俱舍論疏 10
English (machine translation) 10
- Language
- English
10.1
Composed by Śramaṇa Fabao.
10.2
Chapter 3: Exposition of the World, Part 3
10.3
The treatise asks: "What is the meaning of ignorance?" From here below is the second major section, explaining the names and meanings of the twelve links. Within this, there are four parts: first, explaining ignorance; second, explaining name-and-form; third, explaining the link of contact; fourth, explaining the link of feeling. The remaining eight links are referred to other texts for explanation. Within the first, there are two parts: first, directly explaining its name; second, separately demonstrating that it possesses a substantial entity. Within the first part, there is first a question and then an answer. This is the question.
10.4
The treatise says: "It means its entity is not clarity." This is the answer. Within the answer there are three parts: the first two are indirect answers, and the last is a direct answer citing a verse. Within the indirect answers there are two: first, naming it "ignorance" because it is non-clarity; second, naming it "ignorance" because there is an absence of clarity. This is the former answer: the reason it is called ignorance is because it is non-clarity.
10.5
The treatise says: "If so, ignorance should be the eyes and the rest." This is an objection. If its entity being non-clarity is named ignorance, then the six sense faculties such as the eye, and the six sense fields such as visible form—excluding undefiled clarity—are all entities that are not clarity, and should therefore be named ignorance.
10.6
The treatise says: "In that case, this meaning should signify the absence of clarity." This is the second alternate explanation: because clarity is absent, it is named ignorance.
10.7
The treatise says: "If so, the entity of ignorance should not exist." This is a refutation. "If it is named ignorance because of the absence of clarity, then ignorance would have the absence of clarity as its nature"; if ignorance has the absence of clarity as its nature, then the entity of ignorance would not exist.
10.8
The treatise says: "To show that it has a substantial entity and its meaning is not confused with others." Below is the third part, directly explaining via the verse. "To show that it has a substantial entity" distinguishes it from the absence of clarity; "its meaning is not confused with others" distinguishes it from mere non-clarity.
10.9
The treatise states: "... not the non-existence of a friend." This presents analogies to illustrate. Within this there are three: first, giving the analogy of a friend and a non-friend; second, giving the analogy of the real and the unreal; third, using the word "and the rest" to encompass other analogies like unrighteousness and so forth. This is the first, friend and non-friend. Here, "non-friend" takes only an opposing enemy to be named "non-friend"; it is not that because its entity is not a friend, or different from a friend, that it is named non-friend, nor is it named non-friend because of the non-existence of a friend.
10.10
The treatise says: "Truthful speech is named real ... nor the non-existence of the real." This presents the second analogy.
10.11
The treatise says: "The word 'and the rest' is to show ... neither different nor non-existent." This presents the third analogy. "Unrighteousness" refers to unwholesome phenomena. "Non-benefit" refers to unwholesome benefit. "Non-affair" refers to unwholesome affairs, and so on. Because they are the direct antitheses of those phenomena, benefits, and affairs, they are not merely different from phenomena or the non-existence of phenomena.
10.12
The treatise says: "So it is with this ignorance ... neither different nor non-existent." This joins them to explain ignorance.
10.13
The treatise asks: "How is this known to be so?" This is a question. From here below is the second part, separately proving why it has a substantial entity, showing that its entity is not merely different from clarity nor the non-existence of clarity.
10.14
The treatise says: "Because it is spoken of as the condition for formations." This is an answer. Within the answer there are two parts: first, a brief answer; second, an extensive answer. This is the brief answer: because it is spoken of as the condition for formations. Since it is the condition for formations, one clearly knows that it is not all other phenomena different from clarity, nor is it devoid of substantial entity as the mere absence of clarity.
10.15
The treatise says: "There is further authoritative proof." Below, a one-line verse explains this extensively.
10.16
The treatise states: "... it is spoken of as ignorance." This explains the verse text. Within this there are three parts: first, proving it is not different from or the absence of clarity; second, proving it is not subsumed under bad discernment; third, proving it is not discernment other than views. This is the first part. Since ignorance is one fetter among the nine fetters, one bond among the three bonds, subsumed under one latent bias among the ten latent biases, one defiling outflow among the three defiling outflows, and one yoke and one torrent among the four yokes and four torrents, we know it is not other phenomena like the eye that are merely different from clarity, nor is it entirely non-existent like a rabbit's horns. Because it can be spoken of as an item such as a fetter, there is a distinct dharma that is spoken of as ignorance.
10.17
The treatise says: "Just as a bad wife ... should be named ignorance." This is the second part, proving it is not bad discernment. First there is a question, followed by an answer. This is the question.
10.18
The treatise says: "That is not ignorance ... hence it is not ignorance." This is the answer. Within bad discernment there is a portion of discernment that consists of the five views. Since among the nine fetters and the like there are distinct designations such as the fetter of views and the fetter of ignorance, we know that it is a view and not ignorance.
10.19
The treatise says: "If so, discernment other than views should be admitted to be ignorance." This is the third part. Within this, there is first a question, followed by an answer. This is the question.
