俱舍論疏 6.225

6.225

論「若唯不生至豈不相違」，有部難經部也。若無別實物唯法不生是涅槃者，即唯是未來有不生法。如何經說能令過去、未來、現在眾苦永斷？此永斷體即是涅槃，故知於三世隨眠等斷證得無為是涅槃也。

[When] the treatise [states]: "If it is merely non-arising ... would it not be contradictory?" the Vaibhāṣika objects to the Sautrāntika: "If there is no separate, real entity, and merely the non-arising of dharmas is nirvāṇa, then non-arising dharmas would belong exclusively to the future. Why, then, does a sūtra state that it causes the suffering of the past, future, and present to be permanently severed? The entity of this permanent severance is precisely nirvāṇa; therefore, one knows that realizing the unconditioned upon the severance of latent defilements of the three times, and so forth, is nirvāṇa."