俱舍論疏 19

English (machine translation) 19

Language: English

19.2

Chapter Five: Exposition of the Latent Defilements (Anuśayanirdeśa), Part One.

Its mode of activity is subtle, continuously binding and continuously increasing—this is the definition of a latent defilement (anuśaya). This chapter explains them extensively, hence it is named the 'Chapter: Exposition of the Latent Defilements'. Although it also clarifies the entanglements (paryavasthāna) and stains (mala), because latent defilements are the root, they are stated first at the beginning of the chapter. As for why latent defilements are explained after karma: karma, due to defilements, is able to summon rebirths across existences. Karma is particular while defilement is universal; therefore, karma was explained first, and latent defilements are explained afterwards.

19.4

Regarding the treatise passage from "It was said before that the differences in the world..." up to "how many anuśayas are there?", the text of this chapter is broadly divided into two: first, explaining the substance and function of the defilements; second, explaining the differences in their abandonment. Within the former section, it is subdivided into four: first, explaining the anuśayas; second, a miscellaneous explanation of various defilements; third, distinctions by analytical categories; fourth, a separate explanation of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa). Within the explanation of anuśayas: first, explaining their substance and number; second, explaining them sequentially by essential examples; third, distinctions regarding their binding by conditions and so forth. Within the section on substance and number: first, explaining the six anuśayas; second, explaining the seven taught in the sūtra; third, dividing the six into ten; fourth, dividing them into ninety-eight. This single verse has two meanings: first, explaining that karma depends upon anuśayas to be able to bring about existence; second, explaining the six anuśayas. First, the preceding context is taken up to raise the question; next, the verse is cited to answer; thereafter, the prose commentary explains it. This is the question. Within the question, there are two parts: first, asking about karma's reliance on anuśayas; second, asking about the substance and number of anuśayas. In the verse of four lines, the first line answers the former question, and the lower three lines answer the latter question.

19.5

Regarding "The treatise says... up to... has no ability to bring about existence", this explains the first line. Karma, apart from anuśayas, has no ability to bring about existence because the anuśayas are the root of existence.

19.6

Regarding the treatise's "Why can anuśayas serve as the root of existence?", this asks for the reason.

19.7

Regarding the treatise's "Because the active arising of defilements is capable of ten functions", this is the general answer.

19.8

Regarding the treatise's "First, solidifying the root", from here down the ten functions are explained. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "It causes the possession (prāpti) to become firm, because the antidote is distant." The commentary states: Because possession is not abandoned, the anuśayas repeatedly arise. If that possession did not exist, the defilements would not arise; thus possession is the root. Defilements repeatedly arise, and because the antidote is distant, it makes the possession firm; hence it is called 'solidifying the root'.

19.9

Regarding the treatise's "Second, establishing the continuum", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it can repeatedly cause subsequent [moments] to arise in succession."

19.10

Regarding the treatise's "Third, cultivating its own field", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it causes the basis (āśraya) to abide in conformity with it." The commentary states: It causes the body that serves as the basis to conform with what relies upon it.

19.11

Regarding the treatise's "Fourth, drawing forth its homogeneous outflow (niṣyanda)", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it can draw forth secondary defilements (upakleśa) that resemble itself." The commentary states: Because it can draw forth similar secondary defilements.

19.12

Regarding the treatise's "Fifth, instigating karma-existence", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it initiates karma that can attract subsequent existence."

19.13

Regarding the treatise's "Sixth, gathering its own requisites", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it can repeatedly gather and give rise to improper attention (ayoniśo-manaskāra)."

19.14

Regarding the treatise's "Seventh, deluding the cognitive object", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it can harm the wisdom of correct awakening in one's own continuum."

19.15

Regarding the treatise's "Eighth, guiding the stream of consciousness", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it can direct and give rise to consciousness toward the cognitive object of subsequent existence." The commentary states: It can direct the rebirth-linking consciousness (pratisandhi-vijñāna) of subsequent existence, and direct defiled consciousness repeatedly to take cognitive objects.

19.16

Regarding the treatise's "Ninth, transgreasing wholesome factors", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it causes all wholesome dharmas to deteriorate and be lost."

19.17

Regarding the treatise from "Tenth, the extensive meaning of bondage... up to... its own realm and plane", the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because it causes [one] to be unable to transcend one's own realm (dhātu) and one's own plane (bhūmi), since it nourishes the defiled constituent." The commentary states: 'Constituent' has the meaning of cause; the active operation of defilements causes the cause of defiled dharmas to increase and grow, hence it is called nourishing the defiled constituent. Or, it nourishes the defilements of its own realm, and therefore one cannot transcend one's own realm.

19.18

Regarding the treatise from "Due to these anuśayas... up to... have the ability to bring about existence", this concludes the answer. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Although one who has separated from passion also creates wholesome karma, they lack the efficacy to bring about subsequent existence." The commentary states: The 'existence' spoken of above is all based on projecting results. If based on instigating karma that brings about existence, that pertains solely to ordinary persons (pṛthagjana). If based on nourishing previous karma to link future birth-existence, it extends to trainees (śaikṣa); because of this, the non-trainees (aśaikṣa) of the three vehicles do not undergo subsequent existence.