10.20
The treatise says: "It is not so; ignorance ... because they are mutually associated." This is the answer. Within the answer there are two points: first, because ignorance is associated with views; second, because ignorance can taint discernment. This is the first point.
10.21
The treatise says: "Furthermore, it is said that ignorance ... being distinct from discernment, can taint it." This is the second point. Attachment can taint the mind; since attachment is not the mind, we know that ignorance tainting discernment is not itself discernment.
10.22
The treatise says: "Why not accept ... what principle does this contradict?" This is the Sautrāntika defense. The sūtra states: "Ignorance taints discernment; it is not necessarily associated. Various defiled discernments intermingle with wholesome discernment to render it impure, which is named 'tainting.'" What principle does this contradict? Just as attachment taints the mind and prevents it from being liberated, must it necessarily arise actively and be associated with the mind to be spoken of as able to taint? Since attachment is not fixed in that way, we know that ignorance is also not associated; intermingling with wholesome discernment is why it is called tainting discernment.
10.23
The treatise says: "Although it can again be countered ... this statement is good." The author of the treatise evaluates and accepts the Sarvāstivāda view. From this we know that the author does not cling rigidly to a single school, but adopts whichever reasoning is superior.
10.24
The treatise says: "Furthermore, some hold that all afflictions are ignorance." This relates a divergent position. The intention of this master is to state: all afflictions do not comprehend their objects, and thus are all ignorance.
10.25
The treatise says: "This too should be refuted similarly to the previous ... ignorance taints the mind." As in the previous refutations: if all afflictions were ignorance, first, among the fetters, bonds, latent biases, outflows, yokes, and the like, the fetter of ignorance and so on should not be mentioned separately; second, it should not be associated with views, attachment, anger, and the like, because views and the rest would themselves be ignorance, and a dharma cannot be associated with itself; third, or else it should also be said that ignorance taints the mind.
10.26
The treatise says: "If it is said that here it is spoken of in terms of differences." This cites the opponent's defense. The opponent defends that all afflictions are collectively named ignorance, while individually named attachment, anger, conceit, and so on. When the sūtra speaks of attachment tainting the mind without stating that ignorance can taint the mind, it speaks using the differentiated name, not the collective name.
10.27
The treatise says: "Then for tainting discernment, the collective name should not have been used." This is a counter-objection. The objection says: If attachment tainting the mind is spoken of using the differentiated name "attachment taints the mind," why is it that when tainting discernment is mentioned, it is spoken of using the collective name "ignorance taints discernment"?
10.28
The treatise says: "Since it is accepted that ignorance ... what is its characteristic?" The opponent asks.
10.29
The treatise says: "It means not understanding the truths, the jewels, actions, and their fruits." The author of the treatise answers.
10.30
The treatise says: "It has not yet been determined what characteristic ... as is spoken of ignorance." The opponent points out an error.
10.31
The treatise says: "This refers to a distinct dharma that is the antidote to understanding." The author of the treatise answers.
10.32
The treatise says: "It is still difficult to determine what its characteristic is." The opponent does not understand and asks.
10.33
The treatise says: "Things of this kind are naturally so ... its function alone can be discerned." The author of the treatise explains again.
10.34
The treatise says: "The venerable Dharmatrāta [states that it is] the clinging to the category of the 'I'." This presents an alternative theory. This venerable [master] states that ignorance is precisely what another sūtra calls the clinging to the category of the "I".
10.35
The treatise says: "Apart from the conceit 'I am' (asmimāna), what is the intrinsic nature of the category (vidhā)?" The author of the treatise questions the venerable master. Clinging to the category of the conceit "I am" is just the nine categories of conceit; these are precisely the varieties of the conceit "I am". Apart from the conceit "I am", what is the intrinsic nature of the category?
10.36
The treatise says: "A sūtra states, 'Now that I [have so known, have so seen...] ... distinct from the conceit "I am".'" This cites a sūtra to explain by analogy. "Having so known, having so seen"—this is what the Buddha himself stated: having so known the four noble truths, having so seen the four noble truths, which refers to the faculty of having known (ājñendriya) among the three untainted faculties, or the faculty of one who has fully known (ājñātāvīndriya). "All longings" (meaning all greed), "all views" (meaning the five views), "all categories" (meaning ignorance), "all graspings of 'I' and 'mine'" (the Nyāyānusāra states: "Because they are exceedingly grave, they are stated again"), "grasping of the conceit 'I am'" (the Nyāyānusāra states: "It subsumes all conceits"), "latent defilements (anuśaya)" (the Nyāyānusāra states: "This subsumes the two latent defilements of doubt and aversion"); "because of the comprehension through abandonment" (attaining the comprehension through the exhaustion of all fetters), "without shadow" (meaning without the acquisition of defilements, just like a shadow passing through empty space), "quenched and tranquil" (attaining nirvāṇa with remainder, since the Buddha had not yet entered nirvāṇa without remainder). Therefore we know that the category is distinct from the conceit "I am" (because it has already been stated separately from the conceit "I am").
10.37
The treatise says: "How is it known that the category is precisely ignorance?" The author of the treatise challenges. Although it is known that being stated separately means it is not the conceit "I am", how is it known that the category is precisely ignorance?
