俱舍論疏 19.154

19.154

On the Śāstra's statement: 'What dharma is called non-existence... to... is called craving for non-existence': The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 27, says: '"Non-existence" refers to the impermanence of the common group-homogeneity (sabhāgatā); taking this as object and giving rise to craving is called craving for non-existence. Therefore, this craving is abandoned only by cultivation, because common group-homogeneity is abandoned only by cultivation.' The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Is there not also impermanence and craving for non-existence that is abandoned by seeing? For what reason is it abandoned only by cultivation? In reality it is also abandoned by seeing; this is provisionally stated in accordance with the sūtra. That is, the sūtras speak of three cravings: craving for sensual pleasure, craving for existence, and craving for non-existence. In this sūtra, when speaking of craving for non-existence, it takes as its object that which grasps the impermanence of common group-homogeneity, because one longs for the severance of the continuity of retribution. As the sūtra says: "A certain class, oppressed by suffering, has this thought: 'May I, after death, be severed, destroyed, and non-existent; how delightful without affliction!'" Now this is provisionally stated based on this as abandoned only by cultivation; it is not that there is no craving for non-existence abandoned by seeing.' Now, examining the Nyāyānusāra: this craving for non-existence universally takes the non-existence of all grasping skandhas as object to give rise to craving, and all are called craving for non-existence. If one's desire is for the cessation and non-arising of defilements, this is wholesome desire (chanda); how could it constitute craving (tṛṣṇā)? If one does not seek cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), but merely craves non-arising, how could it constitute desire for wholesome dharmas? Only by clinging to the annihilation of dharmas does this craving arise, which is reinforced by views; noble ones do not give rise to it. What this treatise says about the impermanence of the three realms applies to both explanations: if it means the impermanence of all three realms, it agrees with the Nyāyānusāra; if it means the impermanence of the common group-homogeneity of the three realms, it agrees with the Vibhāṣā. Following the text below, because these entanglements and cravings all take what is abandoned by cultivation as object, we know that this treatise agrees with the Vibhāṣā.