俱舍論疏 13.59

13.59

論「若觸與形至能憶念形」，反難成宗。論主本宗：形若有實，即有二根取過。有部救云：因取觸故，能憶念形。論主反難云：觸之與形非定不相離，而取觸時能憶念形，如先不知此有如是香，於闇中嗅如是香時，知花有如是色。而實不然，故不應說因取於觸能憶念形。《正理》救云：此亦非理，現見世間諸觸聚中有形定故。謂形於觸雖無定者，而於一面多觸生中定有長色，於一切處觸遍生中定有圓色，如是等類隨應當知。故觸於形有決定者，非觸於顯有定如形可了。觸時能憶顯色，以無有觸如是安布，於如是顯決定如形。

On the Śāstra's statement: "If tactile sensation and shape [... to ...] one can recollect shape": This is an inverse refutation to establish [the author's] own tenet. The Śāstra master's fundamental tenet is: if shape were real, there would be the fault of being grasped by two sense faculties. The Sarvāstivādin rescues [their position], saying: "Because one grasps tactile sensation, one can recollect shape." The Śāstra master inversely refutes them, saying: "Tactile sensation and shape are not invariably unseparated, yet when grasping tactile sensation one can recollect shape—just as when one does not previously know that this has such a fragrance, upon smelling such a fragrance in the dark, one knows that the flower has such a color. But in reality this is not so; therefore one should not say that because one grasps tactile sensation one can recollect shape." The Nyāyānusāra rescues [their position], saying: "This too is unreasonable, for it is visibly observed in the world that shape is determinate within aggregations of tactile sensation. That is to say, although shape is not determinate with respect to tactile sensation, nonetheless, in the arising of many tactile sensations on one side there is determinately long color-form, and in the pervasive arising of tactile sensations in all places there is determinately round color-form; such classes should be known accordingly. Therefore, tactile sensation is determinate with respect to shape, whereas tactile sensation is not determinate with respect to visible color as it is with respect to shape. When feeling a touch, one can recollect visible color, because there is no touch arranged in such a way that it is determinate with respect to such visible color as it is with respect to shape."