10.38
The treatise says: "Because it cannot be stated to be any other defilement." Although greed, conceit, views, and so forth have already been stated separately in the sūtra, doubt, aversion, delusion, and so forth are furthermore not categories, having already been stated among those latent defilements. Among the ten latent defilements, only ignorance has not been stated; it can only be stated to be ignorance, because it cannot be stated to be any other defilement.
10.39
The treatise says: "Could it not be stated [...] therefore we should stop for now." The author of the treatise raises an objection. Greed, views, and the conceit "I am", having been stated separately by the sūtra, cannot be stated to be greed, views, or the conceit "I am"; but since the other conceits, doubt, and aversion are not stated by the sūtra, how is it known that it is not the other conceits and so forth? "And so forth" means including the two afflictions of doubt and aversion. This is the intention of a different master. The author of the treatise relates it to raise an objection. How is this known? The Nyāyānusāra states: "Some say that the other conceits are subsumed under the category. What they say is incorrect, because the word 'all' flows through to the conceit 'I am'. The statement 'the grasping of the conceit "I am"' subsumes all conceits completely (the meaning is that because the word 'all' flows through to the conceit 'I am', it means 'all conceits'; since it says 'all conceits', we know it subsumes them completely), just as it should be with longing and so forth, each being completely exhaustive (because the word 'all' flows through into longing and so forth). However, here the predominant ones are stated separately: the graspings of 'I' and 'mine' are the root of all views, so within views two kinds are separately indicated (here the word 'all' flows into views, and in principle it should subsume all views completely; but because the views of 'I' and 'mine' are the root of all views and are predominant, they are restated). The word 'latent defilements' is stated in order to subsume doubt and aversion (although doubt and aversion are not explicitly named, they are subsumed under latent defilements); among the predominant defilements, ignorance has not yet been stated, so the word 'category' is stated in order to separately indicate it. Universally co-arising with afflictions (it is called 'category' because it accords with the differing characteristics of the various afflictions), and universally proceeding to the various destinies, it is therefore called 'category'. 'Category' has the meaning of 'proceeding'; being the substantial entity of the categories, it receives the name 'category-nature'." Now, evaluating this explanation of the Nyāyānusāra, it is merely the particular view of one school and lacks definitive proof. Just as it speaks of "latent defilements", how does one know definitively that it subsumes doubt and aversion, and does not subsume ignorance? When it says that "all" flows through, it asserts that the conceit "I am" subsumes the remaining six conceits. If one asserts that the conceit "I am" subsumes the other conceits, it should have simply said "conceit"; the sūtra should not have specifically designated it as "the conceit 'I am'", just as it spoke of "longing". If one asserts that because the conceit "I am" is superior it is specifically designated with the name "I", then one knows that stating "I" does not subsume the other conceits; just as with the views of "I" and "mine", under this word "view" the [other] four views are not subsumed. Searching forward and backward, it cannot resolve the objection of the author of the treatise.
10.40
The treatise says: "What is the meaning of nāmarūpa? [...] Now nāma should be explained." The following sentence is the second part, explaining nāma. The two factors of saṃskāra and vijñāna are explained elsewhere, so here nāma and rūpa are explained out of order.
10.41
"The treatise says: [...] Why is it called nāma?" This is a question. Why are the four skandhas called nāma when in reality they are not names?
10.42
The treatise says: "Because they bend towards objects in accordance with designations given [...] therefore they are called nāma." This is the answer. In the answer there are two parts: first an overarching answer, and then a specific explanation. This is the overarching answer. "Because they bend towards objects in accordance with designations given, therefore they are called nāma" refers directly to names. "Because they bend towards objects in accordance with the force of sense faculties and sense objects, therefore they are called nāma" means that the four skandhas resemble names, and are therefore called nāma. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The Buddha taught that the four immaterial skandhas are called nāma. Why are they called nāma? Because they can express and evoke, that is, they can express and evoke various intentional objects. If so, they should not completely subsume the immaterial, since non-associated dharmas have no intentional objects. This is not so; expressing and evoking occurs only in the immaterial, just as in the explanation of the name rūpa, what is stated is without fault. The Buddha taught that because of transformation and obstruction it is called rūpa; yet past, future, avijñapti, and subtle atoms, though without transformation and obstruction, obtain the name rūpa. Because within the immaterial there is no transformation and obstruction, transformation and obstruction is called rūpa, which is not unestablished." According to the Nyāyānusāra, because the expressing and evoking of the four skandhas is the same as that of names, they are designated with the name nāma. This treatise holds that because the four skandhas bend toward and take cognitive objects just as names bend toward and express, they are designated with the name nāma.
10.43
The treatise says: "How is it that in accordance with names [...] the names of colors, tastes, and so forth?" This specifically explains nāma.
10.44
The treatise says: "For what reason furthermore [...] bend toward and take cognitive objects?" This explains that because the four immaterial skandhas are identical in their bending, they are designated with the name nāma.
