俱舍論疏 21.66

21.66

論「若諸地中至故不別說」，重廣述也。初禪有四識，受有喜、樂、捨。喜意，樂三，捨通二禪已上唯有意識。二禪有喜、捨二受，三禪有樂、捨二受，四禪已上唯有捨受。上地煩惱，隨其所應通四識一識，即與彼識所有諸受相應。《顯宗》二十七云「何緣二疑俱不決定，而上得與喜、樂相應？非欲界疑，喜受俱起。以諸煩惱在離欲地，雖不決定亦不憂慼，雖懷疑網，無廢情怡。如在人間求得所愛，雖多勞倦而生樂想。又說色界喜、樂與疑得相應者，俱寂靜故，依平等義建立相應。既等寂靜，相應無失。如欲喜根，非處生故，相不寂靜。疑即不然，由此喜、疑無相應理。謂世現見，有貧賤人，乃至匱食乏衣，復為重擔之所鎮壓。雖遭此等種種艱辛，而有歡娛歌舞嘯詠，或見他苦而反生歡。如是喜根有非處起，疑即不爾，故無等義。由不等故，無相應理。有說：色界雖復懷疑，而於疑中生善品相，故彼得與喜、樂相應。謂彼現見，諸離欲者多分因疑能引正定。有說：初、二、三靜慮中與疑俱生，應全無受，故但應與本性受俱。」

On the passage in the treatise, "If in the various stages ... therefore they are not separately stated": this further elaborates in full. In the first dhyāna there are four consciousnesses, and the feelings are mental pleasure, physical pleasure, and equanimity: mental pleasure belongs to the mind, physical pleasure belongs to three [sensory consciousnesses], and equanimity is common to all. From the second dhyāna upward there is only mental consciousness. In the second dhyāna there are the two feelings of mental pleasure and equanimity; in the third dhyāna there are the two feelings of physical pleasure and equanimity; in the fourth dhyāna and above there is only the feeling of equanimity. The defilements of the upper stages, according to what is appropriate, pertain to four consciousnesses or to one consciousness, and are associated with all feelings possessed by those consciousnesses. Fascicle twenty-seven of the Xianzong lun states: "For what reason are both kinds of doubt indeterminate, yet above, [doubt] can be associated with mental and physical pleasure, whereas doubt in the desire realm does not arise together with the feeling of mental pleasure? Because defilements in a stage free from desire, although indeterminate, are also free from sorrow and grief; although harboring a net of doubt, this does not hinder delight of mind. Just as in the human realm, when seeking and obtaining what one desires, although experiencing much fatigue, an idea of pleasure arises. Furthermore, it is said that mental and physical pleasure in the form realm can be associated with doubt because both are tranquil; association is established based on the meaning of equality. Since they are equally tranquil, there is no error in association. By contrast, the faculty of mental pleasure in desire arises in improper situations, so its character is not tranquil. Doubt is not like that, and hence there is no principle for mental pleasure and doubt to be associated. That is, it is observed in the world that there are poor and lowly people, lacking food and clothing, and furthermore weighed down by heavy burdens; although encountering such various hardships, they still have merriment, singing, dancing, and chanting, or seeing another's suffering, they contrarily produce joy. Thus, the faculty of mental pleasure can arise in improper situations, but doubt does not do so, so there is no meaning of equality. Because they are not equal, there is no principle for association. Some say: 'Although one harbors doubt in the form realm, within doubt the appearance of wholesome factors arises; therefore, it can be associated with mental and physical pleasure. That is, it is observed that for those who are free from desire, doubt can mostly lead to correct absorption.' Some say: 'In the first, second, and third dhyānas, arising together with doubt, there should be no feeling at all; therefore, it should only be accompanied by the feeling innate to the stage.'"