19.19

Regarding the treatise from "This should briefly be known... up to... ignorance, views, and doubt", this explains the lower three lines of the verse. When summarized, these fundamental defilements are divided into six; when divided by mode of activity, category, and realm, they are ninety-eight. Here they are provisionally presented as six; hence it says: "This should briefly be known: the distinctions are six... up to... views and doubt."

19.20

Regarding the treatise from "The word 'also' in the verse... up to... the meaning will be analyzed later", this separately explains the intention behind placing the word 'also' (api) in the verse. Just as when clothing is moist, dust sticks to it; greed moistens objects, and anger also increases accordingly. Not only with anger, but pride and the rest are also like this; hence it says "also pride".

19.21

Regarding the treatise's "And the word 'and' shows that the six are distinct in substance", this separately explains the intention behind placing the word 'and' (ca) in the verse. 'And' is an appositional compound analysis (samāsa); desiring to show that the substances of the six anuśayas are mutually distinct and separate from each other, the word 'and' was placed there.

19.22

Regarding the treatise's "If the anuśayas are only six in substance", the following single verse is the second part, reconciling with the seven of the sūtras. In the verse there are four lines: the first line answers the reason for expanding to seven, because greed is divided into two; the second line points out the expanded greed; the third line explains greed for existence (bhava-rāga); the fourth line explains the reason for establishing 'existence'. Because it arises relying on the internal, the internal is called 'existence'; one knows that the upper two realms are not liberation.

19.23

Regarding "The treatise says... up to... therefore the sūtra teaches seven", this explains the first line. It is understandable according to the text.

19.24

Regarding the treatise's "Which are the seven?", this asks about their names and substances.

19.25

Regarding the treatise from "First, the anuśaya of sensual desire... up to... seventh, the anuśaya of doubt", this enumerates the seven names.

19.26

Regarding the treatise from "the anuśaya of sensual desire... up to... the interrogation is also like this", this is an inquiry with two alternatives. The Sautrāntika school holds that the active manifestation is called entanglement (paryavasthāna), while the seed is called anuśaya. For the Mahāsāṃghika and others, the substance of anuśaya is a conditioning factor disassociated from thought (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra); that is, it is the anuśaya of sensual desire [a genitive tatpuruṣa]. For the Sarvāstivādin (Vaibhāṣika), sensual desire is itself the anuśaya [a karmadhāraya]. The former two are genitive compounds; the Vaibhāṣikas use appositional compounds.

19.27

Regarding the treatise's "If so, what is the fault?", this questions the two interpretations in turn.

19.28

Regarding the treatise's "Both have flaws", this challenges both schools.

19.29

Regarding the treatise from "If the substance of sensual desire... up to... abandoned together with the anuśaya", this points out a contradiction with the scriptures against the Sarvāstivādins. Regarding sensual desire, the sūtra states that it can be correctly eliminated and abandoned together with its anuśaya; because their substances are distinct, the word 'together with' is used. If entanglement were itself anuśaya, why would the word 'together with' be necessary?

19.30

Regarding the treatise from "If it is the anuśaya of sensual desire... up to... associated with the three faculties", this points out a flaw against the Sautrāntikas. If it were considered the anuśaya of sensual desire, it would be identical to the Mahāsāṃghika and others in being disassociated from thought. If so, it would contradict what the root treatise says: that the anuśaya of sensual desire is associated with the three faculties of pleasure, joy, and equanimity.

19.31

Regarding the treatise from "The Vaibhāṣikas... up to... is itself the anuśaya", this recounts the Sarvāstivāda tenet.

19.32

Regarding the treatise's "Does this not contradict the sūtra?", this cites the sūtra to raise an objection.

19.33

Regarding the treatise from "There is no fault of contradicting the sūtra... up to... and bound accordingly", this resolves the sūtra passage. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Furthermore, that the sūtra says 'abandoned together with the anuśaya' illustrates the meaning of the entanglement of sensual desire being abandoned without remainder. That is, when eight grades abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanā-heya) are abandoned, one grade of anuśaya is still able to bind; to illustrate that its substance is abandoned, it is said to be 'correctly eliminated'. The phrase 'abandoned together with the anuśaya' illustrates that its binding is completely exhausted." The commentary states: Although earlier grades are abandoned, later grades still bind. When earlier grades are abandoned, it is 'correct elimination'; when all are abandoned together with the later ones, it is the abandonment of the binding.

19.34

Regarding the treatise from "Or the sūtra, with respect to possession... up to... establishes the notion of suffering, etc.", this is the second explanation of the sūtra. The substance of fire is not suffering, yet because it can produce suffering, the name 'suffering' is metaphorically applied to it. Although the possession (prāpti) of anuśaya is not the anuśaya, because it possesses anuśaya, the sūtra metaphorically applies the name anuśaya to that possession. At the time when greed is abandoned, it is called 'correctly eliminated', and because the possession is abandoned along with it, it says 'abandoned together with the anuśaya'.

