俱舍論記 23.92

23.92

「若謂第二至已斷疑智」者，牒異計破。若謂初剎那苦法忍後，第二剎那苦類忍唯無間道，與欲界見苦所斷離繫得俱時而生，無解脫道，乃至道類忍應知亦爾。破云：則此現觀位中，於其彼彼四法忍境、四類忍境，應定不起已斷疑智。故《正理》云「苦法忍後即有苦類忍，與前忍果斷得俱生，餘位亦然。斯有何失？若爾，此位緣欲苦等已斷疑智應不得生。計此不生，復有何過？則於後修位，我已知苦等諸決定智應不得生，於苦等境中先未生智故。若於先位未有智生，後已知言便成無義。」

Regarding "If one claims that the second... the cognition of doubt having been abandoned": This takes up a rival thesis and refutes it. If one claims that after the receptivity to the dharma of suffering (duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānti) in the first moment, the subsequent receptivity to suffering (duḥkhe 'nvaya-jñāna-kṣānti) in the second moment is solely an unobstructed path, arising simultaneously with the possession of disjunction from what is abandoned by vision of suffering in the desire realm, without a path of liberation, and so on up to the subsequent receptivity to the path (mārge 'nvaya-jñāna-kṣānti), which should be known to be likewise: in refutation, it is said that in this stage of clear realization, with respect to the respective objects of the four receptivities to dharma and the four subsequent receptivities, the cognition of doubt having been abandoned would definitely not arise. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: "Immediately after the receptivity to the dharma of suffering there is the subsequent receptivity to suffering, which arises simultaneously with the possession of abandonment that is the fruit of the preceding receptivity; the other positions are also like this. What fault is there in this? [Answer:] If so, in this position the cognition of doubt having been abandoned regarding the suffering of the desire realm, etc., would not be able to arise. If you assume that this does not arise, what fault is there further? Then, in the subsequent stage of cultivation, the various decisive cognitions of 'I have known suffering,' etc., would not be able to arise, because no cognition had previously arisen regarding objects such as suffering. If in the preceding stage no cognition had arisen, then the subsequent statement 'I have known' would become meaningless."