10.45
The treatise says: "Moreover, they are similar to names." Because they are in the same immaterial category as names. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle fifteen, states: "Why are the four skandhas called nāma? Answer: The Buddha divided the conditioned into two overall divisions, namely rūpa and non-rūpa. Rūpa is the rūpa-skandha; non-rūpa is the four skandhas of feeling and so forth. Within the non-rūpa group there are names that can make all dharmas manifest; therefore the non-rūpa group is collectively called nāma."
10.46
The treatise says: "Because they are manifested in accordance with names." The four skandhas are subtle and difficult to know, and are manifested in accordance with names. The Vibhāṣā states: "Material dharmas are coarse and evident, so they are called rūpa; immaterial dharmas are subtle and concealed, and because they are manifested by means of names, they are called nāma."
10.47
The treatise says: "Other masters say [...] therefore they are designated with the name nāma." This relates an alternative explanation. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Moreover, because they are able to universally proceed towards and seek after all realms, stages, destinies, and births, the name nāma is established; it is not that untainted immaterial [dharmas] cannot be called nāma. Although they are not what is explained here, they resemble them. Furthermore, in regard to the immaterial, according to the intention of the speaker it is collectively called nāma; there is no need to interrogate it."
10.48
The treatise says: "What is the meaning of contact (sparśa)?" From here on is the third part, clarifying the factor of contact. The six āyatanas have already been explained above, so they are not clarified here, and contact is clarified out of order. Herein there are three parts: first, clarifying the six contacts; second, clarifying the two contacts; third, clarifying the eight contacts. From here on is the first part, clarifying the six contacts.
10.49
"The treatise says: [...] up to mental contact." This divides the six contacts according to their supporting sense faculties.
10.50
The treatise says: "What furthermore is this?" This is a question. What is the intrinsic entity of this contact?
10.51
The treatise says: "Born of the coming together of the three [...] there is a distinct contact that arises." This is the answer. The intrinsic entity of contact is difficult to discern, so it is explained with reference to its causes.
10.52
The treatise says: "Now when the five contacts arise [...] how can there be a coming together?" This is an objection. If they are simultaneously in the present, one can speak of a coming together. If they are distributed across the three times differently, how can there be a coming together?
10.53
The treatise says: "This is precisely what is called coming together [...] because they jointly accord with giving rise to contact." This is the answer. That is, the mind is in the past, dharmas are in the future, and consciousness cognizes in the present; this is called coming together, firstly in the sense of cause and effect, and secondly because they have an identical result. That is, sense faculty, sense object, and consciousness together accord with giving rise to one contact; this is the meaning of cause and effect, which accomplishes an identical result. This meaning of cause and effect accomplishing an identical result is called coming together. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 197, states: "Answer: This coming together has two kinds: first, co-arising without being separated is called coming together; second, being unopposed and accomplishing the same task is called coming together. Contact associated with the five consciousnesses is called coming together because of both kinds of coming together (end of treatise citation)." As for "not being separated", this means being in the same time period without being separated, not being in the same mental congeries, because the eye, ear, and so forth see forms and hear sounds in different locations.
10.54
The treatise says: "Various masters have different understandings regarding this." The Sautrāntika masters state that the coming together of the three is itself called contact. The Sarvāstivāda school holds that a distinct contact arises.
10.55
The treatise says: "Some say that the coming together of the three [...] is called contact." This relates the Sautrāntika thesis. Because the sūtra states that the gathering and coming together of such three dharmas is called contact, and does not state that it arises separately, they know that apart from the three there is no distinct contact.
10.56
The treatise says: "Some say it is a distinct dharma [...] therefore contact exists distinctly." This relates the Sarvāstivāda thesis. Because in the Ṣaṭṣaṭka-sūtra, apart from the six faculties and six objects, six contacts are stated separately, they know that the six contacts are not the faculties and objects, and that contact exists distinctly.
10.57
The treatise says: "To say it is precisely the coming together of the three [...] is not subsumed under the dharmāyatana." This relates the Sautrāntika master resolving the Sarvāstivādin's citation of the Ṣaṭṣaṭka-sūtra. One should not suppose that because after having stated the six faculties and objects, it further states six contacts separately, contact therefore has a distinct substantial entity. Lest feeling and craving, having been stated in the dharmāyatana, being further separately stated as six feelings and six cravings, should lead one to suppose that feeling and craving are not subsumed under the dharmāyatana and have distinct entities.
10.58
The treatise says: "There is no such fault [...] and are stated distinctively." This is the Sarvāstivādin's defense. There is no such fault of restating the dharmāyatana, because the dharmāyatana has many varieties. There are feeling, craving, and contact, and furthermore there are many other dharmāyatanas such as non-associated formations. When the sūtra states the six external āyatanas, it states the remaining dharmāyatanas. When the sūtra states the six feelings, it states feeling; when the sūtra states the six cravings, it states craving; when the sūtra states the six contacts, it states contact. Therefore, having stated the dharmāyatana, it further states the six feelings, six cravings, and six contacts. In your school, apart from contact there are no distinct three, so how could contact and the three be stated distinctively?