19.35

Regarding the treatise from "The Abhidharma... up to... is an associated dharma", this reconciles the sūtra according to the treatise. The sūtra speaks conventionally of possession as anuśaya, whereas the treatise speaks according to reality, taking greed itself as the substance; therefore it says that the anuśaya is precisely a dharma associated with thought.

19.36

Regarding the treatise's "What reasoning proves that it is definitely associated?", this questions the Sarvāstivāda again.

19.37

Regarding the treatise from "Because all anuśayas... up to... are not disassociated", this presents the explanation of the master Dharmaśrī, which is contained in full in the *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya*. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Here, the author of the treatise first relates what the venerable Dharmaśrī said: that anuśayas are associated." In the text there are three parts: first, a direct explanation; second, proof through negation; third, direct conclusion. This is the first. By three reasons, it is proven to be definitely associated: first, because it defiles the mind; second, because it covers and obstructs the mind; third, because it opposes the wholesome. These are the three reasons cited. "Namely, anuśayas can defile the mind" explains the first reason. "Unarisen wholesome [states] do not arise" explains the second reason. "Because it covers and obstructs the mind, making wholesome [states] not arise, and already arisen wholesome [states] deteriorate" explains the third reason. Because it can oppose the wholesome, it causes wholesome [states] to deteriorate; therefore, the substance of anuśaya is not disassociated. This concludes it.

19.38

Regarding the treatise from "If it were disassociated... up to... constantly present", next is the explanation through negation. If a factor associated [with thought] were the anuśaya, when it arises it could obstruct the wholesome so that it cannot arise, and when it does not arise, a wholesome mind would have room to arise. But if the substance of anuśaya were disassociated, it would constantly continue in the continuum without interruption; if it could obstruct the wholesome, wholesome [states] would never have an occasion to arise, because what is disassociated is constantly present.

19.39

Regarding the treatise from "Since all wholesome dharmas... up to... is an associated dharma", this forms the conclusion.

19.40

Regarding the treatise's "None of these are proof", this negates the three reasons altogether.

19.41

Regarding the treatise's "Why is that?", the Sarvāstivādin asks.

19.42

Regarding the treatise from "If it is accepted that anuśayas... up to... is done by the anuśaya", the Mahāsāṃghika and others explain the reason. If our school accepts that anuśayas are disassociated, then the above three functions are performed by entanglement (paryavasthāna); we do not accept that the above three functions are performed by anuśayas.

19.43

Regarding the treatise's "However, what the Sautrāntika master states is the best", the treatise author evaluates and adopts the Sautrāntika meaning.

19.44

Regarding the treatise's "What does the Sautrāntika say regarding this?", the Mahāsāṃghika and others ask.

19.45

Regarding the treatise from "They say sensual desire... up to... is precisely called entanglement", this answers with the Sautrāntika tenet. However, the substance of anuśaya is not associated with thought, differing from the Sarvāstivādin; nor is it disassociated, differing from the Mahāsāṃghika.

19.46

Regarding the treatise's "What is called sleeping?", this is the question.

19.47

Regarding the treatise's "It refers to the seed following [the continuum] without being active", this is the answer.

19.48

Regarding the treatise's "What is called awake?", this is the question.

19.49

Regarding the treatise's "It refers to the defilements actively arising and entangling the mind", this is the answer.

19.50

Regarding the treatise's "What is called the seed of defilement?", this is the question.

19.51

Regarding the treatise from "It refers to the... on the personal continuum... capable of generating defilement", this is the answer. It means perfumed upon the personal continuum, a distinct capability capable of generating future results is called a seed. Because the capabilities are not identical, they are called 'distinctions'.

19.52

Regarding the treatise from "Just as the seed of memory... up to... distinct capability", the treatise author cites two similes to refute the Mahāsāṃghika. This is the first. Following the *Nyāyānusāra*, it also refutes the Sarvāstivādins. The Mahāsāṃghika accepts that through the power of defilements there is separately an anuśaya disassociated from thought called a seed of defilement; but the seed of memory is simply born of realized knowledge, a distinct capability with no separate substance. Now he cites the universally accepted seed of memory as an analogy to refute their anuśaya.

19.53

Regarding the treatise from "Furthermore, just as a sprout, etc... up to... distinct capability", he cites the second simile to refute [them]. These two similes refute that anuśaya is disassociated.

