。」准此評家,依根本地得五下分結盡遍知集遍智故。此即是《婆沙》評家以後說為正。《正理》五十六得捨中云「超越人若依未至,捨五得一,謂五下分結盡。若依根本,捨二得一,謂五下分結盡。」准此,《正理》同《婆沙》評家,亦以後師道為正,及許見道忍果得五下分結盡遍知也。《俱舍》得捨中云「超越人捨五得一,謂五下分結盡遍知。」《正理》云「應言依未至定,捨五得一,以依根本捨二得一故。」准此,《俱舍》許見道及忍果亦得五下分結盡遍知,亦以後說為正。此即是文。憑何文意,以前說亦得為正?又於此時具二緣故定集遍知,不應此時得第六遍知。此即是理。故知前師全無理趣。忍果、智果、見道果、修道果二說,容據次第、超越義別。靜慮根本果,前師定非,無異端故。此是得體不盡,非是得名不得體也。此如超越二果,不得前六品修道無為,及依根本地得阿那含果,後得阿羅漢果時,皆得體不盡。豈是得名不得體耶?由此論中亦應二說。此既不爾,彼云何然?《婆沙》六十三云「問:若已離色染入正性離生者,彼何時得色愛盡遍知?一說:道類智時。評曰:不應作是說,非住果時名住向故。有說:彼後若離空無邊處染,爾時乃得色愛盡遍知,謂彼爾時修未來無漏諸靜慮地彼斷對治故。彼亦不應作如是說,爾時但修未來無漏諸靜慮地,無色對治非色對治故。又說:得阿羅漢果,金剛喻定現在前時乃得此色愛盡遍知。彼亦不應作如是說,爾時諸斷總集為一,名一切結盡遍知。如何說得色愛盡遍知?應作是說:彼定從果起勝進道現在前時,方乃得此色愛盡遍知。若不許彼決定從果起勝果道現在前者,諸已離第三靜慮染,依下地入正性離生道類智時得第三果。既不起勝果道現在前,彼若命終生第四靜慮或無色界,應不成就無漏樂根。若爾,便違十門納息。如說:誰成就樂根?答:若生遍淨、若生遍淨下、若聖者生遍淨上。勿有此失,故必應許諸得果已,彼定從果起勝果道,爾時方名得色愛盡遍知。」
On the Śāstra's statement: "Fundamental dhyānas... up to... because they are fruits of the anāgamya": this is the second explanation, concerning the fruits of the fundamental dhyānas. Within this, there are two parts: first, stating the correct doctrine; second, stating the doctrine of Ghoṣaka. This presents the correct doctrine. According to the Vibhāṣā school, a path of a higher stage is not permitted to sever the defilements of a lower stage; a lower stage can sever those of a higher. Relying on a fundamental dhyāna, one severs only the defilements of the higher realms, not those of the desire realm. As for the paths cultivated by acquisition: if one relies on the anāgamya, the path of seeing can cultivate the counteragents that sever [the defilements] of the three realms to be abandoned by seeing, but does not cultivate the counteragents to sever the desire-realm [defilements] to be abandoned by cultivation. If one relies on the four fundamental dhyānas, all can cultivate generally the counteragents that sever [the defilements of] the two higher realms, because they share the same counteragent; they do not cultivate the counteragents that sever the desire-realm defilements to be abandoned by seeing or cultivation, because they do not share the same counteragent. The acquisitions of unconditioned states that are obtained are tied to the paths that act as counteragents that sever [defilements]. Therefore, the fundamental dhyānas have only five comprehensive knowledges. The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle fifty-six, states: "Would it not follow that when one enters into the seeing of the truths relying on a fundamental dhyāna, one also cultivates the future [paths]; and because one obtains counteragents that sever defilements relying on the path of the anāgamya stage that acts as a counteragent severing desire-realm [defilements], one should also realize the anāsrava acquisition of disjunction through the abandonment of the desire-realm dharmas to be abandoned by seeing? Why then say that the fundamental [dhyānas] obtain only five fruits? This objection is incorrect. At that time, the counteragents that sever defilements relying on the anāgamya stage which are cultivated are solely counteragents that sever [the defilements of] the form and formless realms. Since a path of a fundamental stage cannot serve as a counteragent severing desire-realm [defilements], when it is currently present, how could it cultivate a path that severs desire-realm defilements? Because the counteragents of the anāgamya which are cultivated counter only the higher realms, the fruits are only five." The Vibhāṣā, fascicle sixty-three, states: "Question: How many are the fruits of the fundamental dhyānas? Answer: Five, namely the second, the fourth, the sixth, and the last two. Some say: The second, the fourth, and the last three make five." The Vibhāṣā provides no critical verdict; which one is correct? With which one does this Śāstra agree? Someone explained: The reason the former master speaks of obtaining the sixth and does not speak of the seventh is based on obtaining the actual entity of that sixth in full. The reason the latter master speaks of obtaining the seventh and does not speak of the sixth is based on being able to obtain the designation of that seventh: taking away the designation of the sixth and conferring that of the seventh, because although among the five lower fetters one does not obtain comprehensive knowledge regarding what is to be abandoned by seeing and cultivation in the desire realm, one can sever the three fetters to be abandoned by seeing in the higher realms; speaking in general terms, one obtains three out of five, and following the majority with the minority, it receives the designation of the seventh. If interpreted in this way, each is based on a single rationale and they do not contradict each other. When the Kośa speaks of five, it either agrees with the former master of the Vibhāṣā or with the latter master; the text does not specifically distinguish them, so following either entails no error. Now examining this explanation, it has not yet achieved a sound distinction. The Vibhāṣā itself has an explicit verdict text, and the Nyāyānusāra and Kośa also have clear texts—why explain it arbitrarily? The Vibhāṣā, fascicle sixty-three, in the section on the possession of comprehensive knowledge, states: "Question: For a pratyekabuddha in the stage of a learner, how many does he possess? Answer: For those like a herd, it is as explained for the śrāvaka. For the rhinoceros-horn-like ones, it is as explained for the bodhisattva." This differs from the Nyāyānusāra. The Nyāyānusāra equates them with śrāvakas and not with bodhisattvas, because they lack the path of skipping stages. The intentions of the treatises are distinct and should not be harmonized. If one must explain it, one should say: Rhinoceros-like pratyekabuddhas are of two kinds: one of sharp faculties, and one slightly duller than the former. For those of sharp faculties, it is as explained for bodhisattvas; for those slightly inferior to the former, they produce the sequential path. It also states: "Question: How many does a bodhisattva possess in the noble stage of seeing? Answer: There are multiple explanations. One says: Like a candidate for stream-enterer. Another says: Among those abandoned by seeing, he only obtains the two comprehensive knowledges of suffering, origin, and cessation of the form and formless realms, and does not obtain the three comprehensive knowledges of the desire realm. It is also asked: When does a bodhisattva obtain the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form? One