10.59
The treatise says: "Although there are sense faculties and objects [...] it would become useless." This refutes the opponent's defense. The Sautrāntika defends by saying: When faculties and objects give rise to consciousness, they are called the coming together of the three; when they do not give rise to consciousness, they are called the six faculties and six objects. Refuting them: Although there are faculties and objects that do not give rise to consciousness, so that apart from the coming together of the three one may speak separately of faculties and objects, whenever consciousness arises, it necessarily relies on faculties and objects. If consciousness arises, that is already the coming together of the three; how then could one, apart from the coming together of the three, further speak of six contacts?
10.60
The treatise says: "Other [masters] defend by saying [...] is collectively established as contact." This is the defense of another Sautrāntika. This master's intention is to say: There are faculties and objects that do not generate consciousness, and thus are not the causes of consciousness. There is consciousness that does not rely on faculties and objects, and is not the result of faculties and objects. Examining this explanation now: If the future really exists, this meaning could be correct; but if dharmas are in the present, there is no such principle. Although there are indeed āyatanas without consciousness, there is no consciousness that does not rely on an āyatana, because when consciousness arises it must rely on faculties and objects to arise. This refers to the future and to sabhāga [faculties] not producing a consciousness conjoined with the faculty. This is not the correct meaning.
10.61
The treatise says: "Stating that apart from the coming together of the three [...] the appearance of [the Buddhas] is bliss, and so forth." Here the Sarvāstivāda resolves the sūtra. There are two explanations. The first explanation states: The sūtra text recited by our school is different from this; it does not state that the gathering and coming together of the three dharmas is called contact. The second explanation states: The gathering and coming together of the three dharmas is the cause that generates contact; having this called contact is applying the name of the result to the cause, just as saying that the appearance of the Buddhas in the world can generate bliss, and is therefore called bliss.
10.62
The treatise says: "In this way, back and forth [...] they state that contact exists distinctly." This concludes the preceding Sarvāstivāda position.
10.63
On the Śāstra's statement: "The preceding six contacts are again combined into two": this below is the second [section], explaining the two kinds of contact.
10.64
"The Śāstra says ... established in terms of the cognitive object": this explains the two kinds of contact. The name 'contact with resistance' is established in terms of its support, because its supporting faculties possess resistance. The name 'predominant verbal contact' is established in terms of the cognitive object: among cognitive objects, differing from the five consciousnesses which do not solely grasp semantic content, mental consciousness additionally grasps verbal designations; thus it is called 'predominant verbal'. 'Predominant verbal' refers to verbal designation. The five [consciousnesses] do not grasp verbal designations, but the mental [consciousness] additionally grasps verbal designations; hence it is called having an 'extensive object'; this derives its name from the extensive object that is cognized. Cognizing that something is blue means cognizing the designation 'blue'—namely, mental consciousness cognizing both designations and referents universally.
10.65
On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say that mental consciousness ... established in terms of association": this recounts a divergent view. This master states: with the cognitive object of mental consciousness, speech serves as the predominant condition, and only thereby is it able to cognize the object. Thus mental consciousness itself is named 'predominant verbal'; and contact is associated with this predominant verbal [consciousness], hence it is named 'predominant verbal contact'. This derives the name 'predominant verbal contact' in terms of association.
10.66
On the Śāstra's statement: "The preceding six contacts ... further form eight kinds": this below is the third [section], explaining the eight kinds of contact. Within this there are three: first, explaining contact associated with clear comprehension, etc.; second, contact associated with attachment and aversion; third, contact associated with feeling.
10.67
"The Śāstra says ... non-obscured indeterminate": this explains the first set: the three contacts associated with clear comprehension, ignorance, and neither of the two.
10.68
On the Śāstra's statement: "Among contacts of ignorance ... because of mutual association": this explains the second set: contacts of attachment and aversion. All defiled contacts are called contacts of ignorance; and among all defilements, attachment and aversion arise frequently, so these two are singled out within defilements.
10.69
On the Śāstra's statement: "Comprehensively subsuming all ... contacts conducive to unpleasant feeling": this explains the third set: contacts conducive to feeling.
10.70
On the Śāstra's statement: "These three are able to induce ... called conducive to feeling": this explains 'conducive to feeling'. In this there are three explanations: first, because they can induce feeling, since through the object of contact there is adverse or harmonious [experience]; second, because they are what feelings such as pleasure apperceive; third, because they can serve as the support for the mental mode of feeling, since feeling's arising mode of activity relies upon contact.
10.71
On the Śāstra's statement: "How is contact that which is apperceived by feeling and the support of its mental mode?": this inquires again about the latter two.
10.72
On the Śāstra's statement: "Because the mental mode closely resembles contact and arises based on contact": this is the answer. 'The mental mode closely resembles contact' explains the former 'being apperceived by feelings such as pleasure'. 'Because it arises based on contact' explains the former 'being able to serve as the support for the mental mode of feeling'.
10.73
On the Śāstra's statement: "Combined in this way, there are sixteen kinds of contact": this summarizes the above.
10.74
On the Śāstra's statement: "What is the meaning of feeling?": this below is the fourth [section], explaining the link of feeling. In this there are three parts: first, directly explaining the link of feeling; second, explaining mental investigations; third, differentiations across conceptual aspects. What follows here is the first, directly explaining feeling.
10.75
"The Śāstra says ... merely based upon the mind": this divides into six feelings according to the six contacts. It also combines the six feelings into two feelings in terms of their support.
10.76
On the Śāstra's statement: "Does the arising of feeling occur after contact or simultaneously with it?": this is the Sautrāntika's question.
10.77
On the Śāstra's statement: "The masters of the Vibhāṣā [say] ... because of being co-existent causes": this is the Sarvāstivādin's reply.
10.78
On the Śāstra's statement: "How can two dharmas ... the principle be established?": this is the Sautrāntika's objection. If their arising is simultaneous, how can there be efficacy with respect to co-existent dharmas? If feeling has not yet arisen, contact does not yet exist either; how could it produce feeling? If contact has already arisen, feeling has also already arisen; what function could an already arisen dharma have for contact to produce feeling?
10.79
On the Śāstra's statement: "Why would it not be established?": the Sarvāstivādin turns the question back to the Sautrāntika master.
10.80
On the Śāstra's statement: "Because of lack of functional capacity": the Sautrāntika master provides the reason for it not being established.
10.81
On the Śāstra's statement: "With respect to an already arisen dharma ... what is the use of repeating it?": the Sarvāstivādin reproaches the Sautrāntika that their reason is identical with their thesis. For example, stating that sound is impermanent because it arises and ceases: 'arising and ceasing' and 'impermanence' are conceptually no different; how can an invalid reason prove the thesis of impermanence? You say that the two dharmas arise simultaneously, and your thesis is precisely the meaning that the two dharmas mutually lack functional capacity. Now I asked you the reason why it is not established, and you merely replied again: 'Because of lack of functional capacity.' How is this different from before? Repeating it is useless.
10.82
On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, there would be the fallacy of mutual production": the Sautrāntika turns to refute further. If two dharmas arise simultaneously, how could they mutually be cause and effect? The cause would be the effect, and the effect would be the cause, which is unreasonable.
10.83
On the Śāstra's statement: "Because it is accepted, there is no fallacy ... they are also mutually effects": this is the Sarvāstivādin's reply. Our school accepts that the two mutually serve as cause and effect. Now, examining this reply carefully, it does not accord with the root text: the original dispute was over the principle of contact producing feeling, which does not mean the two mutually producing each other, and differs in sense from co-existent cause. Why did the Sarvāstivādin offer this explanation? We now resolve this doubt: although the original question was about contact producing feeling, now the debate has shifted to simultaneous cause and effect. The Sarvāstivāda accepts it, whereas the Sautrāntika does not; therefore the Sarvāstivādin answered by means of the co-existent cause.
10.84
On the Śāstra's statement: "Although you accept this ... contact produced by feeling": from here below, the Sautrāntika points out fallacies: first, the fault of contradicting scriptural teaching; second, the fault of contradicting reason. This here is the first fault of contradicting scripture.
10.85
On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, this principle is unreasonable ... first the mind and subsequently consciousness, etc.": this is the second [fault], pointing out the contradiction with reason.
10.86
On the Śāstra's statement: "Cause and effect [can be] sequential ... there are derived matters": the Sarvāstivādin defends. Cause and effect are of two kinds: simultaneous and successive. The scripture and reasoning cited just now refer to successive cause and effect. Our school also accepts well-established simultaneous cause and effect, just as the visual faculty and visible forms are simultaneous with visual consciousness, yet the faculty and objects produce consciousness, while consciousness does not produce the faculty and objects. The four great elements and derived matter—like a shadow and a sprout—are they not co-existent? Yet the sprout and the great elements produce the shadow and derived matter, whereas the shadow and derived matter do not produce the sprout and great elements. This also has scriptural and rational support. Examining this explanation now, it accords with the root text.
10.87
On the Śāstra's statement: "Here too it is accepted ... what reason could refute this?": the Sautrāntika clarifies. With the four great elements and derived matter, or the five consciousnesses relying on their faculties, succession is also accepted; what reason could refute this?
10.88
On the Śāstra's statement: "Like a shadow and a sprout, are they not co-existent?": the Sarvāstivādin, unable to refute the previous scripture and reasoning, adduces simultaneous cause and effect dharmas.
10.89
On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say that after contact ... conditioning contact, feeling arises": this recounts the explanation of the elder of the Sautrāntika school. This master means: consciousness of the subsequent moment arises based on the faculties and objects of the preceding moment. In the first moment there are faculty and object; in the second moment consciousness arises, and precisely at this time the three unite in contact. This contact takes the union of the three as its essence, having no separate dharma apart from them. Only upon reaching the third moment does feeling arise.
10.90
On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, consciousness should ... not all be contact": the Sarvāstivādin points out the fallacy. If so, then not all consciousnesses would possess feeling, because the consciousness at the time of the union of the three has not yet produced feeling. All consciousnesses should also not all be contact, because consciousness at the stage of feeling would not be contact.