19.54

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'If it is held that the defilements [...] because it is impossible to find': This combines both similes to apply equally to the anusayas. Both arise by perfuming (vāsanā) and both are seeds; yet one has real substance and is a non-associated [formation], while the other has no real substance and is merely a specific distinction in capacity (sāmarthya-viśeṣa) — the distinct cause and condition for this cannot be found. The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Furthermore, the simile adduced—such as the seed of mindfulness, which is generated from direct realizing knowledge and is a specific capacity able to produce future mindfulness—is likewise not analogous. For in our school's doctrine, what is called the seed of mindfulness is the initial reflective objectification following upon direct realizing knowledge; actual mindfulness arises from the mindfulness that was associated with the prior realizing knowledge, and is able to generate subsequent mindfulness associated with remembering knowledge. This demonstrates that it is simply mindfulness inducing itself prior and posterior, serving as a distinct capacity capable of corresponding to its effect. Yet within its own nature [for anusayas] they are co-arisen; there is no distinct real defilement arising from a prior entanglement (paryavasthāna) that can produce a subsequent entanglement such that it could be named an anusaya or defilement-seed. Therefore the simile is extremely far removed from the principle' (end of quote from the Śāstra). The explanations of the two doctrines differ, as detailed in the Nyāyānusāra; these two similes in the present text are also aimed at the Sarvāstivādins. Examining the Śāstra master's explanation: in the state of prior direct realizing knowledge, the entire assemblage perfumed together is designated as a distinct capacity of the seed. The distinct capacity of the seed is able to produce the subsequent assemblage of dharmas of knowledge and mindfulness. Because the knowledge in the prior state is capable of decisive judgment, simultaneous mindfulness memorizes it so that mindfulness in the subsequent state remembers it clearly; the prior state is generally given the name 'knowledge', while the subsequent state is generally given the designation 'mindfulness'. The mind that directly realizes the object is called 'knowledge'; that which subsequently remembers without forgetting is called 'mindfulness'.

19.55

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'If so, then the Saḷāyatana-sūtra [...] because there is the latent bias of attachment (rāgānuśaya)': This is the Sarvāstivādin's objection based on scripture. The sūtra states that toward pleasant feeling there is the latent bias of attachment; thus we know it is precisely associated with attachment.

19.56

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'The sūtra merely states there is [...] what contradiction is there?': This is the Sautrāntika's explanation.

19.57

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'At what time does it exist?': This is the Sarvāstivādin's question.

19.58

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'At the time when one is asleep [...] the notion of anusaya is established': This is the Sautrāntika's reply. There are two explanations: first, that it is the time of sleep; second, that the name of the effect is established on the basis of the cause. 'Notion' (saṃjñā) is an alternate designation for a name, meaning that with respect to the entanglement in the present state, the designation anusaya is established.

19.59

On the phrase where the Śāstra says, 'Let us set aside peripheral discussions and treat the main treatise': This introduces the direct explanation of the verses.

19.60

On the phrase where the Śāstra says, 'It is said that attachment is divided into two, namely desire-attachment and existence-attachment (bhava-rāga)': This directly explains the verse.

19.61

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Herein, existence-attachment [...] attachment in the upper two realms': This identifies the intrinsic nature of existence-attachment.

19.62

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'For what reason is this name established only for those?': This is a question. All three realms are termed 'existence' (bhava); why is attachment in the upper two realms alone designated existence-attachment?

19.63

On the phrase where the Śāstra says, 'Because that attachment mostly relies upon [...] the name existence-attachment is established': This is the explanation. Within it are two reasons: first, because it mostly operates inwardly, it is called existence-attachment; second, to refute their idea of liberation, the upper two realms are called 'existence'. This is the first.

19.64

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Furthermore, because there are persons who [...] it is not genuine liberation': This is the second explanation. Previously, because the upper realms objectify internal existence, it is called existence-attachment. Later, in order to halt erroneous graspings, the name existence-attachment is established for the upper two realms.

19.65

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Here, intrinsic identity [...] the name existence-attachment is established': This explains intrinsic identity as being named 'existence'. The meditative attainments (samāpatti) and the physical basis are both intrinsic identity, not external objects. 'Existence' has many varieties, as when one speaks of the three existences, which are the three realms. What is called 'existence' here refers to intrinsic identity. Attachment in the upper two realms mostly relishes intrinsic identity, rather than relishing external objects. Because it is free from sensual attachment (kāmarāga), the name existence-attachment is established only in the upper two.

19.66

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Since existence-attachment is spoken of [...] does not separately show it': This explains why the verse only mentions existence-attachment and does not explain desire-attachment. Since mostly objectifying intrinsic identity is called existence-attachment, one can infer that mostly objectifying external objects is desire-attachment.

19.67

Regarding the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Precisely what was stated above', through the following verse: This is the third part, which, relying on the basic treatise, divides the six into ten. The question asked and the verse reply can be understood from the text.

19.68

From 'The Śāstra says' down to 'five, doubt': Here, views (dṛṣṭi) are divided into five, thus becoming ten. The enumeration of names can be understood.

19.69

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Furthermore, precisely what was stated [...] the rest are equal as explained for desire': From here down is the fourth part, which, relying on the basic treatise, divides the six into ninety-eight. Within the text there are three points: first, opening into ninety-eight; second, clarifying abandonment by patience (kṣānti) and knowledge (jñāna); third, the distinct characteristics of the five views. This is the first. The question asked and the verse reply can be understood from the text.

19.70

From 'The Śāstra says' down to 'become ninety-eight': This is a general explanation of the verse.