says: He obtains it at the moment of the subsequent cognition of the path. There are two further explanations. Verdict: One should not speak in this way, for within a single thought-moment one cannot obtain both fruit and path of candidacy. One should rather say: In the noble stage, a bodhisattva definitely does not obtain the comprehensive knowledge of the abandonment of dharmas to be abandoned by the path of seeing in the form and formless realms, nor the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form, because the comprehensive knowledges are gathered into one, and there is no scope to cultivate those counteragents of abandonment." In accordance with this evaluator, relying on the fundamental stage, one obtains the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of the five lower fetters because comprehensive knowledges are aggregated. This means that the evaluator in the Vibhāṣā takes the latter explanation as correct. The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle fifty-six, in the section on acquisition and relinquishment, states: "For a person who skips stages, if he relies on the anāgamya, he relinquishes five and obtains one, namely the exhaustion of the five lower fetters. If he relies on a fundamental [dhyāna], he relinquishes two and obtains one, namely the exhaustion of the five lower fetters." In accordance with this, the Nyāyānusāra agrees with the Vibhāṣā's evaluator, likewise taking the latter master's path as correct, and also accepts that the fruit of patience in the path of seeing obtains the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of the five lower fetters. The Kośa, in the section on acquisition and relinquishment, states: "A person who skips stages relinquishes five and obtains one, namely the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of the five lower fetters." The Nyāyānusāra says: "One should say that relying on the anāgamya absorption, one relinquishes five and obtains one, because relying on the fundamental, one relinquishes two and obtains one." In accordance with this, the Kośa accepts that the path of seeing and the fruit of patience also obtain the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of the five lower fetters, likewise taking the latter explanation as correct. This is the text. On what textual intent could the former explanation also be taken as correct? Furthermore, at this time, because two conditions are present, the comprehensive knowledges are definitely aggregated; one should not obtain the sixth comprehensive knowledge at this time. This is the reasoning. Therefore, we know that the former master is completely devoid of rational principle. The two explanations regarding the fruit of patience, the fruit of cognition, the fruit of the path of seeing, and the fruit of the path of cultivation can allow for distinctions based on the sequential and skipping-stage perspectives. For the fruit of the fundamental dhyāna, the former master is definitively incorrect, as there is no different alternative. This is a case where the entity is obtained incompletely, not that the designation is obtained without obtaining the entity. This is like the two fruits achieved through skipping stages, where one does not obtain the unconditioned states of the first six grades of the path of cultivation; and when, relying on the fundamental stage, one obtains the fruit of anāgāmin and later obtains the fruit of arhat, in all such cases the entity is obtained incompletely. How could it be that the designation is obtained without obtaining the entity? Because of this, there should also be two explanations in this treatise. Since this is not so, how could that be the case? The Vibhāṣā, fascicle sixty-three, states: "Question: If one who has already abandoned attachment to form enters into the determination of correctness, when does he obtain the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form? One explanation says: At the time of the subsequent cognition of the path. Verdict: One should not speak in this way, for one abiding in the fruit is not called one abiding in the path of candidacy. Another says: Later, if he abandons attachment to the sphere of infinite space, he only then obtains the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form, because at that time he cultivates in the future the anāsrava counteragents of its abandonment of all dhyāna stages. One should not speak in this way either, for at that time he only cultivates the counteragents of the formless realm across the future anāsrava dhyāna stages, not the counteragents of form. Another says: When he obtains the fruit of arhat and the diamond-like samādhi is directly present before him, he only then obtains this comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form. One should not speak in this way either, for at that time all abandonments are aggregated into one, termed the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of all fetters; how could one speak of obtaining the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form? One should rather say: Only when he definitely arises from the fruit and brings the path of superior progress directly before him does he obtain this comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form. If one does not accept that he definitely arises from the fruit and brings the path of superior fruit directly before him, then for all those who have already abandoned attachment to the third dhyāna, relying on a lower stage to enter the determination of correctness, at the moment of the subsequent cognition of the path they obtain the third fruit; since they would not bring the path of superior fruit directly before them, if they were to die and be reborn in the fourth dhyāna or the formless realm, they would not possess the anāsrava faculty of pleasure. If so, that would contradict the 'Ten Gates Chapter', which says: 'Who possesses the faculty of pleasure? Answer: Those born in Śubhakṛtsna, those born below Śubhakṛtsna, or noble ones born above Śubhakṛtsna.' To avoid this fault, one must definitely accept that once they have obtained the fruit, they definitely arise from the fruit and produce the path of superior fruit; only at that time is it termed obtaining the comprehensive knowledge of the exhaustion of attachment to form."
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- 俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese