俱舍論疏 23.139

23.139

論「若謂第二至已斷疑智」，牒計破也。《正理論》云「若苦法忍後即有苦類忍，與前忍果斷得俱生，餘位亦然。斯有何失？若爾，此位緣欲苦等，已斷疑智，應不得生。許此不生復有何過？於後修位，我已知苦等諸決定智應不得生，於苦等境中先未生智故。若於先位未有智生，後已知言便成無義。」

The Śāstra states: "If it were claimed that in the second... up to: cognition that has already severed doubt." Taking up their thesis and refuting it. The Nyāyānusāra states: "If immediately after the forbearance with the cognition of dharma regarding suffering there were the subsequent forbearance regarding suffering, arising simultaneously with the acquisition of the severing that is the fruit of the preceding forbearance, and likewise in the other stages, what flaw would there be? If so, in this stage, the cognition that takes desire and suffering as its object and has already severed doubt would not be able to arise. If you allow this not to arise, what further flaw is there? In the subsequent stage of cultivation, the determinate cognitions such as 'I have already known suffering' would not be able to arise, because no cognition had previously arisen regarding the objects such as suffering. If in the preceding stage no cognition had arisen, the subsequent words 'I have already known' would become meaningless."