19.71

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'That is to say, among the six [...] as has already been analyzed previously': The one view among the six is divided into five views due to differences in cognitive activity, as has already been analyzed previously.

19.72

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Precisely this which has been analyzed [...] the three realms of Form and Formless': This generally explains the categories (nikāya) and realms (dhātu).

19.73

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'First, in the desire realm [...] ten, seven, seven, eight, and four': This concerns the number of afflictions across the five categories in the desire realm. Ten for suffering; seven each for origination and cessation; eight for the path; and four for cultivation, making thirty-six. Hence it is said: 'In order: ten, seven, seven, eight, and four'.

19.74

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Precisely the above five categories [...] thirty-six kinds': This analyzes them with respect to category. 'Category' means dividing each class. The rest of the text can be understood.

19.75

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'The former thirty-two [...] only then are they abandoned': This distinguishes abandonment by seeing (darśana-heya) and abandonment by cultivation (bhāvanā-heya). That which is abandoned as soon as one sees the truths is called abandoned by seeing. Because abandonment by seeing does not depend on cultivation, it is called abandoned by seeing. Because they are abandoned only by repeatedly cultivating the path, they are called abandoned by cultivation. Requiring cultivation before they can be abandoned, they are called abandoned by cultivation.

19.76

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Thus it has already been revealed [...] and abandoned by cultivation': This clarifies the scope and restrictions of the five categories, as can be understood from the text.

19.77

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Herein, by what characteristics [...] is termed abandoned by cultivation': This clarifies the characteristics of the fivefold abandonment for the four afflictions such as attachment. The Nyāyānusāra states: 'The master of the treatise himself poses the question and answer here: "Herein, by what characteristic is it abandoned by seeing suffering, up to by what characteristic is it abandoned by cultivation? If it takes that which is abandoned by seeing this [truth] as its object, it is called abandoned by seeing this; the remainder is called abandoned by cultivation." This is not logical. Why so? Because universal (sarvatraga) anusayas take the five categories as their object; thus an anusaya abandoned by seeing suffering and origination would also have to be commonly abandoned by seeing origination, suffering, and so on. Furthermore, what would one say an anusaya abandoned by seeing cessation and the path is abandoned by, given that it objectifies unabandonable dharmas? Therefore, he did not well establish the characteristics of what is to be abandoned. One should say: if viewing takes suffering as its object, it is called seeing suffering, which is abandoned by the two—the dharma-knowledge patience and category-knowledge patience regarding suffering; spoken of collectively, it is called abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on up to abandoned by seeing the path is also like this. Repeated training is called cultivation; that is, one who has seen the footprints, in order to attain higher meaning, repeatedly trains in the knowledge of suffering and the like—this is called cultivation; that which is eliminated by this path is called abandoned by cultivation. This is termed well establishing the characteristics of what is to be abandoned.' A certain person recorded a defense by a Kośa master saying: 'The master of the Nyāyānusāra misunderstood my text, thinking it meant that solely taking what is abandoned by this truth as an object is called abandoned by seeing this truth, and hence raised objections using objects of other categories and objects of anāsrava dharmas. One should state it thus: if it takes seeing this truth as its object, or if it takes what is abandoned by seeing this truth as its object, it is called abandoned by seeing this truth. Afflictions objectifying other categories and objectifying the anāsrava should be known as being subsumed under taking the seeing of this as an object, because they objectify the truths. When explained in this way, it is not different from our statement.' Now, examining this explanation, it does not yet dismiss the objection. When he explains that 'he misunderstood my text', examining what he understands, the Nyāyānusāra relies on the text, while this explanation adds words; how could adding words be correct and relying on the text be an error? Furthermore, he says: 'Afflictions objectifying other categories and objectifying the anāsrava should be known as being subsumed under taking the seeing of this as an object, because they objectify the truths.' For afflictions that objectify the anāsrava, as well as wrong views, doubt, and ignorance under suffering and origination that objectify their own realm, this may be so, since they directly objectify the truths and are abandoned when this truth is seen. But for afflictions under suffering and origination that objectify other realms, under what are they subsumed? These afflictions do not objectify what is abandoned by seeing this, nor when this truth is seen and abandoned do they see what is objectified by them. If one claims that although they do not see what is objectified by them, they are called abandoned by seeing this because they are abandoned upon seeing this truth, then they should generally be called abandoned by seeing this, since both direct delusion and reflective objectification are suddenly abandoned when this truth is seen. Why add text? Now, examining the Nyāyānusāra's groundless rebuke: what the Kośa clarifies here regarding the characteristics of the fivefold abandonment refers to the characteristics of the fivefold abandonment for desire-realm attachment, anger, pride, and their associated ignorance. For these four defilements, if they are abandoned by the path of cultivation, they generally objectify distinct empirical matters. If they are abandoned by the path of seeing, although with respect to all four truths they arise by reflectively objectifying afflictions, the four abandonments are divided precisely on the basis of what is objectified. Due to this, the treatise says: 'If it takes what is abandoned by seeing this as its object, it is called abandoned by seeing this; the remainder is called abandoned by cultivation.' The master of the Nyāyānusāra misunderstood the Kośa and consequently rebuked it groundlessly. Question: How is it known that attachment, anger, pride, etc. under the truths of suffering and origination only arise by reflective objectification and do not directly objectify the truths? Answer: According to the Vijñānakāya, fascicle 11, which says: 'Is there any mind abandoned by seeing in the form realm that definitely objectifies only veiled-unobscured (nivṛtāvyākṛta) dharmas? Answer: There is. Namely, the mind associated with non-universal anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering and origination bound to the form realm, and anusayas objectifying sāsrava dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path bound to the form realm.' Now, examining the anusayas abandoned by seeing the truths, there should be four propositions: some solely objectify the truths, namely wrong view, doubt, and independent ignorance; some solely reflectively objectify, namely attachment, anger, pride, and their associated ignorance; some combine both kinds, namely clinging to views, clinging to precepts and vows, etc. The fourth proposition can be understood.

19.78

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Thus among the six [...] ninety-eight are spoken of': This concludes the total number, as can be understood from the text. Question: The nine stages and the five categories are each distinct; for what reason are the anusayas established here according to differences in realms, and not according to differences in stages? Answer: Because full understanding (parijñā) and the fruits of asceticism (śrāmaṇyaphala) are established through detachment from realms. That is, establishing these two is due to the abandonment of anusayas. This abandonment of anusayas concerns realms, not stages, and so anusayas are not established according to stages. Another explanation: although the stages within a single realm are distinct, the nature of anusayas in the same realm is somewhat similar; therefore they are divided according to realm and not stated according to stage. In the upper realms there is no anger, as has already been explained previously.

19.79

On the passage where the Śāstra says, 'Among these analyzed [...] because they are eliminated by knowledge': This clarifies that the ninety-eight are abandoned by seeing and by cultivation.

19.80

On the verse stating, "As previously stated," the following single stanza is the second [section], explaining that what is abandoned through receptivity (kṣānti) is both determinate and indeterminate, whereas what is abandoned through knowledge (jñāna) is exclusively determinate and differs [accordingly]. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 51, states: "'Preliminary' (pūrvāṅga) has three meanings: first, unique; second, definitive; third, initial. As for 'unique preliminary': if afflictions pertain to the three realms and are abandoned exclusively through seeing, there are two propositions: in the single stage of neither-conceptualization-nor-non-conceptualization, they are abandoned exclusively through seeing and abandoned exclusively by noble persons (ārya); in the lower eight stages, they pertain to both types of persons—abandonment by noble persons is exclusively abandonment through seeing, while abandonment by ordinary persons (pṛthagjana) is exclusively abandonment through cultivation. Here, taking abandonment through seeing in the stage of neither-conceptualization-nor-non-conceptualization as the preliminary (since the path of seeing is unique, it is answered first). As for 'definitive preliminary': if afflictions are bound exclusively to the desire realm and pertain to all five categories, taking their cultivation as the preliminary has two propositions: either abandoned through cultivation, or abandoned through seeing and cultivation. That which is abandoned through cultivation is determinate, because whether by noble ones or ordinary ones, it is always abandoned through cultivation. What is abandoned through seeing is indeterminate: abandonment by noble ones is abandonment through seeing, while abandonment by ordinary ones is abandonment through cultivation. Because abandonment through cultivation is determinate, it is answered first; since among the five categories it is the last, it is called 'definitive preliminary'. As for 'initial preliminary': if afflictions pertain to the three realms and to all five categories, taking their seeing as preliminary has three propositions: what is abandoned through seeing in neither-conceptualization is abandoned exclusively by noble persons, abandoned exclusively by an untainted path, and abandoned exclusively through seeing—this is the first proposition. The lower eight stages are not abandoned exclusively through seeing, and hence are not combined [with it] in establishing it. This is not analogous to the path of cultivation, because the lower stages of the path of cultivation are abandoned exclusively through cultivation; therefore they are combined in establishing 'abandoned through cultivation'. Throughout the lower eight stages all are abandoned through cultivation, pertaining to abandonment by both ordinary and noble persons; whereas the single stage of neither-conceptualization is abandoned exclusively by noble persons and exclusively by an untainted path. Because they are alike in being abandoned exclusively through cultivation, they are combined as one, forming the second proposition. It is not analogous to the path of seeing, because possessing a determinate [nature], it is not the third proposition; and because, being combined with the lower, it is established as indeterminate with respect to ordinary/noble and tainted/untainted, it is not the first proposition. What is abandoned through seeing in the lower eight stages is solely indeterminate, and therefore forms the third proposition." Question: What does "preliminary" mean? Answer: The meaning of establishing first and answering first is the meaning of "preliminary". As with the initial preliminary, it first establishes what is abandoned through seeing, next establishes what is abandoned through cultivation, and afterwards establishes the indeterminate. This follows the order established by the *Vibhāṣā*.

19.81

On the passage from "The commentary states: ..." to "... only then is one able to abandon them": this explains the upper two lines [of the stanza]. That which is abandoned through receptivity is what is abandoned through seeing. In the stage of the pinnacle of existence (bhavāgra), it is exclusively through seeing and not cultivation, because conventional knowledge cannot abandon it.

19.82

On the text stating, "Those subsumed within the remaining eight stages... because they are abandoned through knowledge": this explains the third line. The lower eight stages admit of both types of abandonment: noble persons, as soon as they see the principle of the truths, abandon them immediately and therefore do not allow them to extend into cultivation; ordinary persons do not see the principle of the truths and must depend on repeated cultivation before they are able to abandon them.

19.83

On the text stating, "Destroyed by knowledge... because they are abandoned through knowledge": this explains the fourth line. It clarifies that what is destroyed by knowledge is precisely what is abandoned through cultivation; this is abandoned exclusively through cultivation and does not extend to abandonment through seeing.

19.84

On the text stating, "Other masters say... defilements abandoned through seeing": below is an account of the tenets of different masters. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 90, states: "Furthermore, some hold: ordinary persons cannot abandon anusayas that are abandoned through seeing. Still others hold: ordinary persons cannot abandon anusayas at all; they can only suppress them." The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 51, states: "Namely, the Dārṣṭāntikas say this: ordinary persons cannot abandon defilements."

19.85

On the text stating, "As in the *Mahāvibhāṅga*... active manifestation of views": it cites two sūtras as proof, which is self-evident.

19.86

Regarding the text stating, "Namely, with respect to the prior extreme... views have not been abandoned": this cites the sixty-two views from the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, such as complete eternalism and partial eternalism, to prove the reason why ordinary persons do not abandon the defilements of view. To serve as proof: among the sixty-two views, there are eighteen discriminations concerning the prior extreme (pūrvānta), namely: four doctrines of complete eternalism, four doctrines of partial eternalism, two doctrines of arising without a cause, four doctrines of finitude and infinitude, and four doctrines of evasive equivocations (amarāvikkhepa). There are forty-four views of discrimination concerning the posterior extreme (aparānta), namely: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilationism, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Discriminative views arising based on the past are called the prior extreme; discriminative views arising based on the future are called the posterior extreme; those based on the present are indeterminate, or they are called posterior because they are after the past, and called prior because they are before the future. As for the four doctrines of complete eternalism: first, by recollecting aeons (kalpa)—namely, through being able to recollect one aeon of destruction and formation, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; second, by recollecting lives—namely, through being able to recollect the events of one life, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand lives, one then clings that both the self and the world are eternal; third, by seeing death and rebirth—namely, through seeing with the divine eye the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and rebirth, one thereby clings that both the self and the world are eternal; fourth, by reasoning and investigating (vitarka-vicāra)—namely, through such false reasoning and investigation, one clings that both the self and the world are permanent and eternal. These four complete eternalisms take the view of permanence as their nature. As for the four partial eternalisms: first, through Great Brahmā—namely, having passed away from the Brahmā world and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of recollection of past dwellings, one holds such a clinging: 'We were all created through transformation by the Great Brahmā King; Brahmā the King, being able to create, abides there eternally, while we, being what was created, are therefore impermanent'; second, through the great elements or the mind—namely, hearing the Great Brahmā say that either the great elements or the mind is eternal, one then holds this clinging: 'Taking the Great Brahmā King as the measure, one part of the world is permanent and eternal, and one part is impermanent'; third, the gods corrupted by play (krīḍāpradūṣika)—namely, having previously died from the gods corrupted by play and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one then holds this clinging: 'Those who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness abide there eternally; we, through excessive play and loss of mindfulness, died from that place and are therefore impermanent'; fourth, through the gods corrupted by mind (manaḥpradūṣika), which is also the same as above (these four partial eternalisms likewise take the view of permanence as their essence). As for the two doctrines of causelessness (ahetuvāda): first, having died from the non-conceptual [realm] and been reborn here, through obtaining the supernormal knowledge of past dwellings, one can recollect the state of mind emerging from non-conceptualization and the subsequent states, but cannot recollect the states prior to emerging from that mind, and thus says: 'I arose originally from nonexistence'; second, false reasoning and investigating—namely, investigating that since one can recollect all the experiences undergone in prior states within this very life, if there were things experienced in a prior life, one should also be able to recollect them within this very life; since one cannot recollect them, one therefore knows they do not exist. These are subsumed under wrong view. 'Et cetera' includes the four doctrines of finitude and the four doctrines of evasive equivocations. If those who have already departed from desire for lust raise these above views with regard to desire-realm phenomena, it is not that form-realm defilements arise with the desire realm as their object, because they have already departed from greed regarding the desire-realm sphere. 'It is certain that the views of the desire realm have not been abandoned' is the concluding proof.

19.87

On the text stating, "The Vaibhāṣikas... Devadatta": this presents the Sarvāstivādin explanation. The Sarvāstivādins hold that one separates from greed of desire and also abandons the defilements of views; when one generates these views, one temporarily regresses from the defilement of desire, just as Devadatta obtained the fundamental absorption and was therefore able to perform transformations, but regressed from the form-realm absorption and therefore ate King Ajātaśatru's spittle, and so forth.