10.91
On the Śāstra's statement: "There is no such fallacy ... none that is not contact": the Sautrāntika defends. The consciousness at the time of contact possesses the feeling of the preceding stage; hence it is not without feeling. The consciousness at the stage of feeling is the contact of the subsequent stage; hence none is not contact.
10.92
On the Śāstra's statement: "This is unreasonable": the Sarvāstivādin rejects this.
10.93
On the Śāstra's statement: "What reason is contradicted?": the Sautrāntika asks.
10.94
On the Śāstra's statement: "That is, there are times ... cognizing the same one object": the Sarvāstivādin points out the contradiction with reason. That is, there are times when the two contacts—adverse and harmonious—differ, and successively visible form and sound objects also differ. Conditioned by the preceding adverse object, at the stage of feeling, contact cognizes form; producing the subsequent harmonious object, feeling occurs at the stage of contact cognizing sound. Here adverse and harmonious are different, and visible form and sound objects differ. Since pleasure and distress differ in nature, how could they produce one another? 'Or one must accept that this feeling associated with this mind does not cognize the same single object with this mind': when, from the contact of the preceding adverse object and cognizing visible form, feeling arises at the stage of the contact of the subsequent harmonious object and cognizing sound, since the mind's union of the three is named the contact of the subsequent stage, it should share the subsequent moment's object of feeling and not share the same object with the preceding moment's feeling. If one accepts this principle, the meaning of mental association is ruined.
10.95
On the Śāstra's statement: "Since it is so, if one accepts ... what fault is there in this?": the Sautrāntika shifts its proposition. If the objects differ, one may accept that the consciousness constituting contact is not co-existent with feeling, and accept that the consciousness co-existent with feeling is not itself contact in essence; this is so because the conditions vary. What fault is there in this?
10.96
On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, then it destroys ... constantly co-existent in mental states": the Sarvāstivādin points out the fallacy. Contact and feeling are omnipresent mental factors; they are definitely and constantly co-existent in all mental states. How can you say that there is mind without contact, or mind without feeling?
10.97
On the Śāstra's statement: "Upon what scripture is their definite constant co-existence established?": the Sautrāntika asks.
10.98
On the Śāstra's statement: "It is established upon the fundamental treatise": the Sarvāstivādin answers.
10.99
On the Śāstra's statement: "We only ... should rely on the pramāṇa of sūtra": the Sautrāntika defends. In this there are two points: first, disbelief in the fundamental treatise; second, interpreting the text of the fundamental treatise. This is the first.
10.100
On the Śāstra's statement: "Or the meaning of omnipresent mental factor does not require that it pervade all minds": this is the second, interpreting the text of the fundamental treatise. What is stated in the fundamental treatise regarding dharmas such as feeling being omnipresent mental factors does not mean that they must pervade all minds.
10.101
On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, what is meant by an omnipresent mental factor?": the Sarvāstivādin reproaches. As I have explained, pervading all minds is what is called an omnipresent mental factor. If it does not need to pervade all minds, how can it be called an omnipresent mental factor?
10.102
On the Śāstra's statement: "It refers to having three grounds ... called an omnipresent mental factor": the Sautrāntika answers. There are three kinds of threefold grounds; if a dharma pervades these three kinds of threefold grounds, it is called an omnipresent mental factor, not that it must pervade all mental states.
10.103
On the Śāstra's statement: "If a dharma only in ... not part of the original recitation": taking this opportunity to explain the wholesome omnipresent factors, etc. The major unwholesome ground is an addition of today, not originally present in the fundamental treatise.
10.104
On the Śāstra's statement: "If after contact ... feeling, ideation, and volition co-arise": because the Sautrāntika does not believe in the fundamental treatise, the Sarvāstivādin adduces the fallacy of contradicting the sūtras. The sūtra states that in the union of the three, feeling, ideation, and volition co-arise; how can you say that contact and feeling belong to different times?
10.105
On the Śāstra's statement: "It only says 'co-arise' ... what contradiction needs to be resolved?": the Sautrāntika resolves the sūtra. In this there are two points: first, generally denying that it contradicts the sūtra; second, providing a reconciliatory explanation. This is the first. The sūtra only states that feeling, ideation, and volition 'co-arise'; it does not say that they are simultaneous with contact. This allows for the preceding moment's contact to arise together with the subsequent moment's feeling, ideation, and volition. Therefore the sūtra is not proof.
10.106
On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, in immediate succession ... therefore that is not proof": the second, providing a reconciliatory explanation of the sūtra. Even granting that your contact produces feeling, ideation, and volition, and that this means contact is co-existent with feeling, etc., 'co-existence' is of two kinds: simultaneous co-existence, and arising in immediate succession, which is also called co-existent. Just as the sūtra states that one cultivates the factor of awakening of mindfulness accompanied by benevolence: benevolence is an unwholesome/defiled or contaminated mind, while the factor of awakening is an uncontaminated mind; benevolence and the factor of awakening are co-existent, so we know they are sequential and not simultaneous. Contact and feeling being spoken of as co-existent is also like this.
10.107
On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, why ... distinct from feeling, etc.?": the Sarvāstivādin cites sūtra proof again. Since it says 'intermingled', clearly they are simultaneous.
10.108
On the Śāstra's statement: "Now one should carefully consider ... spoken in this way": the Sautrāntika asks indeterminately. The sūtra admits of two explanations: in the same single moment, or cognizing the same single object; both can be called 'intermingled'. When it says 'intermingled' here, what kind of intermingling is it?
10.109
On the Śāstra's statement: "Regarding vitality and warmth ... definitely in terms of the moment": the Sarvāstivādin cites an analogy to prove it is momentary. In this there are two points: first, citing an analogy as proof; second, reproaching for contradicting the sūtra. This is the first. Since vitality and warmth co-existing are spoken of as intermingled, we know that this intermingling is also momentary.
10.110
On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, the sūtra says ... yet not be called contact": this is the second, reproaching for contradicting the sūtra. The sūtra speaks of the union of the three; how could consciousness at the stages of contact and feeling not be the union of the three? Or how could the union of the three at the stage of feeling not be called contact?
10.111
On the Śāstra's statement: "Therefore one must definitely accept ... co-arise with feeling, etc.": this summarizes the Sarvāstivāda school's position.
10.112
On the Śāstra's statement: "The incidental discussion being concluded, the correct doctrine should now be explained": this following half-verse is the second part, dividing the single mental feeling into eighteen mental investigations.
10.113
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'The Śāstra says [from here down to] to show taking up what preceded and giving rise to what follows', the verse says, 'These, further, become eighteen.' This takes up the preceding division into six feelings and division into two feelings; these, further, are divided into eighteen, hence it 'takes up what preceded and gives rise to what follows.'
10.114
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'What are these eighteen mental investigations (manopavicāra)?', this is a question.
10.115
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'They are six investigations each of joy, grief, and equanimity', this is the answer. These three feelings each take the six objects as referents and are divided into six investigations, which together make eighteen.
10.116
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Again, by what reason [up to] taking them as objects?', this challenges the reason for dividing them into eighteen. In this, there are three questions: if by essential nature (svabhāva), there should only be three; if by association (samprayoga), there should only be one; if by cognitive object (ālambana), there should only be six.
10.117
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'These become eighteen fully by virtue of three [factors]', this is the answer. By virtue of essential nature, they are divided into three feelings; by virtue of associating solely with the mind (manas), they take only the three of joy, grief, and equanimity, excluding suffering and pleasure; by virtue of cognitive objects, each is divided into six kinds. Due to this, the eighteen neither increase nor decrease.
10.118
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Among them, fifteen [up to] all admit of both kinds', this explains mixed and unmixed cognitive objects. Joy and the others apprehending their objects separately are called having unmixed objects. If they separately apprehend the mental phenomenon (dharma) object, they are also called mental investigations of mental phenomena with unmixed objects. If they apprehend two combined, up to five or six combined, all are called mental investigations of mental phenomena with mixed objects.
10.119
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'What meaning is designated by the name "mental investigation" (manopavicāra)?', this is a question.
10.120
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Tradition says joy and so forth [up to] frequently range over them', this is the answer. 'Tradition says joy and so forth take the mind as their proximate condition and frequently range over objects' means that the mind serves as the proximate condition for joy and so forth; because joy and so forth frequently range over objects, joy and so forth are called 'mental investigations.'
10.121
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Some say joy and so forth [up to] frequently range over them', this sets forth an alternative explanation. This means that because joy and so forth serve as proximate conditions for the mind, causing the mind to frequently range over objects, they are called mental investigations. Fascicle 149 of the *Vibhāṣā* contains three interpretations. Two interpretations are identical to this Śāstra's; the third interpretation states: 'Moreover, because they rely on the mind to range proximately toward objects, they are called mental investigations.' It also states: 'Being swift and sharp regarding objects, delighting in frequently conceptualizing them, they are therefore called investigations.' The *Nyāyānusāra* says: 'Joy and so forth possess power to act as proximate conditions, causing the mind to frequently range over objects. If one were to say that joy and so forth take the mind as their proximate condition and frequently range over objects, and are therefore called mental investigations, then ideation (saṃjñā) and so forth should also receive this name, since they are associated with the mind and range by means of the mind.'
10.122
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Why are bodily feelings not mental investigations?', this is a question.
10.123
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'They do not solely rely on the mind [up to] therefore they are not investigations either', this is the answer. Based on the phrasing of this answer, because they rely on the mind they are called 'proximate' (upavi-), and because of conceptual differentiation they are called 'investigations' (-cāra).
10.124
[On the Śāstra's statement:] '[Why is the pleasure of] the third dhyāna [up to] not included?', this asks: Since the pleasure of the third dhyāna relies solely on the mind, it should be called 'proximate'; and being a conceptual differentiation in the mind, it should be called 'investigation'; why is it not called a mental investigation?
10.125
[On the Śāstra's statement:] 'Tradition says that because it does not exist in the first realm [up to] mental investigations', this is the answer. There are two explanations: first, because it does not exist in the first realm (kāmadhātu); second, because there is no mental investigation that is a counterpart to the pain faculty.
First 125 of 264 passages. Read on
Linked texts (1)
- 俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese