俱舍論疏 22.97

22.97

論「又下品受至如何應理」，第三顛倒過也。三受之中分明猛利唯苦、樂二，捨受闇昧。若下品苦現在前時，許是樂受即是分明；中品苦受現在前時，許是捨受即是闇昧。下受分明，中受闇昧，其義顛倒，故成過也。《正理論》云「執下分明，中翻闇昧，誰有智者能忍此執？」

On the Śāstra's statement, "Moreover, an inferior-grade sensation... how could it be reasonable?": This is the third fallacy, perversion. Among the three sensations, those that are distinct and vivid are only the two, pain and pleasure; neutral sensation is dull and obscure. If when an inferior-grade painful sensation is present, it is admitted to be a pleasant sensation, then it is distinct; when a middling painful sensation is present, it is admitted to be a neutral sensation, then it is dull and obscure. That the inferior sensation is distinct while the middling sensation is dull and obscure inverts the meaning, and therefore constitutes a fallacy. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Holding that the inferior is distinct while the middling is conversely dull and obscure—who that has wisdom could tolerate this thesis?"