俱舍論疏 13.59

13.59

On the Śāstra's statement: "If tactile sensation and shape [... to ...] one can recollect shape": This is an inverse refutation to establish [the author's] own tenet. The Śāstra master's fundamental tenet is: if shape were real, there would be the fault of being grasped by two sense faculties. The Sarvāstivādin rescues [their position], saying: "Because one grasps tactile sensation, one can recollect shape." The Śāstra master inversely refutes them, saying: "Tactile sensation and shape are not invariably unseparated, yet when grasping tactile sensation one can recollect shape—just as when one does not previously know that this has such a fragrance, upon smelling such a fragrance in the dark, one knows that the flower has such a color. But in reality this is not so; therefore one should not say that because one grasps tactile sensation one can recollect shape." The Nyāyānusāra rescues [their position], saying: "This too is unreasonable, for it is visibly observed in the world that shape is determinate within aggregations of tactile sensation. That is to say, although shape is not determinate with respect to tactile sensation, nonetheless, in the arising of many tactile sensations on one side there is determinately long color-form, and in the pervasive arising of tactile sensations in all places there is determinately round color-form; such classes should be known accordingly. Therefore, tactile sensation is determinate with respect to shape, whereas tactile sensation is not determinate with respect to visible color as it is with respect to shape. When feeling a touch, one can recollect visible color, because there is no touch arranged in such a way that it is determinate with respect to such visible color as it is with respect to shape."