19.88

On the text stating, "Because their aspects differ": the following single stanza is the third [section], explaining the distinctions among the five views.

19.89

The commentary states: "Clinging to the self and to what belongs to the self is satkāyadṛṣṭi." This is a synonym.

19.90

On the text stating, "Because it is perishable (sat)... only then does one cling to a self": the author of the treatise cites the Sautrāntika explanation, which is clear from the text. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "If so, what is the use of prefixing the sound *sat*? The word *kāya* alone would suffice to exclude permanence, and one should therefore only establish the name *kāyadṛṣṭi*. No non-existent phenomenon is eternal yet capable of aggregation; what is the use of marking the body with the sound of 'perishing'?"

19.91

On the text stating, "The Vaibhāṣikas... it is called satkāya": the author of the treatise cites the Sarvāstivādin explanation. The Sarvāstivādins do not accept that thought arises with non-existence as its object, because mind and mental factors must depend on an existent phenomenon as their cognitive object. The Sautrāntika school says that it is accepted that mind can also arise with non-existent phenomena as its object.

19.92

On the text stating, "All views arise... based only on the five grasping skandhas (upādānaskandha)": this explains the reason why only the view of self is called 'having a body' (satkāyadṛṣṭi). It first explains the reason and afterwards cites scriptural proof, which is clear from the text. However, regarding this view of self, the *Vibhāṣā* explains that in terms of the skandhas, there are either twenty or sixty-five; in terms of the dhātus and āyatanas, there are multiple kinds. Regarding the twenty in terms of the skandhas: differentiating the cognitive aspects taking the skandhas as objects without differentiating the places from which they arise yields twenty. 'Differentiating the cognitive aspects taking the skandhas as objects' means: 'aspect' refers to the cognitive comprehension (ākāra), and 'object' refers to the cognitive referent (ālambana); taking the five skandhas as the object, one divides their cognitive aspects. Each skandha has four: one is the view of self, and three are the views of what belongs to the self. The first is that form serves as a servant to the self, being subordinated to the self; the second is that form serves as a necklace for the self, adorning the self; the third is that form serves as a vessel for the self, because the self is within the vessel. Each skandha has four cognitive aspects, totalling twenty. Although there are three kinds of cognitive aspects, it does not state the places from which they arise; this is called differentiating the cognitive aspects taking the skandhas as objects without differentiating the places from which they arise. If one differentiates the places from which they arise, it becomes sixty-five: namely, the three kinds of belongings of form serve as servant, necklace, and vessel to feeling-as-self, up to consciousness there are also three kinds; three times four is twelve, and together with clinging to [that skandha itself as] the self, there are altogether thirteen. Each of the five skandhas has thirteen, making sixty-five. The application regarding the āyatanas and dhātus should be considered in the same way.

19.93

On the text stating, "Precisely regarding that which is clung to... because they are extremes of annihilation and permanence": clinging to the view of extremes (antagrāhadṛṣṭi). Clinging that arises taking extremes as its object is called grasping at extremes; this grasping at extremes is itself a view, and is called the view of grasping at extremes.

19.94

On the text stating, "Regarding real existents... it is called wrong view": this explains wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

19.95

On the text stating, "All false views... because the others are superimpositions": this explains the reason why this view alone is called 'wrong'. It is like caṇḍālas, who are all called practitioners of evil, among whom the worst are called the evil practitioners of evil. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 9, states: "Question: Why does wrong view not take space and non-analytical cessation as its cognitive objects? Answer: If a phenomenon is a skandha, the cause of a skandha, the cessation of a skandha, or the antidote to a skandha, wrong view takes it as an object. Space and non-analytical cessation are not skandhas, etc., and therefore it does not take them as objects." It also states: "Question: Those who repudiate space and non-analytical cessation—what phenomenon do they take as their object? Answer: They precisely take the names of space and non-analytical cessation as their object. Why is this? Repudiating them is not done with a deep and grave mind, unlike denigrating defiled and purified matters. Question: What kind of knowledge is this? Answer: This is knowledge with an erroneous cognitive aspect that is non-obscuring and indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta) among what is abandoned through cultivation in the desire realm." Following this, non-defiled ignorance is neither defiled nor wholesome.

19.96

On the text stating, "Regarding the inferior, saying it is supreme... are collectively called the grasping of views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa)": this explains the grasping of views. The tainted is called inferior, and the untainted is called supreme; regarding that which is tainted as being identical to the untainted is called the grasping of views.

19.97

On the text stating, "In reality one should establish... it is only named the grasping of views": one explanation in the *Nyāyānusāra* agrees with this treatise, and it also states: "Or, because views are prominent, it merely mentions the name 'view'; taking view as the foremost, it grasps other phenomena." This means that taking views as that which is grasped is called the grasping of views, which is precisely the meaning of the grasping of views.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese